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ISLAMIC AFFAIRS

ICO OFFICIAL DISCUSSES ESTABLISHING BANK FOR MAURITANIA

Nouakchott CHaab in French 11, 12 Apr 85 pp 3, 7

[Interview with Dr Ahmed Mohamed Abdel Aziz Ennejjar, secretary general of the International Union of Islamic Banks; date and place not given]

[Text] Drawing attention to the need to set up Islamic banks in accordance with the recommendations of the Islamic Conference Organization at the meeting of foreign affairs ministers of that organization, on the one hand, and the results of contacts he has initiated with various officials from our country aimed at determining the conditions for the imminent establishment of an Islamic bank in our country: These are the two main issues of the interview granted to our reporter by Dr Ahmed Mohamed Abdel Aziz Ennejjar, published here in its entirety.

[Question] Dr Ennejjar, can you tell us the purpose of your visit to Nouakchott?

[Answer] This is not the first visit I have made to this dear Islamic country! I have previously come to Mauritania twice, the first time as the emissary of the Permanent Secretariat of the Islamic Conference and the second as a representative of the Islamic Bank.

As for my current visit, it responds to a double purpose: First of all, it fits into the framework of recommendations formulated by the interministerial conference of Islamic countries for the past 9 years and relating to the establishment of Islamic banks by member countries and the granting of aid to those wishing to set up such banks. This is a task belonging to us at the level of the International Union of Islamic Banks.

In addition, Mauritania's national leadership has more than once expressed its will to apply the Islamic Sharia [code] and we believe that these efforts are blessed steps taken by Mauritania, which is a model for countries in the region and which deserves the aid and support of Muslims all over the world.

Furthermore, certain banks affiliated with the International Union of Islamic Banks have expressed their willingness to make their contribution to the effort made locally for the establishment of an Islamic bank in Mauritania. This bank will benefit from the experience accumulated thus far in this field.

[Question] Have your talks with officials led to results?

[Answer] Yes. Upon our arrival here, Mohamed Samir Ibrahim and myself were received by the chief of state, Col Maaouiyr Ould Sid Ahmed Taya. We have also had talks with several other officials, particularly the permanent secretary of the CMSN [Military Committee for National Salvation], the minister of justice, the minister of finance and the minister of planning. I can say without exaggeration that we were greatly impressed by the enthusiasm, dedication and sincere concern we saw on their part.

This augurs well for the dawning of a radiant future for Mauritania, in the shadow of the sublime Islamic Sharia.

[Question] Do you believe that the conditions exist for the establishment of an Islamic bank in our country?

[Answer] The enthusiasm of the Mauritanian people, the faith of its businessmen and the support of the chief of state and other officials are all decisive assets for the success of the project.

[Question] What is the benefit of such a bank for Mauritania?

[Answer] We are certain that the establishment and operation of an Islamic bank in Mauritania will not only have beneficial consequences for this country, but will also create a center of economic influence and development for neighboring countries and for the Islamic world as a whole.

[Question] What phases have already been completed on the way toward the establishment of an Islamic bank in Mauritania?

[Answer] During our visit, we have had contacts with ministers and businessmen and we have already drafted regulations and a fundamental charter that we hope will be adopted in the days ahead.

In the meantime, we are working on drafting the agreement based on which the founding parties will institute the Islamic bank for Mauritania and we are completing preparatory measures in order to enable banks desiring to participate to make their contribution as soon as the texts are put into effect.

In order to do so, we have defined a plan of action, but it will not be operational as long as the legal provisions are not ready. This plan first of all provides for the selection of personnel (executives and officials, employees), not on the basis of criteria of specialization, but criteria of aptitude and the ability to bear this great responsibility.

The plan then provides for the training of such personnel, both theoretical and practical, and introduction to previous experience of the Islamic bank.

[Question] How long will all this take?

[Answer] I believe that within 6 months, the Islamic bank will be able to operate effectively. Thorough studies are being made of short-, medium- and

long-range projects because funds already available must not be blocked throughout the period, but rather, invested in Mauritania.

[Question] Can you tell us about the experience of the Islamic banks?

[Answer] It is a relatively long experience, going back to the creation of the first Islamic bank in Egypt in 1962. It is therefore not merely recent, going back a quarter of a century. However, no Islamic bank has yet been totally completed. Several experiments have taken place but have stopped.

Such experiments have been the subject of a large number of studies and much research, including some 60 European, American and Islamic doctoral theses.

The system of the Islamic banks has also been the subject of debates and discussions by all international forums and is flawless.

One must not imagine that the Islamic bank is an ordinary bank that operates without interests.

Regarding its methods, the philosophy on which it is based and the mechanisms governing it are totally different from those of regular banks and are even totally opposite. Banks which practice usury follow a philosophy and a money policy that cannot be compared with a philosophy and an approach based on faith.

The "religious nature" of this system does not imply that it is unadapted to the requirements of our time. On the contrary, this system is in accordance with divine law and it is at the same time adapted to the spirit of the times.

In other words, the Islamic bank means a development strategy that takes the aspirations of the masses and their religious convictions into account.

It considers the latest developments of modern science, without thereby being incompatible with the people's religion.

That is why it can guarantee the participation of the masses in the development effort and their contribution, along with the state, to the achievement of social progress.

The experience of this bank, made up of several phases, cannot be judged definitively until all the phases of the process have ended. There are countries that have finished but one phase, others that have completed two, but we hope that the Islamic bank in Mauritania will have a more rapid development than previous experiments on which it is based.

The success of this bank is much more guaranteed because in certain countries, they plunged in before the conceptual planning was sufficiently clear. Such experiments have included successes, but also errors that we shall avoid in founding the Islamic bank in Mauritania.

In short, the experience of the Islamic bank is not an abstract, theoretical experience. It has become a reality, a concrete fact established on scientific bases.

The great challenge resides in the consistent application of principles and in persistent action until the system has been erected on a sound basis.

[Question] You mentioned in one of your previous statements that Mauritania will not be able to solve the problems facing it without adopting the system of Islamic banks. Can you be more precise?

[Answer] I believe that the Islamic countries as a whole, including Mauritania, will be able to find solutions to their economic and social problems only through this type of institution. These problems cannot be solved by imitating the institutions and methods of the West. This is especially manifest in the fact that in Western countries, 95 percent of the people deal with the banks, while that percentage varies in Islamic countries between 1 and 5.

It is therefore clear that we need institutions able to deal with all the citizens and not only an extremely small portion of the population.

[Question] Is the Islamic bank incompatible with the traditional banking system?

[Answer] As I told you, the Islamic bank summarizes a strategy of accelerated development. It is not incompatible with the existing system. Quite simply, it will do its work as any other bank does.

However, the two systems are different in terms of their goals and the orientations adopted.

[Question] Do you foresee a rush on the bank?

[Answer] When one realizes that only 5 percent of the population deals with existing banks, one can easily deduce that the remaining 95 percent are potential customers of the Islamic bank, whose orientations are in keeping with the aspirations and convictions of the overwhelming majority of the citizens.

Once the bank is set up, the people will have but to choose the institution guaranteeing them the most interest. I am certain that the Islamic bank will receive the lion's share.

[Question] Does the Islamic bank deal with traditional banks?

[Answer] One must distinguish between two methods of operation: with usury and without usury. There are mutual transactions and services that do not involve usury and we know that the ban only concerns the practice of usury regarding both the debtor and the creditor. If an Islamic bank needs outside funds, it will only be able to go to another Islamic bank.

If the Islamic bank in Mauritania needs funds to buy European goods, the Islamic Bank of Kuwait will cover those expenses and thus spare it the need to seek European loans.

[Question] Do you have a statement to make or something else to say on this occasion?

[Answer] I hope that Mauritania will be a model for the Islamic countries in their victorious march down the authentic Islamic path.

I also hope that the national leadership will continue to support the Islamic bank in its first steps until the achievement of its purpose, which without a doubt is in the interest of everyone.

Biographical Background

Dr Ahmed Mohamed Abdel Aziz Ennejjar is one of the most important Islamic personalities in the field of economics, in which he engages in tireless activity with both enthusiasm and devotion.

The founder, in 1962, of the first Islamic bank in Egypt, whose experience has subsequently served as a precious technical basis for the development of Islamic banks in the world, the holder of diplomas from universities in Cairo, Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany, Dr Ennejjar has occupied numerous high posts, including that of chairman of the Economic Commission of the General Secretariat of the Islamic Conference in Djeddah, where he sponsored the accord for the establishment of the Islamic Bank for Development.

Dean of the World Institute of Islamic Banks and Economy, Dr Ennejjar is now secretary general of the International Union of Islamic Banks and president of the board of directors of the Cypriot Islamic Bank.

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ALGERIA

PROGRESS OF POLITICAL POLICY REVIEWED

London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL in English 24 Apr 85 pp 5, 6

[Text]

President **Chadli Benjedid**'s state visit last week to the United States was a personal success. He is now well-established in world diplomacy and as an Arab-African intermediary; and Algeria is regarded, even by American conservatives, as a respectable third world partner. It is the most economically and politically stable country in the entire continent. So long as Chadli remains in power - he is not under pressure to relinquish it - Algeria is set to develop through a gradual process of reform and liberation.

Since the start in 1983 of his second term of office, Chadli has consolidated his power in the ruling *Front de Libération National* (FLN) and the army. He has put in motion a pragmatic policy designed to give political, economic and cultural life greater flexibility. The tenets of the policy are:-

- Reform the basic workings of government and administration to make them more efficient.
- Liberalise the economy by providing the private sector with more opportunity.
- Decentralise the inefficient parastatal decision-making process.
- Allow more cultural freedom to the Berber minority and intellectuals.
- Provide consumers with more manufactured goods and services.
- Revitalise the devastated rural economy.
- Modernise the armed forces.
- Diversify foreign relations.
- Find a compromise solution to the Western Sahara war while maintaining support for Polisario (AC Vol 26 No 8).

Chadli has a dual political base: those from his own Annaba region, in north-eastern Algeria (the late President **Houari Boumedienne** leaned on the so-called Oudja group, from the north-west), and young technocrats of the post-independence generation whose careers depend largely on Chadli. Thus of the 44 ministers and vice ministers in the last government, named in January 1984, only six were in office when Boumedienne died. And of the 92 FLN central committee members elected at the fifth

congress in December 1983, almost half are from Chadli's pool of upwardly-mobile young technocrats.

The main change in the post-congress cabinet was the replacement of prime minister **Mohamed Benahmed Abdelghani**, a Boumedienne faithful, by a Chadli protégé, **Abdelhamid Brahimi**. Abdelgahni was sidelined to the symbolic post of state minister at the president's office. Brahimi, who was previously minister of planning, personifies the new spirit in Algiers. An intellectual and a hero of the independence war, Brahimi is an economist whose motto is efficiency. Having served as US representative for the state hydrocarbon firm, SONATRACH, he is not without international exposure. He was also made a candidate member to the FLN politbureau. His job now is to coordinate economic policy and make sure that bureaucratic bottlenecks are speedily overcome. The government's mild overture to the local private sector and to foreign investors in sectors like oil and gas has been much helped by Brahimi's appointment.

Other key government officials include:

- Foreign minister **Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi**. Representing the reformist Islamic current, he provides excellent contacts with Arab and Islamic regimes. Intellectually sophisticated, he has good relations with western diplomats.
- Interior minister **Mohammed Hadj-Yala**. One of Chadli's top stalwarts, he was considered for the premiership. Coming from the Kabylia regime, he maintains a dialogue with Berber nationalists. He is regarded as a progressive in Algerian politics, and is responsible for controlling the activities of Muslim fundamentalists. He has excellent contacts in France. In the early 1980s, when he was minister of finance, he negotiated several financial packages with Paris.
- Minister of finance **Boualem Ben Hammouda**. Associated with the moderate Islamic reformist current, his star has faded recently. His move from the interior ministry to finance was a distinct demotion. The finance ministry, which has been reorganised, now merely does what the FLN politburo says.
- Minister of justice **Boualem Baki**. A moderate, he retained his post partly because of his close ties with Chadli. He keeps in touch with Islamic traditionalists.
- Maj-Gen. **Abdallah Belhoucet**, deputy minister of defence. He retained his post. Discreet and politically unambitious, his main role is to preserve the basic values of the revolution - nationalism and pragmatic socialism. He is the only senior military officer in the government.
- Minister of energy and chemical industries **Belkacem Nabi**, who also retained his post. A technocrat, respected internationally in oil circles, and firmly backed by Chadli, his main task is to decentralise SONATRACH, which under Boumedienne was a state within a state.
- Minister of heavy industry **Salim Saadi**, who previously held the agriculture portfolio. He is usually considered to be an Islamic progressive. His job now is to rationalise unproductive industry and cut out the bureaucracy which for long has stifled development. Much of the industrial infrastructure built by Boumedienne's powerful minister of industry, **Belaid Abdessellem**, works at 25% of installed capacity.
- Minister of agriculture Col. **Kasdi Merbah**, whose real name is **Abdallah Khalef**. Under Boumedienne he headed military security. He has a tough reputation. After being removed from the politburo in 1980, he appears to be on the way up again.

Chadli rules by consensus more than by forcefully imposing his own authority. He carefully balanced the post-congress politburo, reducing it from nine to eight titular members. The only casualty was **Mohammed Said Mazouzi**, who represented the Kabylia region and was not able to contain discontent there. The politburo is a faithful reflection of the Chadli system. **Rabah Bitat**, president of the national assembly and doyen of Algerian politics, is the only active historical leader of the FLN. His sense of political pragmatism, symbolises the perennity of the revolution. His influence is discreet. He tends to avoid taking initiatives.

Mohammed Chérif Messadja, head of the politburo's permanent secretariat, incarnates the FLN's role in national life. Ex-premier **Abdelghani** represents "continuity" between the Chadli and Boumedienne presidencies. Major-General **Belhoucet** is the armed forces "eyes and ears". The four remaining members - **Ibrahim**, **Hammouda**, **Baki** and **Hadj-Yala** - represent key sectors of the government, thereby dove-tailing the institutional aspects of the political system.

One of Chadli's initiatives after the last congress was the appointment of five candidate members to the politburo: **Kasdi Merbah**, **Brahimi**, Commander **Bachir Rouis**, minister of information; Maj-Gen. **Mostefa Beloucif** and Gen. **Rachid Benyelles**, secretary-general of the ministry of defence.

Chadli has paid special attention to remolding the chain of command in the army, placing faithfulness in important posts and retiring the remainder of Boumedienne's acolytes. A notable innovation at the end of last year was the promotion of several senior officers to the grade of general, with Major-Generals **Belhoucet** and **Benioucif** at the top of the hierarchy. Six other generals were appointed, including Benyelles, **Kamel Abdeirahim** and **Khaled Nezzar**, the latter two both being deputy commanders-in-chief of the army. Chadli himself remains a Colonel.

Algeria is in the midst of an ambitious multi-billion dollar military modernisation programme, and is shopping in the West to replace much of its outdated Soviet hardware. Military delegations from the US, France, Britain, Brazil, West Germany and Italy have been extremely active in Algiers over the past year. American Gen. **James Burns**, under-secretary of defence, at the end of last year considered a long list of Algerian requirements. In 1983 Algeria bought 20 *Hercules* C-130 aircraft from the US, despite lobbying in Washington against the deal by pro-Moroccan groups. Britain supplied the Algerian navy with six rapid patrol boats and two landing vessels worth an estimated £300m. France has sold a radar system and light arms. Now London

and Paris are jostling for a first contract to replace Algeria's obsolete Mig-15s. Britain has proposed the *Hawk* trainer and ground attack aircraft, while the French have countered with the *Alpha Jet*, co-produced with West Germany. France, determined to get the contract, is also offering helicopters and missile-equipped patrol boats.

After some nasty incidents in 1982 and 1983, provoked by the Muslim Brotherhood, the religious front has been relatively quiet. While wooing moderate and progressive Muslims, the government has cracked down hard on the Brotherhood and fundamentalists. The authorities still suspect former president **Ahmed Ben Bella**, a born-again Muslim, of being behind some of the trouble.

Religious institutions like the *Haut Conseil Islamique* are now strictly controlled by the government. All Imams are paid by the ministry of religious affairs; the government goes out of its way not to offend Muslims by restricting, for example, the family code - which extends the rights of women; and public life as a whole has been arabised.

The limited amnesty offered last year to exiled dissidents was designed to reduce further the opposition's declining influence. Though the pro-Soviet *Parti de l'Avant-Garde Socialiste* (PAGS) has not broken with the regime, many PAGS members have been pushed out of the trade union and youth movements, the media and the administration. And of course Mohammed Said Mazouzi, the politician most closely associated with PAGS, was taken out of the politburo last year. PAGS leaders have always threatened to go into active opposition. But they have never done so. As a result, the party's credibility, especially among students, is low.

There are six opposition movements abroad to consider:-

- Ben Bella's *Mouvement pour la Démocratie en Algérie*. From its base in France it proposes a radical Islamic government. The party's influence is strong among the 1m Algerian migrant community in France and Belgium. Its newspaper, *El Baadil*, is published monthly in Paris.
- *Le Front des Forces Socialistes*, led from Morocco by the former FLN leader Ait Ahmed. His backing from King Hassan has lost the party all credibility in Algeria.
- *Le Parti de la Révolution Socialiste*, led from Paris by former FLN potentate Mohammed Boudiaf. The government would like to negotiate his return to Algeria - an unlikely prospect. The party publishes its left-wing *El Jarida* in Paris.
- *L'Union Communiste-Leniniste d'Algérie*, a dogmatic, hard-line Marxist group which has switched its allegiance from China to Albania. It publishes *Que Faire*, which sticks rigidly to the party's dogmatic line. Algerian students in France provide the party with a small following.
- *L'Organisation Socialiste des Travailleurs d'Algérie*, a Trotskyist group active largely among migrant workers in France. It publishes *Tribune Ouvrière*.
- *L'Union des Travailleurs Arabes*, a strange concoction of Maoists, Trotskyists and pan-Arab Baathists. It has a small, eccentric following among Algerians in France.

ALGERIA

NEW GENERAL LABOR STATUTE DISCUSSED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 2 Apr 85 p II

[Interview with Amar Azouz, deputy minister of labor; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] The critical wage provisions of the General Labor Statute [SGT] went into force on 1 January 1985.

Can you, Mr Minister, describe for us the broad lines and the primary objectives of the new wage schedule?

[Answer] In a general sense what we are trying to do is as follows: first of all to establish fair principles of remuneration responding both to the concern for social justice and the need for economic efficiency, which according to the National Charter is something that should characterize all of our options and all of our actions.

Let me cite a few of the most basic of these principles:

- to remunerate each worker according to the quantity and quality of his work;
- to provide equal pay for equal work;
- to protect purchasing power, particularly among those at the bottom of the wage scale;
- to contribute to the expansion of production and a constant increase in productivity, by mobilizing wealth for productive purposes, by setting and enforcing work standards, by continuous advances in know-how, and by the introduction of individual and collective incentives, as well as giving the worker a stake in the success of the enterprise.

Finally, in addition to the improvements in wages themselves, the new schedule has been designed so as to have a beneficial effect on the general functioning of the economy, notably by rationalizing the management of human resources, where possible.

In fact, this kind of system should:

- give industries and the national economy management and guidance tools that are much better adapted to the requirements of modern, planned development management;

--promote social justice by extending broader protection and distributing income in a way that is more in keeping with the option our country has chosen.

[Question] Before coming to the critical phase of implementation of the new wage policy, preparatory measures were carried out. Could you briefly describe the main ones and their objectives?

[Answer] In effect, the government decided on a series of what have been called transitional measures, to be carried out simultaneously with the work of preparing the new wage schedule. These steps were necessary because of:

- the time needed to prepare it (national classification system for jobs, reference schedule of position types, etc.);
- the magnitude of the disparities in this domain;
- the need to get control over changes in the fundamental economic parameters through centralized coordination and monitoring.

The objectives of the transitional measures were:

- to create the conditions for implementation of the SGT by beginning to harmonize wage-scales for identical socio-professional categories between the various sectors of activity;
- to compensate for the declining purchasing power of the workers by efforts to upgrade the rating and complexity of jobs, where these had been harshly eroded by downgrading and the absence of standard regulations and wage targets, particularly for those workers exercising supervisory functions;
- to link wages more effectively to production by the implementation of incentives (personal and collective profit) and the revision of regulations governing the participation of workers in the profits of enterprises.

Realization of these objectives, given the current disparities and the resources available, led to the introduction of several adjustments affecting base salaries, bonuses and benefits, but initiated in a gradual, selective and differentiated way:

- gradual: phased in over time, and going from the lowest to the highest categories;
- selective: affecting the most disadvantaged workers; and
- differentiated: by sector (civil service, agriculture, economic sector).

The establishment of minimum wages--13 of them in all, in the various sectors of activity--has defined a basic minimum salary exclusive of the bonuses and benefits designated by the SGT.

The regulations on special benefits (hardship benefits, relocation, permanent service...) have helped reduce the present anarchy in that field, while improving the lot of workers in poor and difficult work conditions by establishing standardized procedures for defining such conditions and providing compensation for them.

There has been gradual implementation of the individual and group bonuses to reward good work in the various sectors of activity, in accordance with their differing levels of organization and management.

These steps have made it possible to establish closer connections between the wages paid out and the objectives of production, significantly reduce absenteeism, to stimulate consideration of new ways of organizing work and to involve work forces in the elaboration of plans.

[Question] The preparatory work was intense and complex. What methods were used, and what were the various stages in the development of the mechanisms needed for the new wage schedule?

[Answer] Given the scope and complexity of the task, the procedure established was to encourage the widest possible participation of the partners directly concerned, i.e. the managers and the representatives of the workers.

This concept led, in 1980, to the establishment and launching of various appropriate organs throughout all the sectors of activity and at every level:

- enterprise and unit committees;
- SGT cells within the ministerial departments;
- branch committees broken down by activity;
- harmonization committees at the national level.

All of these organs, most of which have worker participation, have been designed to insure that the enterprise acts with optimal objectivity and in accordance with the principle of intra- and inter-sectoral harmonization.

If one takes the example of the process of classifying job positions, the cornerstone of the new wage schedule, one can say that it has been thanks to consultation among the above-mentioned organs that we have been able to analyze 13,000 job positions in what might be called record time and with minimal expense, compared to a number of so-called advanced countries and even to national enterprises which in the past have carried out a similar undertaking.

Finally, it should be noted that before adopting the provisions of the new system, there was a thorough testing of their applicability. In fact, tests were carried out to assess their consistency and measure their impact. They were not ratified until it was certain their impact would be beneficial, after review by the ministerial committee for implementation of the SGT.

[Question] The implementation of the most recent regulations establishing the new wage system requires that certain conditions be met. What obstacles must be removed before implementation can be carried out to the fullest degree in a beneficial manner?

[Answer] In reality, the most recent regulations to which you allude, and primarily the scale of indexation and the national wage table derived from it, can only be implemented after the employer organizations establish their schedules of job positions.

Strict deadlines have been decreed for the elaboration of those schedules.

In order to produce them, the employer organizations will refer to the branch catalogues already ratified, which contain close to 80 percent of the job positions existing at the national level. As to those job positions which do not figure in those catalogues, the employer organizations are required to

describe, evaluate and classify them in accordance with the criteria spelled out in the standard classification procedures. This operation is being carried out in an expeditious manner currently by all sectors, which gives us reason to hope results will be satisfactory. Moreover, classification schedules are arriving daily, and a technical harmonization committee within our ministry is working rapidly to facilitate final approvals, making sure that the proposed schedules are consistent intra- and inter-sectorally.

Considering the technical complexity of this task and the amount of work it entails, and the imperative of translating into reality our concern to enlist the participation of all partners, we deemed it useful to broaden the committee by bringing in the mass sectors and organizations, primarily the UGTA [General Union of Algerian Workers] and the UNPA [National Union of Algerian Peasants], which have seconded to the labor administration several technical classification experts selected for their commitment, competence and objectivity.

In response to the second part of your question, I would say actually that some obstacles have been encountered by the committee that has been set up. These obstacles have dealt primarily with:

- the failure of the sectors to respect the job classifications set out in the branch catalogues;
- a tendency in some sectors to inflate the specifications for the positions not found in the branch catalogues;
- the sometimes excessive creation of several degrees or levels of job positions which appear to be of identical complexity;
- failure to conform with the format requirements, which delays the work of analysis and comparison.

Nevertheless, continuous consultations with the sectors and the organizations is serving to remove most of these obstacles. With more rigor and concerted respect for the regulations decreed, the task of managing this effort could be greatly facilitated. This is what we are asking of all participants in the process.

[Question] The new wage schedule will not be implemented in isolation, since the new ITS [expansion unknown] and national health systems will also go into effect simultaneously. Have steps been taken to make sure no one's current wages are lowered by this change?

[Answer] Actually, the government did decide to implement all three--the wage schedule, the national health system and the ITS--simultaneously, just because of their interdependence and complementarity. The simultaneous implementation of the three will create three possible scenarios:

1. The new wage is equal to the old one: in this case, there is no problem.
2. The new wage is higher than the old: this will be the case for nearly 80 percent of the workers, whose situation, consequently will be improved.
3. The new wage is lower than the old wage: in this case, the government has laid down the principle of maintaining gains already made. A differential income indemnification will in fact be provided to the worker, to maintain the

old wage level. It is probable that close to 15 percent of the workers will be in that situation, which is not of importance.

Finally, I will conclude my response to that question by asserting that in no case will there be a reduction in the wage earned up to now.

[Question] Are there any other special or complementary measures envisaged by the new wage schedule? In other words, what conditions are attached to the augmentation of a worker's wages over and above the base wage set for his job position?

[Answer] A wage schedule is not simply the establishment of base wages. It also reflects a large number of other statutory or regulatory mechanisms.

The base wage defined for any job position represents remuneration for a certain quantity of work. If that quantity of work is increased, the worker's remuneration increases. Decree 80-48 of 23 February 1980 regarding the establishment of economic regulation of wages and collective and individual worker incentives was designed to set the forms and modalities of calculating and assigning productivity-based bonuses and penalties. The connection of these productivity bonuses with the production plan and occupational standards is direct: it is a question of remunerating "each according to his work;" the system of individual and collective incentives (PRI-PRC) makes it possible to apply this principle with precision.

So there are means for augmenting a worker's income: increasing production and improving production.

Moreover, within the framework of worker profit-sharing, if workers fully meet or surpass the objectives established by the production plan, their efforts will be rewarded, since they can claim a portion of the benefits realized.

There is also the benefit schedule envisaged to provide compensation for certain work conditions and certain special kinds of work.

Finally, the SGT, as I was saying at the beginning of our interview, is not simply a wage schedule.

The constant improvement of worker skills by means of the various forms of training from which he can benefit enables him to climb higher up the ladder, giving the possibility of increasing his income.

Similarly, all the steps of a social character developed by the enterprises contribute to consolidating the worker's income and thus his purchasing power.

[Question] Are there not some problems in establishing wages by sector?

[Answer] Actually, we are running into a few problems with certain sectors, in terms of fixing base wages. Those sectors consider that the best way of attracting and retaining workers is inflating the classification criteria set up in the standardized classification method. Now that kind of thinking is not only a hindrance to the implementation of the principle of harmonization, but it is also opposed to the spirit of the regulations, which require that wages be determined solely on the basis of the demands and conditions the worker must face.

Regarding the concerns in those sectors, they are in fact taken into consideration under the framework of the statutory language relative to zonal compensation. In addition to the category of "geographical localization" of the job position, this language also regulates questions bearing on the priority attached to the skills needed, etc. Priorities are dictated by the economic circumstances and will be determined by the economic and social development plans.

Thus the same job position might have different remuneration because of zonal compensations from which the worker could benefit in various ways.

[Question] The day before yesterday you certified the first job position classifications. Overall, Mr Minister, how is the work coming along on that process, which is critical to the new wage schedule?

[Answer] In response to your question, I will say that it is actually only after certification of the classifications that the new wage schedules can be implemented.

The process has begun, in that sense, and all the conditions have been met to assure, at all levels concerned, the elaboration and certification of those documents, with due concern for respecting the deadlines established by the government. Naturally, delays have been seen in a certain number of sectors, but one could say that in general the work is proceeding at a satisfactory pace.

Indeed, the review session of 31 March 1985 discovered that 18 ministries have classified 4,500 job positions in the organizations under their purview.

It should also be noted that the process of adopting classifications has been facilitated by the creation of a repertoire of specific positions in each sector and the establishment of a catalogue of all common positions. This was carried out by the harmonization committee established by the labor administration.

With regard to tardy sectors, we note that steps have been taken with regard to them to prompt them to respect the procedures and the deadlines established.

To that end, several working sessions have been held, during the course of which constraining factors have been analyzed in order to establish appropriate schedules for the various phases of the implementation process.

This initiative enables us to hope that we can get back on schedule and that the next few weeks will see a real intensification of the certification operation. That intensification will also be encouraged by the experience acquired in the processing of the classification of positions in the hydraulics, housing and public works sectors, which we just certified and which involve about 2,000 job positions and more than 600,000 workers.

[Question] Your conclusion, Mr Minister?

[Answer] I would like to re-emphasize the necessity of rigor in the application of the policies established. We must not fall back into the mistakes made in the implementation of the transitional measures. The managers and

representatives of the workers have now accumulated sufficient experience to be able to understand implementation of the new systems more easily. In the relatively well organized sectors, where dialogue and concertation have been imposed by the work, where laxity has been eliminated, results are very convincing.

The president of the republic, secretary general of the party, urges that this approach be taken whenever an important question must be resolved. Questions related to the SGT, and especially those regarding the new wage schedule, can only be resolved if all the workers, whatever their rank in the organization, give their total cooperation and are regularly informed of all measures that have been enacted.

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ALGERIA

EFFORTS TO COMBAT DESERTIFICATION DISCUSSED

Agriculture in Extreme South

Algiers ALGERIE ACTUALITE in French 21-27 Mar 85 p 15

[Text] Bordj Badji Mokhtar and In-Guezzam are two towns in the extreme south that were once known only to initiates, tourists looking for the exotic, and long-distance truck drivers bold enough to cross the sea of sand linking us to Mali and Niger. Today that image is fading and giving way to the reality of the 1980's. It is the reality of work, effort, and the conviction that the sand no longer means just petroleum but also orchards: the orchards of the postpetroleum period.

Those communes in Tamanrasset, which Prime Minister Abdelhamid Brahimi has just visited, have decided to catch up quickly so as to live a better life based no longer on exhaustible resources but on those that are most lasting. Everything grows there, provided that the land is worked. Experiments have shown conclusively that Bordj Badji Mokhtar and In-Guezzam can supply not only their own needs and those of their governorate, but also those of other governorates, with surpluses left over for export.

The area being developed in Bordj Badji Mokhtar consists of 40 irrigated hectares divided among 20 allottees who grow a variety of products: wheat, radishes, carrots, potatoes, beets, peas, onions, zucchini, and so on.

In-Guezzam, which is a communal agricultural cooperative of 20 hectares divided among about 20 allottees, grows primarily date palms, but it also produces fruit (watermelon in February!) and truck garden produce. In another irrigated area, this one worked by the ANP [People's National Army] (the National Service), every variety of experimental crop tested has succeeded in satisfactory conditions: rice, beans, watermelons, peppers, eggplant, and so on.

There are certainly problems. The allottees told the prime minister about the lack of material means such as tractors and small vehicles that would make the marketing of their products easier. There is also a lack of doctors and so on. But other national enterprises will soon be set up in that region, which is in the vanguard when it comes to using such energy sources of the future as solar energy. And perhaps in the future, there will even be large packing centers where farm products will be prepared for export to the north and abroad.

Alongside this sign of emerging life stands a scene of distress but also a specific example of solidarity with the peoples of Africa.

It is due to the inevitable drought, which has brought back the nomads from the Malian desert in particular. There are currently over 13,000 of those refugees, and more are arriving every day. Members of the National Service, the civil protection service, and officials of the governorate, who provide daily assistance for the refugees, are hoping that an emergency plan will soon get underway. People are arriving every day, and quick action is necessary. Brahimi, who visited the camp, insisted that he be informed regularly concerning this tragedy, which Algeria is trying to resolve.

In a discussion with a family of refugees, the prime minister recalled the concern of the people and government over this serious problem and their determination to help solve it.

Desertification Being Combated

Algiers ALGERIE ACTUALITE in French 28 Mar-3 Apr 85 p 15

[Article by Rachid Meddour]

[Text] Desertification is a complex set of phenomena resulting in a reduction and impoverishment of the ground cover and the stripping away of surface soil and organic material in the soil, which are carried away by water and the wind (erosion factors). It also has the result of transforming arid and semiarid zones (steppes) into desert zones.

The steppe, which receives from 100 to 400 millimeters of precipitation and covers an area of about 20 million hectares, is in a state of continual deterioration. It is thought that nearly 4 million hectares, or one-fifth of the total area, have already deteriorated, thus increasing the region's desertification.

The phenomenon is continuing, and thousands of hectares (about 200,000) deteriorate every year.

Inexorably, therefore, the desert is "advancing" right up to the edge of the cereal-producing high plains.

But that succinct picture is far from reflecting the complex reality of the phenomenon. The desert is not advancing literally--it is true that the movement of dunes is spectacular, but it affects only limited areas--but it does establish itself wherever favorable conditions--particularly deterioration of the ground cover--exist.

The phenomenon of desertification in the Sahel and in our own Sahara is currently explained by deteriorating conditions for the exploitation of grazing lands due to the breakdown in the ecological balance as a result of several factors, among which "population growth" occupies an important place.

The overcrowding of space in the arid and semiarid zones has reached a critical stage: larger flocks have combined with population growth to cause the ecosystem to deteriorate.

Natural population growth in those regions, which are subject to growing pressure as the population increases, is causing a gradual deterioration of renewable resources: forests, soils, surface water, and animal resources.

Extensive exploitation of the land using traditional methods results in a brutal deterioration of grazing areas, which are reduced in size and overexploited, with the result that the possibilities presented by natural resources are reduced.

And the impact of human activity (overexploitation of the environment, overgrazing, extensive cereal growing, the destruction of trees and the consequent denuding of the soil, which then erodes, and so on) leads to a deterioration of the ecosystem which is irreversible in certain areas, a breakdown in the ecological balance, and, in a word, desertification.

In the view of many researchers, therefore, thoughtless human activity is the preponderant factor in the formation of certain deserts. And that desertification of grazing areas is made worse by climatic conditions (sparse and irregular rainfall and drought).

It is often said that the Sahara is advancing further every year and that the climate is growing drier.

What is the real situation?

One thing is certain: man is irreversibly damaging the environment and apparently, as a result, also disturbing the climate and rainfall. Some researchers feel that a reduction in ground cover might have consequences on the rainfall pattern. This would explain the stabilization of the current phase of aridity (sic).

But the climate, which has very often been incriminated, is not, in fact, the basic cause of this phenomenon. It merely accentuates the consequences of man's carelessness.

The fact is that the cyclical changes in climate which affect those regions (the Sahel and the Sahara) over periods of between 10 and 15 years--according to some estimates--are not new.

The results of numerous studies indicate that the Sahara and the Sahel have undergone a succession of wet and dry periods with irregular fluctuations over the past 40,000 years.

And for the past 2,500 years, the present type of climate has supposedly remained stable with very regular minor variations in a wetter or drier direction.

There is currently no indication of a clear trend toward aridification or desertification due to climate.

But the advance of the desert is not a one-way process: it can be halted! On that score, Algeria's experience sets the example for many countries confronted by the problem of desertification.

In 1972, with a view to protecting the environment, restoring the ground cover, and combating the desert's expansion, our country launched a vast program for reforesting a wooded belt some 1,500 kilometers long and about 20 kilometers wide on average--a total area of 3 million hectares--along the northern edge of the Sahara. It is known as the Green Barrier.

At first, the major objective of that program, which was entrusted to the National Service, was to check the desert's advance by establishing a forest cover whose purpose was to slow the deterioration of the soil, improve the local and even regional climate, and make it possible to store water to feed the underground water beds in the steppes and the Sahara.

Currently, the need to plan for the steppe's overall development and reorganize stockraising methods has somewhat altered that early objective.

The Green Barrier is currently conceived of as an integrated operation (comprising agriculture, forestry, and grazing) for developing the steppe zones as part of the fight against desertification.

The Grazing Code has also reinforced that large-scale undertaking by laying down principles for the integrated improvement of steppe zones (development, reforestation, and conservation of grazing lands and esparto cover) that take into account the complexity of the environment, socioeconomic factors, and the needs of the local inhabitants.

There is no doubt that desertification is progressing today. And the immediate problem is therefore not only to halt it but also to prevent it.

For that purpose, the steppes--those vast areas of land--must be the object of reclamation to the extent made possible by the fantastic progress of scientific research. The hope of the arid and semiarid zones lies above all in the progress of scientific research, but also in the translation of the knowledge acquired into specific measures.

In the semidesert zones, there is no lack of water in the subsoil. In fact, about two-thirds of the freshwater existing on earth is located in underground reservoirs, notably in the Sahara.

Rational utilization of the freshwater stored in the soil is one measure in the struggle against drought in those zones and a factor for agricultural production in the future.

It would make it possible to meet the constantly growing human need for food and thus escape the effects of drought (shortage of water, desertification, and so on).

The arid zones are also not lacking in soil. In fact, the space and sunshine with which they are abundantly supplied are what will ensure their wealth in the future. It is possible to create new oases in the desert wherever groundwater is abundant, the soil fertile, and energy inexpensive. One example we can mention is Oudi El Kreroufet, with wells sunk in Algeria's gaults. There is no doubt that the exploitation of deep groundwater through the development of processes for desalinating water by distillation using solar energy (in Touggourt), the mineral wealth of the soil, and permanent sunshine are all factors which, in the future, will ensure the success of agriculture, self-sufficiency in food, and the prosperity of those areas, which have remained underprivileged until now.

Agricultural Development

Algiers ALGERIE ACTUALITE in French 28 Mar-3 Apr 85 p 16

[Article by Belaid Djamel]

[Text] The national territory consists largely of desert. Each of us has heard it said at least once that only 3.5 percent of the land is usable for agriculture. The steppe alone comprises 20 million hectares. Is there no way to reclaim that land so as to increase our usable agricultural area?

The difficult nature of that region--with its 100 to 200 millimeters of rainfall per year--is made worse by the nature of its soil, which is encrusted or salty. Evaporation is so intense that minerals rise to the surface, resulting in the limestone layer that appears beneath a thin layer of dirt or those salt-whitened soils that remind one of snow. The soils of the steppe are therefore fragile in nature, and it is not possible to utilize them without preliminary study.

The period from 1977 to 1983 saw the establishment of several pastoral cooperatives, the startup of green-barrier operations, and establishment of the Office of the High Commissioner for Development of the Steppe. This new organization will make better coordination possible in actions aimed at developing the steppe.

"Sheep country" is the name often given to the steppe. But that must not make us forget the diverse potentialities of those regions. The drilling of wells has made it possible in a few places to establish truck gardens that supply the local markets. The steppe is also dotted with depressions called "dayas" that could be developed for the production of forage crops.

Cereal growing on the steppe covers 1 million hectares. Yields are pathetically low, however, and barely pay back the costs incurred. The disadvantage of this crop is that it speeds up the process of desertification. Wind carries away the soil and makes way for outcroppings of the limestone layer. Those practices explain in part the sand and dust storms that coastal cities have been experiencing over the past few years. The tools used are inappropriate: instead of disk equipment, pronged equipment is what is needed. Irregular rainfall is another factor limiting yields.

Certain traditional varieties of wheat have been lost. One farmer complained: "If only I had a handful of Biskri seed!"

Sheepraising is the main agricultural activity at present. Three-fourths of the nation's livestock grazes in those areas. The potential for improving stockraising is vast. For example, there is practically no genetic animal breeding, and stockraising is done too intensively in terms of the current possibilities offered by the rangeland. Ewes produce lambs twice a year, meaning that the ewes age too quickly and their lambs are not necessarily born at the time of year when grass is most plentiful.

There are 5,000 water points. Efforts are currently being made to maintain the existing wells and provide them with new windmills. Tests are also being made with solar pumps. Those water points have a direct effect on the density of sheep per hectare. Any reduction in the number of wells leads to intensive utilization of the pasture located close by. The reason is that if the animals go more than 6 kilometers away, they can be watered only every other day. And in summer, a sheep needs 5 liters of water per day.

The flock is sometimes regarded as a means of building up capital. The result is that rams and old ewes are numerous. And those animals, which have stopped growing, no longer put on weight.

One of the most questionable aspects of that stockraising method is the disorganized grazing it involves. After a flock passes by, the vegetation does not have time to grow back before more animals appear to graze once again. Eventually, the vegetation may disappear completely. Studies have shown that simple rotation to minimize grazing on young shoots in the spring would ensure a steady growth of vegetation.

Livestock on the steppe is mostly in private hands, so it is no doubt a matter of finding the best system that will ensure support by the stockraisers for any kind of development.

Another resource on the steppe is its 3 million hectares of esparto, representing an interesting prospect for the paper industry. But picking esparto is a tedious manual operation, and the shortage of manpower is now making itself felt to such an extent that supplying the existing mills is becoming a problem. A survey of the esparto-growing zones was recently completed. Tests with the sowing and fertilization of esparto were also carried out, as were tests concerned with the mechanization of harvesting.

Rational exploitation of the steppe may make it possible to increase the production of farm products. The fact is that whether we are talking about sheep, truck garden produce, cereals, or esparto, many improvements remain to be made. But the steppe is a fragile ecosystem that must be respected.

Drip Irrigation

Algiers ALGERIE ACTUALITE in French 28 Mar-3 Apr 85 p 16

[Article by Belaid Djamel]

[Text] Produce a yield 50 percent higher than normal while using 50 percent less water? It is possible thanks to a new irrigation method known as the drip system.

The drip technique was developed in certain farming regions that are dry or where there is little water. California was one of the first places in the world where this technique was developed on a large scale.

Agriculture's water requirements are enormous, and the second 5-year plan calls for completing 16 dams and building 17 more. Industrial use and a supply of drinking water for the cities must also be taken into account.

The traditional practice consists of submerging the crops in water, which slowly penetrates the soil. In the meantime, however, some of it evaporates. After 4 or 5 days, depending on the season, the operation must be repeated. That procedure, which dates from antiquity, is used by almost all farmers.

Actually, no one knows exactly how much the plants use. From sowing to harvest, the same quantities are applied without regard for how much water the plant uses during each phase of its development. In response to those empirical methods, departments in the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries are advocating more rational solutions. Sprinkler irrigation is being strongly encouraged, for example. The ONAMA [National Agricultural Equipment Office] provides farmers with all the appropriate equipment. And in large irrigated areas, the soil's ability to retain water is taken into account in determining the amount of water to apply.

Research in this field is making it possible to determine irrigation doses more accurately. It appears that specific studies are needed for each type of crop. Between a parcel planted in lettuce and one planted in corn, the water requirement may vary by 100 percent. Measurements incorporating wind velocity, temperature, hours of sunshine, and type of soil make it possible to foresee irrigation on command in the future. Thanks to sensors set in the ground near the plants and linked to a computer, it should be possible to irrigate in calculated doses at the proper time.

To begin with, the means of achieving greater efficiency in the use of irrigation water may consist of using the drip system. The principle behind it is relatively simple. Water under pressure is distributed through a system of pipes containing holes to let the water out. The holes are arranged near the plants to be watered. The flow is calculated to match the amount of water delivered with the amount required by the plants.

The pipes may be buried or laid on top of the ground. This type of irrigation is used especially in plantations of fruit trees. The installation is rather

expensive, but it remains in place for several years, thus paying for itself quickly. The drip system can be used with truck garden crops. A simple method consists of using a strip of plastic film to make the tubing. The edges of the film are sewn together by machine, and the stitches constitute the pores through which the irrigation water will be delivered. Vegetables can then be planted all along the tubing, which is connected to a motor pump.

In Algeria, the drip system is already being tried out with date palms at experimental stations. The results show that considerable water can be saved. But the presence of salt in the irrigation water causes the pores in the tubing to silt up, making a filter system essential.

Since date palms require large amounts of water, a recent study reaches the conclusion that the future development of date cultivation will depend on adoption of the drip system.

The value of this method is that it makes it possible to envisage better utilization of irrigation water. Sizable savings in water can be realized. In our regions where water is the limiting factor, new prospects are opening up. The manpower aspect is not being neglected, since once the system of tubing is installed, one person can operate the entire system.

However, the salinity of irrigation water necessitates a local approach when it comes to the materials to be used. Also necessary is the local manufacture of special items of equipment--couplers and drippers--that are not currently available on the market.

But is that a problem?

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ALGERIA

KASDI MERBAH ON LAND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 3 Apr 85 p 12

[Interview with Kasdi Merbah, minister of agriculture and fisheries, by Rachid Semmad; date and place not specified]

[Text] Law 83-18 on accession to land titles (APF) continues to excite the interest of a public that is increasingly attracted to working on the land. In fact, since the promulgation of Decree 83.724 of 10 December 1984, establishing the modalities for implementation of the aforementioned law, returning to the land has taken on a new dimension, to the point where APF applicants now include not only fellahs but people from other social classes as well: teachers, artisans, small businessmen, officials and even doctors. In the field, and more especially in the wilayas of the South, the new "pioneers" of the desert are working tirelessly to prepare the areas identified in the cadastral survey for cultivation.

This process is being followed very closely by the government, which has provided appropriate resources to encourage such development, for example by furnishing agricultural equipment and long-term credit on very concessional terms. In addition, a water supply program has been launched with the construction in 1985 of 300 small dams and 700 hillside reservoirs in the North, and substantial borehole drilling activity has started under the auspices of the newly created agency for exploitation of the gault layer in the wilayas of the South.

In order to get a clear picture of developments in APF and prospects for Saharan agronomic development, we posed several questions to Mr Kasdi Merbah, candidate member of the Politburo, minister of agriculture and fisheries. In light of his answers to these questions, we have become convinced that APF, by promoting such development, is going to transform radically the face of regions hitherto considered to be impoverished desert land. We are very fortunate that these pioneers have decided to make their land more valuable by their own labor and to demonstrate that the burning ochre sand can be made to yield valuable agricultural production, both qualitatively and quantitatively.

It is possible, in the first instance, to satisfy local needs. Going even further, these areas could produce a surplus to be sent to the North or exported abroad.

[Question] Mr Minister, can you review the situation with respect to the land title accession program?

[Answer] To tell the truth, this review has already been carried out during evaluation meetings with directorates of the wilayas in question on Saharan and steppe agronomy. The reviews show that to date 7,820 hectares of land have been distributed throughout the wilayas of the South, including 1,134 in the steppes.

The number of beneficiaries comes altogether to 2,430, including individuals who developed lands well before the promulgation of the law and the beneficiaries who expressed the desire to gain title to lands officially set aside for that purpose by the communes.

It should be emphasized that the Saharan wilayas have been in the forefront here, with 85 percent of total land distributed; the palm goes to the wilaya of Adrar, which has helped 731 applicants to acquire 2,516 hectares out of the 5,854 defined in the survey; Laghouat is in second place, distributing 1,684 hectares out of 5,900 surveyed to 340 beneficiaries, followed by Ghardaia, which has already distributed 1,385 hectares to 358 applicants, including several who have now acquired official title.

The wilayas on the steppe have made significant efforts, especially Tiaret and M'Sila. The latter claims to have distributed 1,400 hectares. Naama and El-Bayadh together have distributed 1,134 hectares to 379 applicants.

El Oued and Biskra have respectively distributed 4,820 and 1,166 hectares this year. These are desert areas which have been turned over to individuals who had already made improvements.

The wilaya of Adrar has a hefty advantage and major agricultural potential in the Ksours, because the water, which is available not far below the surface, naturally predisposes the areas to agriculture.

Taking all the various projects into account, we have set as our goal for 1985 to distribute and regularize title to 12,000 hectares.

The number of applicants has grown considerably this year. Nearly 13,000 applications have been filed by claimants to title under APF. There is no shortage of available land. Above all, we must increase water availability by substantial new borehole drilling. Technical estimates must be refined and confirmed, in order to accelerate the process of developing the 65,000 hectares set aside for this program, including the 50,000 hectares in the wilayas of the South and 15,000 for the steppe zones. This will mean 20,000 beneficiaries.

Given the high level of citizen interest, we find ourselves facing a thorny problem: how large to make the parcels of land. It is impossible to set a simple numerical figure, because parcels must have both enough land and enough water. On the other hand, in order to satisfy all the requests, we should make

the parcels as small as possible, though making sure beneficiaries are able to live decently and earn appreciable income. This is why we have set the minimum parcel size at 2 hectares, and the maximum will be determined by the number of applicants.

I should point out that land development is a complex process which must be integrated into the framework of Saharan agronomy, according to a paper which we have under preparation.

The land development covers three fundamental aspects. The first consists in renovation projects to maximize the profitability of units that already exist: palm plantations, drainage for irrigation networks and improvements to the fruit-growing areas. The second aspect concerns implementation of the law on APF.

The third aspect is the most important, for it will provide the opportunity to see how far the large surface areas can be valorized or exploited by means of a system which has already been developed in the U.S., and which is currently in use around the world, in the Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia, Libya and other countries.

This is why this development project must be seen in the context of promoting Saharan agronomy, taking account of all these facts.

[Question] Law 83-18 is not limited only to the wilayas of the South, but the juridical interpretation has been such that only the wilayas of the South have been involved in APF. Could you clarify this ambiguity?

[Answer] The law does not actually limit APF to the southern regions. In reality, it is clear that it is easier to implement it in the Saharan and steppe wilayas. That is why it has started up more easily in the Saharan wilayas and less easily in the steppe regions [as printed].

Work is under way concerning the wilayas of the North, to determine land development potential there and which wilayas could undertake such programs. The survey now under way should make it possible for us to start the program sometime in 1985. The survey will in large part cover the mountain, forest and bush zones.

Up to now there has been no distribution of land in the northern wilayas, for one must be circumspect about these things.

The program to identify areas or scattered parcels to be developed continues. The wilayas from which we have received data indicate that Annaba has 2,029 hectares, Tarf 1,698 potential hectares, Tizi-Ouzou 177 hectares for 33 applicants, Bouira 600 hectares, Boumerdes 419 hectares of scattered parcels, Bordj-Bou-Arreridj 200 hectares in the Zamora region. Medea has 7 areas surveyed, but their area has not yet been determined, and Djelfa has 86 hectares. The wilaya of Relizane has 6,500 hectares of public land. They had been abandoned, thereby producing a salinization problem, and they will have to be drained.

Here again, the question will be studied in order to develop these lands within the framework of APF; the problem has been taken up by the ministry with the wilayas concerned, and the program may get under way sometime this year.

[Question] We note, Mr Minister, that in some wilayas technical committees are taking a great deal of time to deliver provisional titles. What steps does your department plan to take to alleviate the red tape?

[Answer] Within Agriculture and Fisheries, we have asked the various wilaya directors involved to accelerate and facilitate operations. But there are constraints: we are trying to minimize them; for example, the cadastral survey of surface areas before entitlement. Frequently the cadastral information is absent or does not fully cover the land in question. Title cannot be issued until the area in question is precisely determined. This is more easily carried out in areas under urban district jurisdiction; the areas in question are well defined there. We have taken several steps: we have asked the Finance Ministry, with which we have an agreement, to beef up the cadastral staff for a period of time, to accelerate the parcel delimitation operation. As in all programs just getting started, it is normal for problems to arise, and sometimes erroneous interpretations are made which we must try to clarify in our meetings with the wilayas. Explanations will be given at a national seminar which should be held in early April at El Oued. In addition, this meeting will enable us to survey all the problems, with a view to finding adequate solutions.

[Question] The government has recently taken steps concerning the provision of agricultural equipment to the beneficiaries of APF. Exactly what are these steps?

[Answer] We must again come back to the principle that the government views this program as very important for a variety of reasons. First of all, APF is a program that will help raise national agricultural production, which is the primary objective. Second, it will generate economic activity in these underdeveloped areas. Consequently, it will contribute to keeping people in those areas and give them a decent living, by providing them with work and corresponding income. Thirdly, this operation will mean these areas will not have to call on the North--which cannot even fully satisfy its own food requirements--to feed them. Thus, by means of this law, we are hoping to make the South self-sufficient in food production, thereby also solving transport problems. Finally, one should not lose sight of the fact that this program should enable us, given favorable climatic conditions, to grow early fruits and vegetables that could be sent to the North or exported, because they could be ready to market before the corresponding produce in Europe. Thus we have had the experiment since last April in the wilaya of Adrar, to attempt to exploit the agronomic conditions of this zone. That wilaya has lands, water that is not too far below the surface, and growers. These are basic conditions for development at the least possible cost. These three elements--land, water, and manpower--must be brought together, and in areas already inhabited, in order to avoid the excessive investment that would otherwise be necessary, and also to make crop-growing profitable. We have set up a special provisioning program for the wilaya of Adrar in order to be able to get this started ahead of the other wilayas.

Significant results have been noted, since according to estimates made, this wilaya by itself has produced 28,000 tons of truck garden produce, including 5,000 tons of potatoes, and similar quantities of tomatoes, carrots, turnips, etc.

We have even run into marketing problems because of overproduction; finally, we put part of it on the domestic market and the rest was exported from the port of Oran. In addition to the fact that agriculture in the South gives greater yields, it also enables us to diversify crops more effectively. I read somewhere that in the Saharan regions one could grow nine crops a year under glass of lettuce, with a yield of 18 kg per square meter per year, or 1,800 metric hundredweight; 4 crops of cucumbers with 65 kg per square meter, or 6,500 metric hundredweight.

Using under-glass agronomic techniques in the north, we presently get 1,000 metric hundredweight of cucumbers.

Thus, as you can see, agronomy in the South, in addition to the higher yields, could enable us to obtain produce well before it is available in the North, if only the number of hothouses could be increased, and if, at the same time, we could export earlier.

In this context, the experiment this year in the wilaya of Adrar has given conclusive results, and as a part of our land development effort, we are going to try to organize and propagate this technology in order to be able to export pimento in January and February at a time when truck garden produce is not yet available in Europe.

The government's interest in land development has to do with these spillover effects, and there has been a program to encourage all the APF beneficiaries by putting at their disposal the agricultural equipment needed. The program involves 115 mini-tractors, 525 mechanized ploughs, 2,092 disc harrows, 2,022 dusters, 510 injecting tubes, 1,500 mechanized pumps of various kinds, 1,050 utility vehicles, 431 generator sets, 6,954 lots of horticultural implements, 39,930 harvest containers, 1,763 watering-cans, 2,260 200-liter barrels, 30 solar pumps, and 10 wind-driven pumps as well as 20 all-terrain vehicles to improve equipment support for the fellahs.

We are going to try to introduce to the producers, both to make their job easier and at the same time to exploit solar energy, 150 supplementary solar pumps which the Commissariat of New Energies will be setting up in the wilayas to pump water, with the government defraying part of the installation costs.

Also, those pumps produced recently by the wind-power unit at Laghouat perform better and are more durable than the old ones. An initial appropriation of 130 million dinars has been made available by the government, and these credits are currently with the BADR [Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development]. The distribution of this equipment will start in April 1985, and we are counting on officials at the wilaya level to distribute them more equitably.

[Question] Mr Minister, the BADR requires provisional property title before issuing loans, but in practice such a document is not easily obtained from the officials concerned. What steps are you planning to take to enable the beneficiaries to take advantage of these credits?

[Answer] It is true that some problems exist, and we are going to ask the BADR to facilitate the efforts of all beneficiaries to gain access to credit, by simplifying procedures as much as possible. We are hoping, with the cooperation of the BADR, to take several steps to help beneficiaries who do not have

official title, first of all to see that the technical committees accelerate the issuance of these documents, and second to persuade the BADR to provide the necessary credits, even if the title-holder is not in possession of title, if it can make verification on the basis of administrative documentation. One must also bear in mind that these credits are provided on a long-term basis at a very reduced rate of interest, which encourages the expansion of agricultural APF operations.

[Question] The 5-year time-frame for land development cannot be maintained by beneficiaries in those areas where the water is far below the surface.

The government's intervention is required to drill boreholes. What are your thoughts about this, Mr Minister?

[Answer] Here again, the Council of Ministers has recently studied the file on this point, in other words boreholes related to agricultural APF. A comprehensive program was therefore adopted by the government, establishing the cost of borehole drilling. This action plan also covers all geographic areas of the country, in setting certain conditions, particularly with regard to maintenance of the gault layer, in order to avoid the requirement for pumping systems. It must be recognized that ground water rises directly to the surface, thus averting the need for excessive investment, which is an important fact, considering the limitations on resources available to the hydraulic service. A program for each wilaya has been circulated, and we will meet with officials of that department to establish how many linear feet of drilling will be carried out in each wilaya, depending on the funds available, and this drilling will be charged to land development. We will take all possible measures to satisfy everyone as far as our appropriations will allow. It might be noted that this problem has been studied within the framework of the APF in order to develop land which is able to get water from the gault layer covering the entire 600,000 square kilometers of the Sahara, as soon as water becomes available.

There are zones where the layer is at groundwater level, and others where there is significant depth. The primary constraint for these latter zones remains the lack of boreholes, but under current conditions, drilling can be profitable, despite the high cost, because production can also reach a high level. And this is why we have worked with Hydraulics on creating an agency to exploit the gault layer, to manage the process, in such a way as to avoid overutilization of the layer.

As you know, there is water for quite a few years in the Biskra region, since, according to a study, 100,000 hectares could be irrigated for 20,000 years, even if the water is from fossil zones and is only renewed little by little. There are large quantities of water that could be exploited for a very long time.

[Question] Saharan agronomic techniques, once fully developed, could insure agricultural self-sufficiency. In that context, what steps have been taken to achieve that fundamental food-supply objective?

[Answer] The land development program cannot be pursued in isolation from the entire Saharan agronomical program which we have proposed to orchestrate, because it is different from agronomy in the North. That is why we have thought about organizing it separately, with the creation of an Institute for the

Development of Saharan Agronomy. In that light, at the research and development level, we have started special training of engineers and technicians in Saharan agronomy this year at the ITAS [Institute of Saharan Agricultural Technology] at Ouargla. We also plan to start up the training center at Timmimoun and another in the Abadla urban district, so that problems of Saharan agronomy can be dealt with by that training infrastructure.

Once that infrastructure is in place, we will be able to realize the existing potential, by engaging in drainage programs, renovation of irrigated areas, rejuvenation of palm plantations, working to overcome the "bayoud" [translation unknown] which is damaging that important resource. With a little more effort, we will be able to export. It should also be noted that this year date exports have picked up significantly.

Also, I should say that this agronomy will create problems over the long term, because it requires much manpower to make all of this work and investment productive. There is a third area, no less important, which we are studying, namely the determination of the extent to which large surface areas can be exploited, in various ways, by intensive mechanization. Along the same lines, we have proposed creation of four or five pilot farms at Adrar, Gassi-Touil, Biskra and In-Amenas, covering no more than 200 hectares, where we will attempt modern mechanized agriculture and sprinkler systems. That could facilitate the cultivation of early vegetables, big crops such as high-yield wheat (why not?), perhaps stock-raising as an activity complementary to crop cultivation (production of forage, crop rotation) and other crops as well, including groundnuts, which would reduce vegetable oil imports. To do all this we must carry out experiments on these farms in order later on to propagate this system and resolve the problem step by step.

This vast undertaking must be launched in inhabited zones, because, above all, we must avoid overinvestment. We can cite the example of the Zelfana lands, which require only an investment in boreholes, for here the people are close to home, so a farm of this kind is bound to be profitable. This is still under study, and the task has been entrusted to IDCS [expansion unknown] to determine steps to be carried out to solve the borehole problem, which is the primary requisite for successful land development.

It must be remembered that President Chadli has asked the hydraulics minister to relocate the headquarters of the main drilling companies in the South; the move is under way, and this will doubtless facilitate land development operations.

[Question] Are the beneficiaries required to cultivate certain crops?

[Answer] The beneficiaries are free to cultivate the crops of their choice, as long as they contribute to the satisfaction of local needs. We leave all the initiative in their hands, and, for example, the small area now being developed at Bordj Badji-Mokhtar will solve all the provisioning problems of the inhabitants, and that is the result we want.

They must be organized to profit from the agro-climatic conditions by exporting as many vegetables as possible as "extra-earlies." Then, we will accustom them gradually to grow crops that they are not currently growing, asparagus for example, and many other profitable ventures.

[Question] What do you have to say in conclusion, Mr Minister?

[Answer] The political leadership is very closely following this operation, and the assistance program for the fellahs, in the form of credit for the purchase of agricultural supplies, is the one decided upon for the year 1985. At the end of the year, as part of the land development program, a second program will certainly be adopted to provide further support for these operations.

The agriculture minister will provide all the logistical and technical support needed to see that these operations, which are one expression of the nationwide policy of increasing production, are carried out under the best possible conditions.

We are very sensitive to the problems facing us, and we assure the beneficiaries that all the services of the ministry will be at their disposal to help them resolve those problems as quickly as possible. By rationally exploiting agro-climatic conditions, there is no doubt that we will turn things around, and in fact achieve something very unexpected: feeding the regions of the North from the excess production of the Saharan regions.

9516
CSO : 4519/124

ALGERIA

MEDIA CENSORSHIP OF ISLAMIC ACTIVISTS' TRIAL

Trial of Activists Begins

Paris LE MONDE in French 13 Apr 85 p 6

[Article by Jean de la Gueriviere]

[Text] Algiers--The trial of some 100 Islamic activists began this week before the State Security Court in Medea, private sources in Algiers report. By Thursday, 11 April, the official press had not yet told of the event. Several dozen fundamentalists were arrested at the end of 1982 following the discovery of bombs "ready for use." During the first half of 1983, other arrests were made. The trial of these activists, announced semi-officially, has been postponed several times. On 13 May 1984, 92 were to go on trial in Medea. At the last minute, the session was postponed and 23 were released. The latter were men not accused of participating in actions that might lead to bloodshed, their role being limited to psychological agitation. Some are now appearing as free accused.

The other defendants implicated in most serious matters did not enjoy the clemency measures handed down in the spring by President Chadli for the sake of the fundamentalists, but also other political prisoners, including supporters of Ben Bella (LE MONDE, 17 May 1984).

The authorities who succeeded in containing fundamentalist agitation at the end of 1982, seem hesitant about what attitude to take with regard to the persons arrested. The idea most widespread in official circles is that they "must not be turned into martyrs." The Medea trial will undoubtedly be long and the penalties must be wisely chosen.

An initial trial in September 1984 ended in prison sentences ranging from 5 years with suspension of sentence to 8 years without parole, handed down in the case of seven fundamentalists indicted following a fight that left one person dead in a university residence compound in Algiers.

Press Remains Silent

Paris LE MONDE in French 16 Apr 85 p 7

[Article by J. L. G.]

[Text] Algiers--A week after the opening of the first session, Algerian media were still remaining silent on Sunday, 14 April, concerning the trial of the Islamic activists now before the State Security Court in Medea (LE MONDE, 13 April). Obviously, it is the intent of the authorities to resolve the matter with the least possible sensation and the trial will very likely end with the release of a large number of defendants after 2 years imprisonment.

The activists number 134. In February, the Grand Jury ruled on the fate of 152 prisoners, referring most of them to the Security Court and ruling that 18 were to be released for lack of sufficient charges. The trial is proceeding in a courtroom most of whose space is occupied by the dock, preventing the presence of many spectators, although theoretically speaking, the sessions are not closed.

At the first hearing, some 20 persons were called upon who were not among the accused, seemingly indicating that there were still defendants free. Actually, they were persons summoned as witnesses.

The presiding judge is a civil magistrate assigned to Annaba. He is aided by two other civil judges and two military magistrates. The accused are heard by a group of about 30 and the hearings extend into the evening. The verdict will probably be handed down at the end of the month.

The defense is in the hands of some 30 Algerian attorneys, some of whom are appointed. Actually, several of the defendants, following their arrest, remained faithful to the ideas developed in their "program" for a different society and those plans included the elimination of the legal profession.

One of the defense attorneys is Ali Yahia, the courageous and infatigable swashbuckler of all political trials in Algeria. Yahia met some of his clients in prison, where he himself was incarcerated for several months before being released (LE MONDE, 17 May 1984) and having the charges dismissed. This progressive has in the past defended communists and Berber activists. He does not share all the ideas of his fundamentalist clients but, he told us, he has taken on their case out of loyalty to his unwavering commitment to human rights in general.

The accused were arrested in the Algiers region and the province at the end of 1982 and the beginning of 1983. They are workers from national enterprises, as well as trade union leaders, merchants, craftsmen, teachers and professors. They range from young unemployed workers to university intellectuals. A few fired shots at the time of their arrest, killing one gendarme and wounding another. Some were found to be carrying MAT-40 automatic pistols. They say that they were acting in self-defense, while the prosecution speaks of conspiracy based on the fact that they sometimes had explosives in addition to weapons.

However, the majority, some 100, were arrested for participating in rallies or meetings in the course of which a 14-point "Islamic Charter" was drafted. On this subject, the presiding judge allowed them to speak at length without interruption.

11,464
CSO: 4519/136

ALGERIA

HOSPITAL CONDITIONS CRITICIZED

Algiers ALGERIE ACTUALITE in French 28 Mar-3 Apr 85 pp 20, 21

[Text] Our hospitals are ailing; they do not move quickly enough to keep up with the growing needs of a growing population concerned about their health.

The problems start at the reception room--unless they begin in the parking lot. It is like a carnival in reception. A crowd of people grumbling and shouting insults, generally ill-tempered para-medics who do not know which way to turn, or who act like it. Friendliness, courtesy, or even a decent sense of responsibility disappear in these invariably crowded halls where everyone is poised to take advantage of the unexpected opportunity to get past the first barrier. You go on through. Yes, but your troubles are not over. You have to find the right corridor, the right room, and...keep elbowing your way through.

At this point, one must have plenty of patience. An endless line of white shirts goes back and forth, and still you are waiting. Time to smoke a pack of cigarettes, to go through a box of chewing tobacco, to read a book, to knit a pullover and learn all about the maladies of your neighbors, before you are called. In the meantime, you have seen people going on in. Those with appointments and those without. What is their secret? Nothing so terrible: if one is not a friend of the physician or the friend of a friend, then he is the friend of the chief of security or the nurse. This is only human nature, and it happens everywhere on earth, but here, in our country, it only makes for more disorganization. Perhaps if the hospital had more than one consulting room for each specialty things would be better, at least in the CHU [expansion unknown], where there is hardly room enough for the doctors and nurses to pass each other in the halls, and where they spend more time walking around than examining patients. Well, you are finally in the consulting room. So you think the nightmare and the anguish are all behind you? Think again. In most cases, the practitioner disposes of you in no time at all. He does not have the time either to listen to you or examine you. He barely touches you. And sometimes, other people with no apparent business are there with you in the consulting room. Privacy? Not yet. In two or three strokes he dashes out a prescription for tests to be taken and follow-up care. So you jump back into the rat-race for the tests, and you are surprised when you see those sparkling new machines with which our hospitals are endowed--but which do not function as planned because of lack of organization.

There are doctors, and equipment, too. What then is that grain of sand that keeps the machinery from working? Organization. No imaginative thinking has

found its way into our hospitals yet. It would be no staggering achievement to organize reception centers, train receptionists and organize the work of the doctors. It is simply a question of determination and goodwill on the part of all concerned, the administration, the doctors and the para-medics. Some services in certain hospitals function to the satisfaction of all the patients. Within the hospital, everyone has a particular task and everyone cooperates to meet the needs of the patients. We are nowhere near Quincy, of course, but all the same...

In addition to the current state of disorganization, there is also the dehumanization that is rampant in most of our hospitals. Now is it not true that the most basic factor for restoring a patient's health, or at least alleviating his suffering, is to be found in the relationships between doctor and patient, para-medic and patient, and hospital and patient? Well, at least the medical treatises are always harping on that. At any rate, the patient is the best judge of that, and he knows the difference. If he carries on like a tiger to get an appointment with X rather than with Y it is quite simply because X listens more attentively than his other colleagues, who doubtless have as much aptitude as he does. X is more conscientious and has a higher sense of responsibility. Of his mission...

Up to now our hospitals could fall back on centralization as an excuse, but since last May they have been restructured and can even buy their own equipment and spare parts. So it is now just a question of initiative. Is a hospital not also a business? If everyone would simply do the job for which he is responsible, things would get better. Much better.

The demand for health care is growing, spurred by the rising standard of living. The institutions are falling behind...Abdelkader Hammouche took three hospitals into the examining room. Here is his diagnosis...

A half-opened portal is jealously guarded by a row of impressive-looking security agents as well as two or three policemen. Every vehicle is stopped, the driver questioned and finally told to turn back. It is no use trying to persuade any of them: they get agitated very quickly, and there is nothing for it but to comply with the order.

No, this is not the headquarters of the Central Bank, not at all. This is only the Mustapha Hospital. Since a decree from the wilaya was promulgated to regulate parking in the precincts of the hospital, the patients have had two problems to deal with, instead of just one: finding a place to park and a doctor to see. "It has become a virtual fortress," protests one motorist bringing in a sick young child, "where you must enter with your hands up." At the entrance, one of the guards arrogantly or indifferently argues with him. He has told him to put the child in the ambulance standing a few steps away. "As if all patients necessarily had to make use of such transport!" Then, after circling around and around the First of May Square in hopes of finding a place to park his vehicle, he takes his child back home, not without expressing his resentment against "that hospital where every day something new is added to make things worse for the patients."

Now the hospital administration contends that "Mustapha is a hospital, not a parking lot. Before the wilaya decree, it was a real carnival. People parked

their cars anywhere at all, regardless of whether they were blocking the ambulances, and this was a continuous cause of concern."

Still, it must be recognized that the guards carry out their instructions with for the most part misplaced zeal, for after all, people do not go to the hospital for the pleasure of watching the patients! So, a priori, why should the patients be penalized even before they get to the entrance? "All the same, they are going too far at Mustapha," confided an official at Beni-Messous Hospital, where, fortunately, that practice is not followed. Nor is it followed at Parnet, even though the flow of traffic there, while perhaps not as dense as at Mustapha, is still heavy. This shows that even if one has serious problems, one does not have to resort to absurd measures!

That said, Mustapha Hospital over the years has become too small, too decrepit for the patients, whose number has been growing very, very rapidly. "Ten thousand people come through our doors every day," explains Mr Terrak, director general. "Add to that about 6,000 employees who make up the staff of the hospital, and you will understand why managing Mustapha is a real headache!"

Indeed, whether at Mustapha, Beni-Messous, Parnet or elsewhere, the existing structures are visibly obsolete, overutilized, and thus delapidated to a point incompatible with the expressed determination of the public authorities to improve patient care.

One doctor asks, "How can we hope to improve the quality of service when our working conditions are deplorable? We more than anyone want our patients to have impeccable reception rooms, receptionists, etc. But things being the way they are, what can we do? Should we refuse to work and wait until better conditions of practice are obtained? I sincerely do not think so."

Is the state of decrepitude of the structures the only cause for the poor care given the patients? "Certainly not," says Professor Yaker, "there is also and above all demand which far exceeds supply, which has stayed the same. People also have a propensity to go to the hospital even if their case could be handled by a general practitioner. Thus, we are overwhelmed by demands which are not really in our purview, because there is no support network worthy of the name that would enable us to discharge from the hospital all those health center cases, in other words those patients who really just need primary care."

Over the years this demand which far exceeds supply is going to wear out equipment which is already in an advanced state of decay, such as the laundry-room at Beni-Messous Hospital, which dates from 1947 and is almost a prehistoric monument. The result: lengthy shutdowns because the technicians that might make repairs on the scene do not exist. "The problem of maintenance," according to Mr Yaker, permanent undersecretary for health services at the Ministry of Public Health, "was a real scourge for the hospitals. I say 'was' because recent steps have just been taken to implement the governmental directives of 30 May 1984 to give the hospitals AGI [expansion unknown] to tackle the problem of equipment maintenance. Henceforth, the hospitals will find it easier to import equipment and spare parts. Until last year ENEMEDI [expansion unknown] had this mission. That enterprise, which is still young, has encountered many problems, and so has not been fully able to carry out its mission."

Theoretically, therefore, the equipment maintenance situation should get visibly better within a few years, if not a few months. But this step, tardy though it is, even if praiseworthy, does not solve all the problems. For example, the problem of food provisioning. "We cannot order a special meal," admits Mr Djeffal, director general of the Beni-Messous Hospital, "because food is not available. We do sign contracts with local companies that impose their own prices on us, but that does not solve anything, because it frequently happens that we see our trucks coming back half-empty. That situation will not change so long as hospitals are not a priority matter."

Not all other officials agree. "I personally consider," says Mr Bouzid, director general of Parnet Hospital, "that the food for hospitalized patients is not as bad as some would have us believe, considering the resources at our disposal." Mere euphemism? Refusal to look the facts in the face? In any case, the patients themselves say they are quite content just to find a bed available. In their view, all the rest is just icing on the cake.

Is this just making do with what one has? Are our patients just fatalistic? "What do you expect people to do?" asks a patient hospitalized at Mustapha. "Whenever we protest against the poor quality of our meals, they retort that it is all they have: take it or leave it."

But even worse than the food is the deplorable hygienic conditions on the premises. The explanation? According to that official at Parnet Hospital, "This is once again due to demand. When the facilities are built, for example, to accommodate 150 patients per day, and they have to take 300 or 400, how can you expect that reception facilities and hygiene will not suffer?" If any one structure is a perfect example of hospital "shantification," it is the emergency room. At Mustapha, Parnet and, to a lesser degree, Beni-Messous, the emergency room provides on a daily basis an appalling spectacle: detritus littering the floor, waiting rooms without any benches in sight, ill-tempered orderlies and nurses, doctors who cannot be found or may not even be there...the list is a long one. In short, the first idea that comes to your mind when perchance you find yourself in an emergency room is that if you manage to "survive" the experience, luck is on your side that day. "In 1972," says the director general of Parnet Hospital, "when the municipal government gave us an emergency room, which at the time was nothing more than an infirmary, we thought we were lucky. In theory, it was only a temporary solution. Unfortunately, that is where it remained, despite all the promises made to us."

In sum, a temporary situation became a permanent one, according to Mr Boukhroufa, chief of cardiological services at Parnet, "even though a plan has been made, appropriations have been authorized and we bring up the problem to every minister that passes through. Apparently with no results. Moreover, it is an anomaly that this center should be situated nearly 3 kilometers from the CHU," the official maintains. "An emergency room should be located within the hospital," Mr Boukhroufa believes.

Even so, we must face the truth: two-thirds of the patients who come to the emergency room really do not belong there. Like the "pseudo" patient who came at 0100 hours to an emergency room to get an illness verification form signed to show his employer! This has become so prevalent that these centers find

themselves unable to carry out their original purpose. "During the 4-year plan," explains Mr Yaker, "the Ministry of Public Health planned the creation of modern emergency care centers, one at Mustapha Hospital, and the other at Parnet Hospital. Studies have been carried out, but we ran up against constraints out in the field. However, we expect to complete them during the second 5-year plan." Pious hope? Only the future will tell.

For the moment, the emergency care centers are a veritable torture for those who, having no alternative, end up there. Are these people, as the staff at Mustapha and Parnet choose to believe, merely "false patients"? Nothing could be less evident. "To tell the truth," notes Mr Djeffal, "there are no false patients. A person who presents himself to the hospital always has something to demand of a physician, even if it is only advice."

Of course, no one could deny that patient education has far to go. In that connection, it is curious to note that the behavior of most of our patients abroad is less aggressive and more disciplined than it is when they are in their native country. But it would certainly be a gross error to blame the prevailing admission problem entirely on the citizens. "The public authorities also bear a share of the responsibility," says the official at Beni-Messous Hospital, "insofar as the policy in effect up to now is certainly not at all above reproach."

One of the criticisms might be expressed this way: we have done practically nothing to put the brakes on medical expansion. "In the past," observes Professor Boukhroufa, "people took herb preparations and similar things for some ailments. Now they go see a doctor. This is a sign of rising standard of living, but it is one which--under current conditions--forces doctors to deal only with the most immediate urgencies, in other words they must provide quantity instead of quality. They can do nothing else."

Humanize our hospitals? The Ministry of Public Health, according to Mr Yaker, is working on it: numerous improvements have been made to many hospitals in recent years, particularly with respect to facilitating the training of medical and paramedical personnel. Which brings up bed capacity. "Since 1962 we have not done any building in Algiers, because the authorities believed--correctly, moreover--that there was a great regional disparity in terms of health services. That is why the government decided to put an end to the special status enjoyed by the metropolitan areas. However, hospital construction plans have been on the books for a long time, but they have not been completed because of insufficient resources."

Also, one learns that hospitals in Bologhine, Zeralda, El Harrach and Ain-Taya are soon going to be opened, which will doubtless come as a great relief to those already existing. Nevertheless, hospital construction is not everything. One must also and above all give thought to providing an adequate budget, the necessary equipment, and vital human resources. Without those things, we will be trapped in the round of Sisyphus. It is well known that hospitals never get sufficient appropriations, in any country. Still, there is a minimum standard that must be observed, if these new hospitals are not to be stillborn.

"But when will we have hospitals as clean and accommodating as those one sees in that series RTA [Algerian Radio and Television] showed some time back, Doctor Welby?" is the bitter question raised by one person we encountered at

Mustapha. A doctor's answer: not tomorrow. His tone is not fatalistic, even less denigrating. It is a simple question of being realistic. It is impossible to build in only a few years what other countries have taken several decades to create. However, all the ingredients needed for it exist: a reasonable number of doctors, the determination of the public authorities, the juridical basis...Now all that is needed is to find a good recipe and a good cook. But that is another story, quite another story.

Statistics

The budgetary appropriation for hospitals has climbed from more than 4 billion Algerian dinars in 1979 to close to 9 billion in 1983.

In 1982 there were 742 health centers and 272 polyclinics, compared to 662 and 160 in 1979.

The number of beds has grown from 42,875 in 1979 to 44,445 in 1982.

Investment appropriations grew from 3,163 million dinars in the 1974-1979 period to 6,887 million dinars in the 1980-1984 period.

"Pro-Professor"

"I came to see Professor B..." The man was intransigent. The practitioners present in the room tried in vain to explain to him that one does not see a professor that way, that there are doctors qualified to do consultations, etc. He would have none of it. He was determined to speak to no one but Professor B...For him, no one is really a doctor unless he has the venerated title: professor.

How many people insist on speaking only to some professor with a well-established reputation for a simple cold, a migraine headache, the flu? Are our doctors (attention: residents, assistant lecturers) incompetent enough to justify that lack of confidence? Or is this nothing but an inveterate propensity on the part of some patients who are much more concerned about exhibitionism than efficiency?

Paradox

At Beni-Messous people are formal: an interne is not authorized to write out prescriptions. At most he can assist the resident at consultations.

At Mustapha, they speak a different language: it is said that the interne is allowed to examine the patient and to prescribe. If he runs into a problem, he refers it to someone with more seniority.

The question remains: do the regulations prohibit or authorize an interne to write prescriptions?

Organization?

Have we too many or too few specialists in Algiers? Officials of the three big hospitals in the capital are unanimous: the numbers are adequate in most specialties. But then how can one explain these excessive delays in getting

appointments? There is, it seems, an organizational problem in the sense that these medical celebrities are not always distributed in the most efficient way. Another explanation advanced by practitioners is the absence of a hierarchy of medical service facilities, meaning that the CHU (and thus the specialists) treat cases that really should go to the health centers. Where they exist.

More and Better

Contrary to what one might think, people today not only get more medical care than in the past, but also better, in that the number of doctors and specialists has grown considerably. Let us take as an example the cardiology clinic at Parnet Hospital, which in 1979 performed 1,116 consultations. In 1984 the figure was up to 2,500. Hospitalizations in that unit grew from 638 in 1979 to 1,428. In a word, an increasingly significant number of people are benefiting from care that previously--because of objective conditions--was available only to a few dozen of the "fortunate."

9516
CSO : 4519/129

ALGERIA

BRIEFS

ALGERIAN-MAURITANIAN FINANCIAL AGREEMENT--(APS)--Mohamed Fadel Ould Dah. Mauritanian minister of water supply and energy, paid an official visit to Algeria from 1 to 7 April. During his stay, the minister held talks with Boualem Benhamouda, member of the Political Bureau and minister of finance, Belkacem Nabi, member of the Central Committee and minister of energy and the chemical and petrochemical industries, and Mostefa Benamar, vice minister in charge of the budget. An agreement concerning the financing of reconstruction of the Nouadhibou refinery (Mauritania) and a framework agreement dealing with the reconstruction, operation and management to be entrusted to the Algerian operators of the same refinery, were signed yesterday afternoon at the Ministry of Energy and the Chemical and Petrochemical Industries in Algiers. The signing of the two documents was done by Belkacem Nabi, member of the Central Committee and minister of energy and the chemical and petrochemical industries, Mostefa Benamar, vice minister in charge of the budget, for Algeria, and Mohamed Fadel Ould Dah, minister of water supply and energy, for Mauritania. During the signing ceremony Nabi and Dah spoke to emphasize the importance of this new step in relations between the two countries, expressing their desire to work in the direction of greater friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the Maghreb. For Fadel, this is also a new phase marking the common determination of Algeria and Mauritania to cooperate closely and constituting a concrete expression of cooperation between two Third World countries within the context of privileged South-South relations. [Text] [Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 8 Apr 85 p 3] 11,464

UK FIRM WINS CONTRACT--Algeria has awarded a more than \$130mn contract to Britain's Baxter Fell International Co. for the de- [words missing in original] awarded by the Ministry of National Defence, is the British company's second in Algeria; in 1982, Baxter Fell won a \$10mn turnkey contract to build ten large supermarkets. Britain's official Export Credits Guarantee Department has guaranteed nearly 100mm for a loan for the project, the largest cover provided by the agency on a civilian loan to Algeria for ten years. Kleinwort Benson is leading a consortium of banks providing the financing for the project. Other banks include Britain's four major clearing banks--Midland, National Westminster, Barclay's and Lloyd's--as well as Morgan Grenfell and Banque Arabe et Internationale d'Investissement (BAII). Baxter Fell is a joint venture between F.J.C. Lilley, the Scottish contracting group, and Hoogovens (UK). [Text] [Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 25 Mar 85 pp 10, 11]

CSO: 4500/104

EGYPT

GHALI OUTLINES ISRAEL'S VIOLATIONS OF PEACE TREATY

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 26 Mar 85 p 4

[Interview with Dr Butrus Ghali, minister of state for foreign affairs, by Muhammad Barakat: "Dr Ghali Talks to Al-AKHBAR About Peace Treaty After 6 Years; Israel Violated Treaty by Annexing Jerusalem and Golan and by Aggression Against Lebanon; There Is No Connection Between Palestinian-Jordanian Agreement and Peace Treaty"]

[Text] Now that 6 years have passed since the conclusion of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, several questions and various criticism have been voiced regarding the treaty.

Egypt charges Israel with violating the word and spirit of the peace treaty by its aggression against Lebanon, its annexation of Jerusalem and the Golan and its acts of oppression in the West Bank, Gaza and South Lebanon, all of which have dictated the recall of Egyptian ambassador from Tel Aviv.

Israel, in its turn, considers that Egypt has violated the treaty by recalling its ambassador and not sending him back until now.

This is why we had this interview with Dr Butrus Ghali, the minister of state for foreign affairs, who responded in his capacity as one of those who shouldered the responsibility of the preliminary negotiations which led to concluding the treaty. The interview also covered the new Egyptian diplomatic movement, the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement and whether there is or there is not a connection between this agreement and the treaty.

[Question] To start, I said to Dr Butrus Ghali: Today, namely 26 March 1985, 6 years have passed since the conclusion of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Do you agree with what some people say, namely that the treaty died before it reached the age of 6 or do you think it is sick and dying?

[Answer] The peace treaty is alive and well. Egypt abides by it and clings to its provisions and spirit. Therefore, it is wrong to imagine that it has died. I can say that now that 6 years have passed, all have a clear vision. If the valiant Egyptian forces' crossing of the Suez

Canal on 6 October 1973 is considered a decisive victory for the Egyptian military, then the conclusion of the 26 March 1979 peace treaty is a decisive victory for Egyptian diplomacy.

[Question] You shouldered a fundamental responsibility in the Blair House negotiations which led to the peace treaty. What is your feeling today toward the role you performed in light of the developments of the past 6 years?

[Answer] During the Blair House negotiations, I was actually the acting minister of foreign affairs. But the Egyptian delegation was headed by Gen Kamal Hasan 'Ali, the minister of defense at the time. I only say this to give credit where credit is due. The delegation chairman played a fundamental role in the success of the negotiations, especially since the Egyptian side occupied an important part of the negotiations.

I am not at all saying this out of fear of responsibility because I feel now that the other members of the Egyptian delegation and I performed our duty at Blair House, God be thanked, and that the outcome of those negotiations is an accomplishment in every sense of the word.

Criticism of Treaty

[Question] Are you saying this despite the strong criticism that has been and continues to be voiced against the treaty?

[Answer] If we refer to the minutes of the debates which took place at the People's Assembly for tens of hours in 1979, we would find that most of the criticism directed at the treaty has since disappeared, has become insignificant and has lost its importance.

I recall, for example, the objection of the opposition members to having the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai staged over 3 years and their demand that the withdrawal be completed in 1 year. Where is this criticism now that the withdrawal has taken place? Let me also note the criticism voiced against Egypt's exporting of oil to Israel. Those who criticized this position did not take into account the development which has caused the world oil market to experience a glut and a drop in prices.

[Question] But don't you think that the security arrangements established in the treaty for the Sinai have limited and undermined Egyptian sovereignty over this area?

[Answer] I do not agree with this view. Egypt's sovereignty over the Sinai is as complete as its sovereignty over any other part of the Egyptian homeland. The security arrangements do not at all undermine Egypt's sovereignty as long as they have been established with Egypt's approval and by an Egyptian decision.

Added to this are the security arrangements present on both sides of the borders, meaning that what is applied to Egypt also applies to Israel.

On top of all this, these arrangements are temporary by nature and I do not exclude the possibility that they will be reconsidered in the coming period through communication between the two sides.

[Question] Does this mean that you are satisfied with the phrasing of the treaty provisions despite the criticisms leveled against them?

[Answer] I cannot say that I am satisfied with the phrasing of every provision in the treaty and I do not claim that the treaty reflects perfection. Perfection belongs to God alone. Technically, I, in my capacity as a lawyer, can point out the flaws in some provisions and articles. There are provisions that lack clarity, others that are not specific and yet others that do not contain our objectives and demands explicitly. But the provisions we achieved after difficult negotiations were, in my evaluation, the best we could achieve under the then prevalent conditions.

Moreover, the important thing is not so much in the provisions as it is in the acts, results and spirit prevalent in the translation of these provisions into a tangible reality. The main outcome of the peace treaty has been Israel's withdrawal from all the Egyptian territories it had occupied since 1967.

What about Taba?

[Question] Excluding Taba?

[Answer] The importance of Taba is not due to its size or area. We are involved in more of a technical dispute over the demarcation of borders than in a dispute over land. Taba is no more than 1 feddan in acreage. But the matter concerns principle and concerns Egypt's refusal to relinquish a single inch of its territory. In accordance with the preamble of the peace treaty, Egypt and Israel agree on the need to settle the disputes emanating from the implementation of interpretation of the treaty through negotiation. Should this be impossible, we must resort to compromise or to arbitration. We are now asking the Israeli side to form an arbitration committee to settle the dispute. Moreover, Taba is not the only bone of contention in demarking the borders because there are several spots where we have disagreement over the location of the borders between Egypt and Israel. Most of these disputes concern no more than a few meters which seem even less significant because they are in the heart of the desert. But as I have already said, the matter concerns principle and the refusal to relinquish a single inch of the Egyptian territory.

Palestinian Gains

[Question] You point out the gain made by Egypt. But don't you think that the problem is that the gain has been confined to Egypt alone, excluding the Arab countries and the Palestinian people?

[Answer] The Egyptian plan was founded on linking the Egyptian part with the Palestinian part and, consequently, with the comprehensive solution. Therefore, the peace treaty was coupled with a special complementary agreement concerning the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In addition to the withdrawal from the Sinai, the Israeli military government was supposed to withdraw from the Bank and the Strip and to establish full Palestinian self-rule there.

[Question] Are you satisfied with this complementary agreement, considering that no progress has been achieved to implement it?

[Answer] We must know what this complementary agreement contains in order that we may be able to pass judgment on it. This agreement is no more than a framework for negotiations. The agreement states that Egypt and Israel agreed to begin the negotiations within a month after exchanging the instruments of ratification of the treaty and that the two governments declared that they plan to negotiate continually and with good will in order to complete the negotiations as soon as possible. Moreover, a period of 1 year was set to complete these negotiations. The agreement also states that the Israeli military government would be withdrawn from the Bank and the Strip and replaced by Palestinian self-rule. The agreement also provides for withdrawing the Israeli forces and redeploying them in limited and specific security positions. Is there anything wrong with these provisions which could have constituted a step toward enabling the Palestinian people to exercise their legitimate rights?

If the Israeli side has not abided by the provisions of this complementary agreement and has not observed its provisions out of good will, then this does not mean that the agreement in itself is bad or deficient. Rather, I believe that the Israeli side's procrastination is an indication of how positive the provisions of the agreement are, and of how far Israel committed itself through this treaty to settle all aspects of the Palestinian problem. Israel has procrastinated only to avoid these commitments.

It suffices to say that had Israel implemented the commitments undertaken in the complementary agreement and had it observed its pledges with good will, we would today be at the end of the transition period and the threshold of a new phase permitting the Palestinian people to exercise their right to self-determination.

[Question] But is this complementary agreement still extant?

[Answer] Yes, it is actually still extant and the proof is that we are asking the U.S. administration to continue to play the role of full partner and to take part in all the phases of negotiation. Our legal argument in making this demand is the paragraph in the final provision of the agreement stating that the U.S. administration shall fully participate in all phases of negotiation. As long as we have not reached another negotiation framework with the approval of all the parties concerned, then our interest dictates that the agreement continue to exist.

Ambassador's Recall

[Question] You charge Israel with failing to observe the complementary agreement whereas Israel charges Egypt with failing to observe the original treaty. To put it specifically, the Israeli side says that Egypt violated the first article of the appendix to the treaty which speaks of the "agreement of the two sides to establish diplomatic and consular relations and to exchange ambassadors upon completion of the first phase of the Israeli forces' withdrawal from the Sinai." The Israeli side says that Egypt violated this article when it recalled its ambassador from Tel Aviv more than 2 years ago.

[Answer] This is an Israeli distortion or, at best, an Israeli mis-understanding of the said article and of its correct meaning. In accordance with the treaty, Egypt undertook to send an ambassador and we did not honor and implement our commitment when we decided to appoint an Egyptian ambassador to Israel.

But we never undertook to keep this ambassador there forever. The true nature of what Egypt pledged was to normalize the relations, i.e., to have with Israel normal relations similar to Egypt's relations with other countries of the world. Egypt is entitled to recall its ambassador from any of the world's capitals if it decides to do so. Should we exclude Israel from this? Is it reasonable that we should not have the right to recall our ambassador as we wish and whenever we wish? Egypt has the right to recall its ambassadors from Israel and from other countries without any stipulation or restriction. Anything to the contrary is a legal distortion and an empty allegation.

Our Egyptian ambassador was recalled from Israel as an expression of our total rejection of the policy of aggression which Israel has pursued in Lebanon. Diplomatic representation is of the essence of the acts of sovereignty.

Jordanian-Palestinian Agreement

[Question] But Egypt has now begun a new diplomatic movement and has presented new ideas to move the peace process forward in the wake of the 11 February agreement between Jordan and the PLO. What is the connection between this movement and the peace treaty, and what is the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement's connection with this treaty?

[Answer] There is no connection between the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement and the peace treaty. However, there is no doubt that the peace treaty helps to create the political climate which allows Egypt to contribute to building bridges between the Palestinian-Jordanian positions and the Israeli positions.

The ideas presented by Egypt and the current Egyptian diplomatic movement seek to create a dialogue and to push the negotiations forward with the aim of reaching a just, lasting and comprehensive solution.

Therefore, there is absolutely no contradiction between this movement and the peace treaty. Egypt stressed as of the first day of the peace initiative that it is committed to full flexibility insofar as the means are concerned while, at the same time, fully clinging to the objective. The objective is to enable the Palestinian people to exercise their rights and to restore the Arab territories occupied since 1967. This is an objective from which we will not swerve and one over which there can be no flexibility. As for how to achieve it, we will knock on every door and will follow every path that may lead to the objective, whether the path is self-rule negotiations, an international conference, Jordanian-Palestinian-U.S. negotiations, President Reagan's proposals, the Fez initiative or other means. There is continuity in the Egyptian policy insofar as the objective is concerned and flexibility insofar as the means are concerned.

Israel's Actions

[Question] Finally, I asked Dr Ghali: Mr Minister, don't you consider Israel's actions in the Bank, the Strip and in South Lebanon violations of the peace treaty?

[Answer] The peace treaty is founded on the principles and objectives of the United Nations and on the rules of general international law. When Israel violates the rules of international law by violating the human rights in the Bank and the Strip and by its acts of oppression in the occupied Arab territories, there is no doubt that it violates the peace treaty. We consider the Israeli aggression against Lebanon and the Israeli annexation of the Syrian Golan and of Arab Jerusalem acts in total violation of the word and spirit of the peace treaty.

8498
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EGYPT

SOCIOLOGISTS, ARTISTS ANALYZE CRIME WAVE OF RAPES

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 19 Mar 85 p 7

[Article by Mary Ya'qub, Najwa 'Abd-al-Hamid, Mayisah Hafiz and Hibatallah Yusuf: "Sociologists and Artists Discuss Cause of Crime Wave of Rapes; Dr Hisham Abu al-Nasr: Illicit Wealth Behind Rape; Dr Samiyah al-Sa'ati: Information Media Teach Our Youth Crime"]

[Text] The crime of rape still stirs and provokes public opinion and arouses anger and fear.

People are still looking for a sensible explanation for this crime.

Is the cause psychological, economic, social or...?

Is the cause the information media and the decadent films? The answer is offered by this report in which scientists, artists and others express their opinion.

Dr Samiyah al-Sa'ati, a sociology professor at 'Ayn Shams University, said: We must sound the alarm for all the agencies concerned with youth because Egyptian society, which is called the safe society, has begun to lose its best qualities, causing people to be scared.

Despite the heinous nature of these crimes about which we have begun to talk a lot these days, I must note that the direct reason for the emergence of these heinous crimes is society's basic disregard for the crimes to which women are exposed, such as robbing women and snatching things from them and victimizing them. Here is where the danger lies. It is in the nature of things to begin small and then develop. This is what is happening to women in our society now. We must first restore respect for women and we must return to the principles of our Egyptianism which are embodied in harmony and in viewing the individual as part of the group.

We must return to the concept of the "neighborhood girl." Until the recent past, the men living in a quarter considered themselves responsible for a "neighborhood girl" and considered her like a sister or a mother. This feeling has diminished and the reason for this decline is

"individualism" and the pursuit of material things, which cause the decay of morals. We find that the social bond has nearly vanished and the family bond has disappeared. This is, of course, the result of materialism's predominance in man's life. As soon as morals vanish from a society, individualism develops and this individualism encourages people with weak souls to commit anything, even a crime, to serve themselves.

We must also not forget the role of the information media, especially of television and of the movies, which are the direct means for teaching crime. We find that some programs offer detailed explanations, through movies or other kinds of media, on how crimes are committed, with the officials thinking that such programs tell the youth: Stay away from crime. But what is happening is probably producing the opposite because such programs are capable of influencing youth with weak souls and who are ready to imitate. Even suicide may perhaps have supporters among the weak in spirit. I urge those in charge of trying the youth who have committed rape not to rush into issuing their sentences and to provide the opportunity to study the cases of these youths scientifically so as to use this study to establish criteria to be applied in the future. Even if the death sentence is issued against such people, I am, scientifically, against executing the death sentence in a public place so that the opportunity may not be provided to others who are weak or sick in spirit to emulate them as heroes. When executed in a public place, others may be encouraged to emulate them.

Dr Samiyah al-Sa'ati added: These crimes must not be exaggerated or underestimated. All that there is to the matter is that an alarm is being sounded to awaken us from our slumber because these crimes are the consequence of laxity toward the problems that occur and of the officials' failure to tackle these problems.

Return to National Dream

Playwright 'Ali Salim said: The crimes publicized by the press recently are incidents that ordinarily happen in all societies. However, the press has begun to publish the details of such crimes. This is good and warns us to be alert to the dangers of this age. As a result of the relative freedom of the press, the press has been actively publishing such news reports.

However, facts mix with lies in these incidents, meaning that the press often facilitates the perpetration of such crimes. Swift trial and punishment and the assertion of the state's authority are capable of putting these cases in their right place.

Regarding the direct reasons for the delinquency of youth and for their perpetration of such crimes as theft, rape and even the so-called "illegal organizations" with a religious or political character and regarding the youth's frustration and their feeling of alienation in their own land, 'Ali Salim said: We are going through a period when the national dream

is nonexistent. Clarifying what he means by a national dream, he said: It is a big national objective at the internal and external levels--a dream in which every citizen feels that he is contributing toward the achievement of an objective that is beneficial to himself and to his country.

The ideal solution to all these problems is development at faster rates than the present rates because frustration and the feeling of misery are the inevitable inlet to crime. The information media, the publishing houses and the cultural and educational institutions have failed to offer ideal models to youth. Thus, aggression becomes more active in the youth's souls than their constructive and creative capabilities.

This is why I say that youth must be given a national dream, not through laws and bureaucratic decrees but through clear and tangible action. Self-esteem must also be restored and Egyptians must be reminded of the fruits of work.

Rapid Aggrandizement and Rapid Increase in Rape

Dr Hisham Abu al-Nasr said: There is no doubt that the information media currently play a major role in the spread of crime. But they are not the only factor. We would be neglecting other aspects if we were to say this because social, economic and political conditions also have their role.

The economic changes that have developed in the past 10 years have greatly changed the ethics of some people. These changes have created opportunities for rapid enrichment and a new class has emerged. Moreover, the changes have been tempting people with a variety of consumer goods. Another class incapable of acquiring such goods has also been created and this class has resorted to illegal means to obtain these commodities.

What has happened is that the information media have served, rather than fought, these conditions and have been fostering them under the canopy of the same authority which issued these economic decrees without realizing the enormity of the consequences of such decrees.

Moreover, there are a large number of poorly selected, and I do not know whether selected intentionally or out of ignorance, films that glorify the United States as a whole, glorify the consumerist values prevalent in U.S. society and glorify the wealth which makes the viewer covet it. These films also glorify gangs. The movie "Bonnie and Clyde" is a folklore saga of two criminals (a man and a woman) who rob banks. This film has been shown on Arab television. On the other hand, we find that there is strict censorship over all forms of thought. Any idea that does not trumpet the ruling party's theories is banned.

Whereas anything containing a semblance of opposition is banned, there are numerous movies that glorify Western values incompatible with ours and glorify crime. Such films are shown on our television and without any objection as long as they are American. Here is where the danger of the media surfaces.

There is a contradiction as close as can be to schizophrenia in the information media. While the government calls daily for encouraging Egyptian products, we find that most of Egyptian television's time is taken up by commercials glorifying foreign products, even though most of them are luxury goods that are incompatible with our economic conditions.

Social Environment Is Reason

Farid Shawqi said: It is true that I have acted in numerous films depicting crime. But they demonstrate how a criminal is created and what his ultimate end is so that nobody may think that he can commit a crime and escape punishment. Such films make people think twice before committing a crime, regardless of the circumstances.

Crime must be preceded by a poor environment which makes a youth turn into a criminal. There are reasons that motivate a person to commit a crime. By my nature, I like to tackle social problems with any means at my disposal. The movies are my only weapon and this is why I have been interested in acting in this type of film through which we discuss the environment in which a criminal lives, a criminal's upbringing and a criminal's social problem that motivates him to commit a crime. We then show to the end of such a criminal and the consequence of what he does, which is jail or execution, meaning that crime must be punished.

Crime is nowadays different from the past. The biggest crime in the past was to rob a safe but nowadays there are those who rob banks. As for the rape incidents about which we hear nowadays, they did not exist in Egypt in the past. The most a young man did was to tease a girl or take her to a park or for a boat ride.

As for today's young men, they study for 16 years to graduate and then get a job paying 40 pounds a month. A young man falls in love with a girl and she falls in love with him but he cannot get an apartment or come up with enough money to pay the dowry and to buy the engagement ring or anything else. The engagement and the marriage are thus ruined and the youth strays or develops a "repression" that drives him to rape.

Even though I support the execution of young men committing the crime of rape, I do not blame them because there are factors that have led them to this end.

Shawqi added: People no longer fall in love with each other. The age of romance has ended. In the past, a young man and woman would sit in a park and talk of their dreams and fancies whereas now they discuss how to get an apartment or purchase furniture.

As individuals, we no longer love each other nowadays or show concern for each other. Rather, each is concerned with his own interest first and foremost.

Environment and Social Problems

There is no doubt that the role of the educational process has declined horribly and that education has become the job of the family alone at a time when the family is immersed in numerous problems. As Freud's theory asserts, the first 7 years of life are the formative years. Through examination, we have found that a large number of delinquents failed in the elementary education stage and then turned to crime through which they accumulated big fortunes. Such people failed to acquire moral immunity through the educational process and this is why they have not learned how to invest soundly the monies they acquired through crime. Thus, such people turn to all kinds of delinquency, such as drugs which put them in a state of unconsciousness under which they commit crimes. We cannot deny the influence of the information media and what consequences the media can create. Television, which is the most influential medium at present, does not educate as much as it teaches crime. Add videos to the television because there are video films that go beyond all legal, moral and social boundaries and that clearly teach the youth how to stray.

Artist Salah al-Sa'dani added: "As strongly as we demand the freedom of the press, we must more strongly demand the freedom of the information media because we are in a country where the illiteracy rate amounts to 70 percent of the population. Therefore, the majority of the people may not be able to read whereas they can see and hear. Therefore, the influence of the television and radio is much more significant than that of the press. However, we do not demand permissiveness but rather freedom of artistic action.

Let this freedom be supervised by a censorship committee, not a committee of bureaucrats but a committee comprised of such people as Zaki Najib Mahfuz, Louis 'Awad, 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Sharqawi and others. The government must also have confidence in this generation's artists who are more alert to and aware of the social issue than artists of the past generation.

8494
CSO: 4504/283

EGYPT

AL-AHRAM ATTACKS 'TERRORIST' AL-QADHDHAFI

PM071243 AL-AHRAM in Arabic 3 Apr 85 p 7

[Editorial: "Libyan Terror Once Again"]

[Text] The Libyan Terrorist plan against Egypt which the general intelligence and state security services uncovered once again demonstrates the role the Libyan authorities' fingers are playing in the attempt to undermine the security and stability of our country.

While Egypt always operates openly and in the daylight and acts in a clear and straightforward manner, the ruling authorities in Libya continue to operate in the shadows and to be dedicated to acts of violence and sabotage.

The ruling Libyan authorities which are in control of the Libyan people's fate are not ashamed of the role they are playing with total disregard to fraternal relations and neighborly ties between two fraternal peoples. Rather they are publicly talking about what they are doing before the whole world and all members of the international community.

The Libyan news agency, which is controlled by the ruling regime in Tripoli, said the day before yesterday that the so-called "revolutionary violence front," whose formation the ruling Libyan authorities announced Friday, has decided to set up "joint struggle forces" under Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi's leadership whose goal is to fight against all peace initiatives in the Middle East, including the Jordanian-Palestinian accord which the PLO approved and the Fez resolutions issued by the 14th Arab summit.

In his press statements Colonel al-Qadhdhafi never tires of saying that he is a terrorist, that his name is on the list of international terrorists, and that he would like to cut off the heads of all Arab kings and presidents.

We in Egypt are capable of protecting our country from al-Qadhdhafi's foolishness, but we can only sympathize with our Libyan brothers whose misfortune is that the head of the regime in their country is a man who prides himself on being a terrorist and head of the "unified" sabotage forces.

CSO: 4500/91

EGYPT

CAIRO PROGRAM BROADCASTS VIEWS OF ISLAMIC SCHOLAR

NC101400

[Editorial Report] Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic at 1115 GMT on 10 April 1985 broadcasts a 45-minute program entitled "A Witness To The Age" [Shahid 'ala al-'asr]. The weekly program is prepared and presented by 'Umar Battishah. At the beginning of the 10 April program, Battishah says: "Dear friends, may God's peace and mercy be with you. In last week's program, we listened to the first part of a talk by the great scholar Dr Ahmad Shalabi, professor and director of the Department of Islamic History and Civilization at Dar al-'Ulum. In his talk, he dealt with the reasons for the emergence of deviationist religious and non-religious doctrines, and shortage of preachers. He also spoke about contemporary man, his surrender to materialism, his economic fears, and the discrepancies between prices, wages, and incomes. He called for the redistribution of the labor force and the reorganization of education to fill the shortage in craftsmen, to develop the countryside and the desert, and to face the brain drain. He also underlined the role of Islamic preachers in fortifying our youth against deviationist tendencies and doctrines."

Battishah then says: "Dear friends, we now move to the second part of his talk." A dialogue then ensues in which Shalabi answers a question by Battishah on the reasons for the poverty and backwardness of some Islamic nations in Asia and Africa. Shalabi recalls Islam's success in science, medicine, and education in the early ages when "Westerners, and even their kings, could not write their names." Shalabi says that the reasons for ignorance and poverty among Islamic nations lie not in Islam; the reasons are that the Muslims have deviated from Islam. He cites illiteracy as the reason for poverty and backwardness. He notes that there is a shortage of educators in Egypt caused by the emigration of teachers seeking higher pay in other countries.

In response to another question, Dr Shalabi discussed some aspects of Islamic jurisprudence. He notes that Islamic jurisprudence is very specific and is valid for all ages. He cites Islamic law on inheritance and marriage.

In the only reference to Bahais during the interview, Dr Shalabi says: "I want to stress that all the onslaught is against Islam. Therefore, Islam must defend itself." He adds: "Let us defend Islam and explain Islam's position toward these myths or these attempts, which are called by various names, such as existentialism. We have our principles. Suppose existentialists come, we talk to them. Suppose communists come, we talk to them. Suppose Bahais come, we talk to them. I will face them myself without needing any help."

Dr Shalabi then answers a question on the role of women in Islamic society. He also discusses the harm of smoking and the need to prevent cigarette advertisements on billboards and video cassettes, saying that it is not enough that the government has banned such advertisements on radio and television.

At the end of the program, Battishah says: "Dear friends, a new witness will testify to the age next week."

CSO: 4500/91

EGYPT

BRIEFS

U.S.-PLO DIALOGUE PREDICTED--Cairo, 15 Apr (MENA)--The 16 April issue of AL-AHRAM predicts that it will not be long before President Reagan's administration opens a dialogue with the PLO within the framework of a U.S.-Jordanian-Palestinian dialogue, which President Husni Mubarak has suggested. During such a dialogue the Palestinians must explain their issue to all U.S. officials so that the United States will not be monopolized by Israel. The paper writes: An interesting point is that communication exists between the PLO and U.S. parliamentary delegations. In addition to the recent meeting between 'Arafat and a U.S. congressional delegation, comprising five members of the Senate and House of Representatives, a similar meeting was held less than 3 years ago in July 1982. AL-AHRAM adds that communication between the PLO and the U.S. congress does exist, although not formally. Former President Jimmy Carter has noted that contacts were held in the past between the PLO and officials in his former government. [Text] [NC160603 Cairo MENA in Arabic 2225 GMT 15 Apr 85]

MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES JOURNALISTS UNION--Egypt agreed that Cairo be the seat of the Union of Mediterranean Countries Journalists, headed by Ahmad Hamrush, chairman of the Egyptian Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. Hamrush said that the founding conference of the Journalists of Mediterranean Countries, which was held in Malta in July 1983, had decided to form a union for the journalists of the Mediterranean countries and chose Cairo as seat for this union. [Text] [Cairo MENA in English 1544 GMT 8 Apr 85 NC]

ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS WITH JAPAN--Three agreements were signed at the Planning Ministry today calling for the promotion of economic cooperation between Egypt and Japan. The agreements, which have a total value of some 52 billion yen, seek to strengthen national programs in the fields of agriculture and land reclamation. [Summary] [Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic 1230 GMT 19 Apr 85 NC]

INDUSTRIAL AGREEMENT WITH GDR--A memorandum of understanding between Egypt and the GDR was signed at the Ministry of Industry today. Industry Minister Muhammad 'Abd al-Wahhab signed on Egypt's behalf, while Guenther Kleiber, deputy chairman of the State Council, signed for the GDR. The memorandum calls for bilateral cooperation in the auto industry, with special emphasis on passenger cars and military trucks. [Excerpt] [Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic 2000 GMT 19 Apr 85 NC]

OPPOSITION GROUP DECLARATION--The Egyptian Arab revolutionary force in Al-Bayan Al Awal (Benghazi) declared its accession to the national Command of the Revolutionary Forces in the Arab World. The declaration came in a message to the Leader of the Revolution. The Egyptian revolutionary force asserted in their message that "due to the deteriorating situation being suffered by the Arab nation, the Egyptian Arab revolutionary force in Al Bayan Al Awal (Benghazi) declares its accession to the National Command of the revolutionary force in the Arab World and vows God and the revolutionary Leader Colonel Muammar al Qaddafi to sacrifice everything for the elimination of reactionary forces and symbols of treachery in Egypt. The Egyptian Arab revolutionary force undertakes to use all the means at its disposal to eliminate the puppet Egyptian regime and hit the interests of the common enemy of the Arab nation wherever they may be. [Text] [Valetta THE JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 13 Apr 85 p 3]

CSO: 4500/106

LIBYA

BRIEFS

NEW ARMS FACTORY--The Leader of the Revolution, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, opened an arms factory amid celebrations for the 15th anniversary of the expulsion of the Colonial British bases. The opening celebration was attended by the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, Brigadier Abu Baker Younis Saber, the Commanders of different forces, delegations participating in the National Command for the Arab revolutionary forces and a number of the armed forces officers. On this occasion the Leader of the Revolution wrote these words in the factory's record: --"This is a significant achievement on the road to independence and the establishment of armed people that will never be defeated forward. Colonel Muammar Qathafi." [Text] [Valetta THE JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 13 Apr 85 p 2]

'DECISION-MAKING PROCESS' LECTURE--A LECTURE was recently given in Malta on the decision-making process in the Jamahiriya by Dr Ali Shembex of the university of Gar Younis in Benghazi. Dr Shembex, who is an associate professor at the university, explained the "People's Authority" to the audience who attended the lecture and which was largely made up of several professors from the university of Malta and several other persons interested to learn more about the novel order of governing which is today being practised in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. The lecturer also discussed several points which were brought up by the audience during his explanation of the decision-making process. [Text] [Valetta THE JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 13 Apr 85 p 3]

REVOLUTION FORCE ISSUES STATEMENT--The patriotic unions, the Revolution Force in Beirut, have announced their support to the National Command Revolutionary Forces in the Arab homeland. In a statement they sent to the Leader of the Revolution they said: "From steadfast Beirut we talk to you to express our deep feelings of pride and appreciation for the achievements of the Great al Fateh Revolution. This revolution is the lighthouse for the revolution and struggle forces. It showed them the right road to Arab unit, the armed struggle against imperialism and zionism, the revolutionary thought of the revolutionary thinker Muammar Gathafi, the Green Book. From Beirut we hereby declare our support to the National Command for the Arab revolutionary forces, the integration of all the honest revolutionary forces which will pave the road for victory through the national struggle you are leading." [Text] [Valetta THE JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 13 Apr 85 p 7]

CSO: 4500/105

MOROCCO

EFFECT OF EEC EXPANSION DISCUSSED BY COMMERCE MINISTER

Rabat L'OPINION in French 8 Apr 85 pp 1, 3

[Interview of 7 April with Azzedine Guessous, minister of commerce, industry and tourism, by Nadia Salah; place not given]

[Text] The statement made by the European Council following the meeting of 28 and 29 March marks the political determination of the European Community to conceive an overall strategy for the development of countries on the southern Mediterranean with balanced, harmonious relations.

It wants to find mutually satisfactory solutions in keeping with the concerns expressed by the North African countries mainly over the consequences of the expansion.

However, already seriously "burned" by similar statements of intention, Morocco, like Tunisia, is asking to see the real and practical content of the March 1985 statement.

The similarity of the current situation with that of May 1984 causes observers to ask about the imagination of political Europe in the face of the complexity of the problems posed and the ability of that Europe to guide arbitration that will take place at the level of Community experts.

These questions take on their true dimensions at the time of the visit of Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Andreotti, whose country, as president of the Community, has played a key role in the progress of the expansion and also backed the sponsorship of the Council's declaration.

Yesterday morning, L'OPINION therefore asked Minister of Trade Guessous what Morocco's reaction was to the Brussels statement and whether, in the overlapping of the interests and objectives of both sides, there is a solution acceptable to everyone.

[Question] There are two ways of interpreting the statement of the Ten: optimistically because of the resumption of certain principles by Moroccan memoranda or pessimistically because of the absence of any concrete proposal. What is the right way?

[Answer] It is too soon to try to interpret the statement. In general, regarding statements of intentions, we are often overwhelmed, but in the text of 29 March, beyond statements of principle, we see no concrete mechanism permitting the rapid realization of objectives without risk involved.

Actually, the statement of the Ten gives no indication about the practical ways of achieving the objectives of maintaining markets.

One must therefore wait to see the practical conditions of Spain and Portugal's membership in order to see how it enables one to envisage solutions to our countries' requests.

The May 1984 declaration already affirmed the importance of the guarantee to be given to commercial trade from our countries and the importance of not halting that flow. Next, there were certain suggestions regarding what is called the "modulations of the PAC mechanisms," that is, the adaptation of Community mechanisms to permit the achievement of objectives set by the statement. That is where we noted that the modulations proposed in no way corresponded to the objectives and did not permit the achievement of the objectives.

Last week's declaration refers the matter to the commission that must propose instructions on negotiations in order to adapt our cooperation agreement to the legal and economic situation created by the expansion. One must therefore wait to make a final pronouncement on the European position.

What we want is for one to move away from these declarations of intentions, to propose something concrete, precise and technical. What we fear is that the experts, the only ones who know all the subtleties and the entire complexity of the Community dossier, may drain the declarations made by the political organs of their meaning.

We want practical technical mechanisms making it possible, as the statement says, to safeguard the commercial flow and ensure the development of our countries. We are still waiting.

[Question] What will Morocco tell Mr Andreotti?

[Answer] The Italian presidency naturally has a fundamental role to play, first of all, because Rome appeared at the outset to be the leader of countries that were relatively reticent over the particular status of our products on the Common Market and second, because Italy must now be the driving force of the expansion. I believe that the declaration it sponsored makes Italy a country that will have every interest in protecting complementary economies and economic inter-dependency on both sides of the Mediterranean. I believe that Andreotti and the Italian authorities are perfectly aware of their historic responsibilities and of the key role they must play. The future of relations between North Africa and Europe is in their hands.

[Question] What forms can measures to support traditional trade take and can one hope that the search for mutually satisfactory solutions will eliminate current impediments to Moroccan exports?

[Answer] In the two memoranda presented to the Community organs, we have already made a number of proposals. They were widely reported in the press. I shall therefore not go back to them. I shall simply emphasize that the real modulation of the restrictive mechanisms of the PAC, a return to the spirit and letter of the '76 accord, with respect to our industrial and mainly textile products, are the only ones that might preserve our traditional exports and reduce the structural deficit of our trade balance vis-a-vis the Community.

If the political will exists, there will be no insurmountable difficulties in achieving these objectives.

[Question] How is one to reconcile the rapid evolution of the Moroccan economy and therefore, its supply of products, with the commercial "sensitivities" of Europe? Will that sensitivity be greater or less great in the Europe of the Twelve?

[Answer] Whatever the case, in medium-range terms, with respect to the level of the Moroccan supply, both agricultural and industrial, we know that it cannot threaten the equilibrium of the Community market. For nearly all the products that we export, our share of the market is very modest, but the impact of those exports on our trade balance, on employment in this country, on our economy in general, is extremely important, on the other hand.

The Community is perfectly aware of these factors. It all therefore amounts to knowing to what extent it is possible to adapt certain aspects of the common policies in order to give our products the chance to compete loyally with the Community supply.

The expanded Community, with the incentives supplied by the PAC for the formation of production surpluses, will be able to meet all its needs for Mediterranean products. Consequently, is it desirable to maintain the mechanisms that distort the market laws to our disadvantage and prevent the preferential partners of the EEC from benefiting from their comparative advantages?

[Question] Then what should they do?

[Answer] Why not plan for the PAC mechanisms to be modified in such a way as to permit Morocco's exportation of traditional quantities and not come into play until that level is exceeded?

The precedents exist. Once again, it is a matter of political will.

A kind of fairly peaceful commercial coexistence has existed for several years. No one is content. We especially are not. Nor is anyone very dissatisfied, especially ourselves.

Why introduce mechanisms into sectors that have reached a balance?

The solution in keeping with Community mechanisms would be to say the following: Until we reach the quantities that we traditionally export, those mechanisms are inactive, then revived as soon as those levels are surpassed.

[Question] Concerning the situation now emerging, can Moroccan exporters now define new strategies? What are they?

[Answer] From the very beginning, the policy of the government of the king was oriented toward the diversification of our commercial markets. Independently of the matter of the expansion, it is important for our commercial potential to be developed on all markets and it is vital, as the old saying goes, "not to put all your eggs in one basket."

To cite but the case of citrus fruit, nearly half of our exports are outside the EEC. Important inroads have been made by exporters on the American market, in the Middle East, and so on.

The proximity of the EEC market, the ease with which it can be approached, for historic reasons, must not hide the other outlets.

We therefore intend to continue to diversify our partners, but Europe must remain our natural market for an important part of our production.

11.464
CSO: 4519/138

MOROCCO

\$1-BILLION ARMS EXPENDITURE OVER NEXT FIVE YEARS

Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 25 Mar 85 p 5

[Text]

King Hassan of Morocco says he will spend \$1bn over the next five years to modernise his land, sea and air forces to ensure a complete victory over the Polisario Front, fighting for the independence of the Western Sahara. The king said the war against the guerrillas could last "a long time".

The declaration contradicts reports in *The Observer* earlier this month that the war in the Sahara was over "bar the diplomatic shouting" and that Morocco had won. The statement also underlines King Hassan's determination to fight the war to the finish and not to look for diplomatic or political solutions. This resolution was behind the failure of recent Tunisian attempts to convene a Maghreb summit to discuss the war.

Speaking in Al-Ayoun, the capital of the Western Sahara, to the local elected Consultative Assembly, the Moroccan monarch said: "We must modernise the army and prepare ourselves, because this war could last a long time."

He continued: "We must have one billion dollars — neither more nor less. Then the land, sea and air units of the Royal Armed Forces would be up to their responsibilities and be able to follow the technological demands of the twenty-first century." The armed forces were currently fighting with equipment that was more than ten years old, he said.

The Polisario last month celebrated the ninth anniversary of its revolt to prevent Morocco taking over the territory evacuated by Spain in 1975, and to declare an independent Sahara Arab Democratic Republic. However, Morocco appears to have secured the upper hand, partly because of last year's coup in Mauritania, which brought to power a leader less sympathetic to the Polisario, and partly because Morocco has managed to push the huge defensive sand walls virtually to the Algerian border. This is forcing Polisario to launch its attacks from behind the Algerian frontier, but making Moroccan air-strikes difficult because of the risk of over-flying Algerian territory.

The Moroccans claim that Polisario is getting military supplies from Algeria and the Soviet Union, including advanced BMP-1 armoured vehicles, eight of which were captured intact near the Algerian border in October. Polisario also uses Soviet anti-aircraft missiles, with which it shot down a Moroccan Mirage F-1 fighter and two unarmed civilian aircraft earlier this year.

The king also announced plans to develop the Western Sahara's iron ore, phosphate and oil deposits and fishing, both to strengthen the regional economy and to help pay for the arms. He said iron ore deposits discovered near Smara were richer than those around Tindouf in Algeria, usually regarded as among the richest in the continent.

CSO: 4500/103

MOROCCO

RESULTS OF 1983-1984 AGRICULTURAL PROGRAM

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 8 Apr 85 p 8

[Text] The 1983-1984 season was below average, but better than 1983, which was rather poor. Actually, total production is dominated by grain and livestock raising (two-thirds of the total, approximately), both practiced in dry farming areas and therefore dependent upon climate conditions. The important buffer effect provided by the dams essentially acts upon other crops, although it was also affected by the persistent drought that struck the country between 1981 and 1984.

In 1984, agriculture therefore had to withstand the whims of the climate, characterized by delayed rains and especially, their poor distribution in time and over the different farming regions, a situation fortunately in contrast with the current year. Let us look at the results for 1983-1984.

1983-1984 Season in Figures

Grain

The total grain harvest reached 37,498,700 quintals in 1983-' compared with 35,733,900 in 1982-1983, a slight increase of 4.9 percent. tal area cul- tivated was 4,478 million hectares, with an average yield of quintals per hectare.

For the main grain crops, the season ended with a crop of 36,30,700 quintals, compared with 34,565,600 quintals the previous year, an increase of 5.8 percent. This rate of increase actually covers a drop in hard wheat and corn production and an improvement in the production of soft wheat and barley. The area reserved for the main grains was 4,365 million hectares, including 1.123 million for hard wheat, 733,300 hectares for soft wheat, 2,126 million for barley and 383,600 hectares for corn. Regarding yield, the average was 8.4 quintals per hectare, covering a difference depending on the crop: 10.4 quintals for hard wheat; 11.2 quintals for soft wheat; 6.6 quintals for barley; and 6.9 quintals for corn. On the whole, yield improved from one season to the next, going from 7.6 to 8.4 quintals per hectare.

The following table shows the trend in production for the past 3 years [next page]:

Production (in 1,000 Quintals)	1981-1982	1982-1983	1983-1984
Hard wheat	14,062.0	12,385.5	11,712.8
Soft wheat	7,771.8	7,317.8	8,182.0
Barley	23,337.6	12,278.7	14,046.3
Corn	2,468.9	2,583.6	2,639.6
Total Principal Grains	47,640.3	34,565.6	36,580.7
Alpist	60.5	67.6	33.9
Oats	742.1	442.6	441.4
Sorghum	286.6	238.4	245.9
Others	315.1	419.8	196.8
Total Grain [as printed]			49,044.6
		35,733.9	37,498.7

Legumes

Production totaled 2,455,500 quintals, compared with 2,852,600 the previous season, or a drop of 13.9 percent attributable to the decline in the harvest of broad beans and chickpeas. The rest of the legumes registered rather substantial improvements. The total area used for such crops was 443,500 hectares and average yield was 5.5 quintals per hectare.

Production in 1,000 Quintals

	1981-1982	1982-1983	1983-1984
Broad beans	986.6	1,422.4	1,222.3
Peas	218.0	222.2	275.8
Lentils	252.7	320.3	245.3
Chickpeas	508.7	558.6	286.6
Others	250.2	328.8	424.9
Total Legumes	2,216.4	2,852.6	2,455.5

Industrial Crops

Concerning beetroots, 53,100 hectares were harvested, giving a production of 25.3 million quintals, or a yield of 475.6 quintals per hectare. Regarding sugar cane, the 11,300 hectares harvested yielded 7.8 million quintals, or 685.9 quintals per hectare. Cotton production totaled 115,400 quintals on an area of 9,600 hectares. For oil-yielding crops, production totaled 190,400 quintals of sunflower seed and 353,900 quintals of peanuts on respective areas of 29,300 and 25,000 hectares.

Market Garden Crops

The total area cultivated is 145,400 hectares, yielding 21,383.500 quintals. The latter includes 5,063,000 quintals of tomatoes, 6,171,000 quintals of

potatoes, 2,242,000 quintals of onions and 7,909,000 quintals of other market garden crops.

Plantations

The total area occupied by plantations is 518,800 hectares and production is 19,353,100 quintals. In terms of area, olives are predominant, with 286,600 hectares. However, it is citrus fruits that lead with respect to production, with 1,017,050 tons.

Let us emphasize that citrus fruit production rose 6.2 percent compared with the previous season, mainly thanks to the late varieties (see Cedies No 1452).

In sum, the total area cultivated in 1983-1984 was 8.02 million hectares, while 2.3 million hectares were left fallow.

Livestock Raising

National livestock raising has been hard hit by the drought, but for the past year has been on the way to recovery. The latest study in October and November of 1984 showed an overall increase of .6 percent compared with the same period in 1982, due to sheep. The number of cattle and goats is still below their level of the previous year.

Prospects

Actually, the total size of the herd is 15,757,860 head in 1984, including 2,296,434 head of cattle, 9,586,754 head of sheep and 3,874,672 head of goats. In 1983, the total was 15,657,244 head, with 2,330,866 head of cattle, 9,272,267 head of sheep and 4,054,111 goats. The total nevertheless remains under the 1982 total (down 3.2 percent).

The current season is more promising. Precipitation is in contrast with the drought of recent years and regional distribution has been better balanced. Consequently, the water supply accumulated by the dams has begun to be rebuilt, although quite a long time will be needed for this to occur completely. In addition, several measures have been taken to aid the season, particularly the organization of collective tilling and cultivation work, an increase in prices to the producers announced at the beginning of the season, the granting of easier payment terms for farmers owing money to the CNCA [National Agricultural Credit Bank], the provision of select seed and fertilizers in adequate quantities, an increase in the minimum wage in agriculture and the sector's exemption from all taxes.

This being the case, the recent rains confirm the satisfactory progress of the season and there is great hope concerning results, if not as good as those in 1978, then at least good enough to reduce grain imports substantially, on the one hand, and start a chain of beneficial effects on the rest of the economy originating in agriculture.

MOROCCO

EFFECTS OF DROUGHT ON DAIRY PRODUCTION STUDIED

Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 12 Apr 85 p 15

[Text] Moroccan dairy production has experienced a relatively rapid development since 1975 thanks to incentives decided upon by the government within the framework of the dairy plan and resulting in the importation of purebred dairy cows, the establishment of artificial insemination centers, the establishment of milk collection centers, the granting of subsidies for genetic improvements, the construction of dairy barns and the purchase of dairy equipment and milk support prices to producers and consumers.

National dairy production went from 530 million to 780 million liters from 1975 to 1980 and to 655 million liters in 1983 due to the drought raging in the country.

However, despite this development, dairy products still occupy only a minor place in the daily diet of the population and individual consumption is steadily dropping, going from 71 to 53.4 liters per person per year from 1979 to 1983.

In addition, the quantities of milk received by plants went from 61 million to 260 million liters from 1973 to 1983 and the installed processing capacity doubled during the same period, with an average annual increase of nearly 16 percent.

However, despite this important development, the dairy sector has experienced certain weaknesses, particularly the irregularity of dairy production, which has a period of heavy milking (March-August) and an abundance of production, with a period of light milking (September-February) and a shortage. This cycle hits its peak in May and its lowest level in December.

The installed capacity is not regularly or entirely used. In 1983, the average rate of utilization of that capacity was 50 percent, varying depending on the plant and the season.

Dairy production during heavy milking times is not made the most of and Morocco continues to import large quantities of dairy products.

In addition, in 1983, local production met only 54 percent of the country's needs and imported quantities reached the equivalent of 500 million liters, for a sum of 312 million dirhams.

Evolution of Volumes of Milk Received

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total Production (Million Liters)</u>	<u>Vol. Received (1,000 Liters)</u>	<u>Rate of Reception</u>	<u>Variation in Volume Received</u>
1973	480	61,000	12.71%	
1974	500	70,000	14.00%	+ 14.75
1975	520	108,000	20.77%	+ 54.29
1976	590	140,000	23.73%	+ 29.63
1977	620	172,000	27.74%	+ 22.86
1978	660	210,000	31.85%	+ 22.21
1979	730	224,600	30.77%	+ 6.85
1980	780	249,600	32.00%	- 12.13
1981	700	225,200	32.17%	- 9.78
1982	625	210,000	33.60%	- 6.75
1983	655	260,000	39.69%	+ 23.81

Processing of Production

The main products of the Moroccan dairy industry are pasturized milk, yogurt, *raibi*, cheese and butter. This production is led by pasturized milk, which still represents 84 percent of all milk received, although the other products have experienced noteworthy development during the past decade. This situation results in self-sufficiency in pasturized milk and a major shortage of condensed milk, butter and powdered milk, amounting to 100 percent, 94.5 percent and 78.90 percent respectively.

Future Prospects

Despite the development and diversification experienced during the past decade, the Moroccan dairy sector must double its efforts to improve production, make the most of surpluses during heavy milking times and reduce the shortages of dairy products now covered by imports. To do so, there are several possibilities, mainly: development of the local production of purebred dairy heifers; development of powdered milk and butter production; production of sterilized milk; fabrication of condensed milk; and development and diversification of the production of milk by-products.

Milk Production (Index Figure of 100 for May, Heavy Milking Period)

January	60
February	70
March	90
April	95
May	100
June	95
July	90
August	80
September	70
October	60
November	50
December	55

Imports of Dairy Products 1979-1983

Product	1979 KG	1,000 D KG	1980 Value 1,000 D KG	1,000 D KG	1981 Value 1,000 D KG	1,000 D KG	1982 Value 1,000 D KG	1,000 D KG	1983 Value 100 [sic]
Fresh milk	2,070	2,768	2,214	3,628	2,581	4,127	2,077	3,973	
Condensed milk	10,566	35,130	9,038	35,743	8,897	41,249	8,661	46,065	6,781
Powdered milk (home use)	4,098	38,098	2,913	28,453	2,753	35,296	2,446	37,370	2,122
Powdered milk (ind. use)	2,722	7,492	2,521	10,975	2,984	18,626	4,264	30,733	1,277*
Powdered whey					23	60	32	106	6
Nursing formula	1,094	11,850	1,020	13,136	699	11,165	62	984	23
Butter	21,506	100,957	21,171	134,257	18,152	211,229	21,799	292,173	16,532
Raw materials for cheese	512	4,091	680	5,579	827	7,927	987	10,059	934
Cheese for consumers							3	129	
Total	12,567	200,394	39,557	230,773	36,914	329,369	40,528	412,461	27,678

* Not including World Food Program (WFP) gift (2,860 tons of powdered milk).

D = dirhams

11,464
CSO: 4519/138

MOROCCO

CHANGES IN TRADE BALANCE OUTLINED

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 22 Apr 85 p 5

[Text] After a decline in 1982, Moroccan-Libyan commercial trade resumed its growth in 1987 [sic] and 1984. The trade balance between the two countries in 1984 showed a noteworthy trade surplus favoring Morocco. That surplus rose 295 percent, going from 82.4 million dirhams in 1983 to 323.3 million in 1984.

This evolution is essentially explained by the heavy increase in Moroccan exports to Libya (up 188.6 percent), and the drop in our purchases from that country (down 73.5 percent).

(In millions of Dirhams)	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>Jan. 1985</u>
Imports	33,383	8,855	0
Exports	115,754	334,210	46,940
Balance	82,371	325,355	46,940
Cover Rate	346.7%	3,774.3%	

Source: Exchange Office

11,464
CSO: 4519/138

MOROCCO

BRIEFS

RESCHEDULING PACKAGE APPROVED--A rescheduling agreement between Morocco and a 10-bank negotiating committee has been circulated among 200 creditor banks for approval. The negotiations lasted some 18 months and covered \$535mn worth of debt due between September 1983 and December 31st 1984. The agreement calls for 100 per cent of Morocco's medium- and long-term debt due between September and December 1983 and 90 per cent of that due in 1984 to be rescheduled over eight years, with four years' grace, at 1-3/4 per cent over Libor. The banks have also agreed to retain short-term commercial credit of \$750mn. A clause in the agreement calls for Morocco to remain a member of the IMF "in good standing" and to maintain an IMF-agreed economic package. The Banque du Maroc (central bank) has committed itself to maintaining sufficient foreign-exchange reserves to guarantee the repayments. [Text] [Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 25 Mar 85 p 6]

FLOUR SUPPLY MEASURES--In the meeting chaired by Prime Minister Mohamed Karim Lamrani on Thursday, measures were adopted to supply the domestic market with flour. According to the officials of the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, these measures are summed up as follows:
1) Mobilizing all our wheat resources to secure a normal supply for our markets as soon as possible after these markets experienced some disturbances when we changed our places of import. The shipments of wheat imported by our country have arrived and are now being unloaded at the two seaports of Casablanca and [name indistinct]. Other shipments are expected in the coming few days. 2) Importing a quantity of wheat to meet our current needs until the national harvest for this year is ready. [Text] [Rabat Domestic Service in Arabic 2200 GMT 16 Apr 85 LD]

CSO: 4500/90

SUDAN.

NEW CABINET, PROBLEMS FACING GOVERNMENT DISCUSSED

London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL in English 24 Apr 85 pp 3-5

[Text]

The announcement on Monday of a civilian cabinet under the premiership of **Gizouli Dafallah**, the former president of the Medical Association, has set the political tone for the next few months. An overall problem now is the poor machinery of government inherited from **Jaffar Nimeiri's** regime, which decimated practically every Sudanese institution. The administrative capacity of the new transitional two-tier government - the 15-man all-military council effectively sitting above the civilian cabinet - will be stretched to the limit. More important, Sudanese politics, with all its religious and cultural pressure groups, are bound to be in a state of flux for at least the remainder of the year.

There are a number of key considerations:-

- The armed forces command and a number of individuals now in the cabinet (see below) and elsewhere were closely involved with even the latter stages of Nimeiri's regime. Public pressure to investigate his regime and its ancillary bodies, such as the disbanded Military Economic Commission, is unlikely to result in large-scale retribution. But senior figures will inevitably come under attack once public euphoria has died down.
- Head of state Gen. **Abdel Rahman Sowar el Dahab**, is a devout Muslim (AC Vol 26 No 8). Like most of his colleagues, he deplored the brutality of "Sharia" law as imposed by Nimeiri's regime. But undoubtedly he would like Sharia to become, in a pragmatic way, a firm part of Sudanese life. The *Muslim Brotherhood*, whose largest faction continues to be led by the astute **Hassan al-Turabi**, is officially proscribed from government. In practice it has several footholds, and is intent on building on them at the highest level. Sharia cannot be constitutionally enshrined in a country where 30% of the people are non-Muslim. Al-Turabi's faction of the *Muslim Brotherhood*, though, believes it can. Most Sudanese want a secular state. Unless the new government assumes fully its designed role, the Brotherhood will take advantage of the inertia.
- The leadership of the *Sudan People's Liberation Army* (SPLA) in the south, almost certainly under great pressure from the **Ethiopian** government, has uncompromisingly rejected participation in the new Sudanese interim government. SPLA leader Col. **John Garang** might reckon that the government will collapse before elections can be held, and that the SPLA will then be able to proclaim itself as the only "legitimate" force. But he appears to have made a serious tactical error: there is most unlikely to be another coup in Sudan; the south is now represented in government by southerners who were

sympathetic only to the SPLA's aim of overthrowing Nimeiri. Libya, a former military supporter of the SPLA's, wants the SPLA to stop fighting. What will happen if it continues?

In the foreseeable future, now that the cabinet is formed, Gen. Sowar el Dahab is unlikely to be usurped in the pecking order of the military. Nimeiri rid the army of almost all top-flight generals. The strongman on the military council is its vice-chairman, deputy C-in-C Gen. Taj el Din Abdulla Fadul, an outspoken officer whom Nimeiri was probably about to dismiss. The other three Lieutenant-Generals, **Mohammed Tewfiq Khalil** (director of logistics), **Youssuf Hassan Ahmed** (director of naval administration) and **Mohammed Mirghani Mohammed Tahir** (airforce) are important only because of rank. Brig. **Osman Abdulla Mohammed**, minister of defence, who sits on both the military council and the cabinet, is probably the key military figure. Crucially, he is commander of the Khartoum military district. He also has close associates outside the top command which is stigmatised by its former dependence on Nimeiri; and after being put in charge of the negotiations with the civilians during the past two weeks, he has presumably a good working relationship with the cabinet.

The extent of Nimeiri regime's corruption is gradually becoming public knowledge. A number of leading Sudanese figures, including Ansar leader **Sadiq el Mahdi**, have called for Nimeiri's extradition from Egypt to face charges of treason. The new government could be placed in an awkward position if it takes no action against any member of the military council or civilian cabinet found to have participated excessively in the previous regime's corruption. But the military is unlikely to be threatened, firstly because there is clearly no momentum for a counter-coup from within the army, and secondly because the energy which went into the civil strikes could not be mustered again in the short-term. The prospect of elections, no matter how much of a logistical improbability, is enough to deter further anti-government actions.

But the rise to political prominence and power of the professional groups organised by Dafallah and others; and the parallel decline in power of the traditional parties - the *Umma Party* of the Ansar and the *Unionist Party* of the Khatmiya - has opened the way for a deluge of new pressure groups. Within seven days of the coup there were 29 political parties and 77 trade unions. The army found itself negotiating with 14 civilian groups (the established ones² plus the *Baathists*, the *Nasserite Socialist Arab Party*, the *Socialist Islamic Party* [alias Hassan Al-Turabi's Brotherhood], and **Sadiq Abdul Majid**'s wing of the Brotherhood).

If the new government asserts itself, avoiding the impossible procedure of always seeking agreement from the multitude of groups and parties, most of the small parties will fade away. The cabinet after all has 10 at least nominally-independent members (i.e. those without significant political ties), enough to ensure that decisions can cut across traditional divisions. (Having decreed a statutory transition period of 12 months, the military council agreed that the cabinet would comprise a civilian prime minister, three ministers from the south, 10 from the ranks of the independents, a minister of defence to be chosen by the military, and a minister of the interior to be nominated by the police and vetted by the military).

Until late last week there was a race for the premiership between Dafallah and **Mirghani El Nasri**, president of the *Bar Association* (Both appear to have been endorsed by the *Umma* and *Unionist* parties, but Dafallah clearly had most support among the independents). The cabinet is as follows:

- 1) **Gizouli Daffalah**, prime minister. A devout Muslim, he held sway over the *Muslim Brotherhood* caucus in the *Medical Association* during last year's formative doctors' strike (AC Vol 25 No 8). He was the leading figure behind civil strikes leading to Nimeiri's overthrow.
- 2) **Brig. Osman Abdulla Mohammed**, minister of defence (see above).
- 3) **Abbas Medani**, minister of interior. Formerly police commissioner, he will also now control the new security organisation.
- 4) **Ibrahim Taha Ayoub**, foreign affairs minister. A career diplomat and current ambassador to **Kenya**, he at first declined the portfolio, preferring a secondary position. A former cabinet director of **Mansour Khalid** when the latter was foreign minister in the 1970s, he also spent three tours in **Ethiopia**, and is thus well-placed to negotiate with the Ethiopian government and the SPLA.
- 5) **Awad Abdul Majid**, minister of finance and economic planning. Now a private businessman. In the 1970s he was governor of *Bank of Sudan* until sacked by Nimeiri. Later he became a director of *Barclays Bank* in Sudan. He was chosen for this portfolio in preference to **Sid Ahmed el Sayed Hamad**, minister of trade and commerce (see below).
- 6) **Abu Shakima**, minister of justice and religious affairs. A private lawyer, he was proposed by the anti-El Nasri group within the *Bar Association* in preference to former Muslim Brother **Mohammed Saleh Shabu**.
- 7) **Mohammed Bashir Hamed**, minister of information, culture, youth and sports. A social democrat and probably the most radical member of the cabinet, he

played a key role in organising anti-Nimeiri activity, notably in the *University Teachers' Association*. The military, apparently misinterpreting his political views as extremist, tried to promote in his place a fourth southerner. But the professional alliance prevailed.

- 8) **Bashir Haj El Tom**, minister of education. A member of the Sadiq Abdul Majid wing of the *Muslim Brotherhood* (which is more moderate and less doctrinaire than Turabi's gathering). He is the only acknowledged Muslim Brother in the cabinet. His presence might in fact be a useful foil against Turabi. He is in good stead with the professional alliance.
- 9) **Sid Ahmed El Sayed Hamad**, minister of trade and commerce. At present a businessman with good international links. In the 1970s he was a permanent under-secretary in the ministry of finance and director of the budget. After that he spent some time in the Gulf. The portfolio appears to have been offered first to the former permanent under-secretary of commerce, **Mohammed El Amin Mirghani**, who declined the offer. Sid Ahmed's appointment, however, will be looked on favourably by bankers and financiers.
- 10) **Abdulaziz Osman Musa**, minister of energy, industry and mining. The former director of the *Central Electricity Generating Board* (CEGB), from where he was sacked by Nimeiri. (The Saudis had given \$5m for equipment for CEGB, but Nimeiri's notoriously corrupt adviser, **Bahr El Din Idriss**, ordered the money to be transferred to *Wad Nimeiri*, the former president's private company. Abdulaziz refused to agree and was sacked).
- 11) **Sadiq Abdin**, minister of agriculture. A respected former director of the *Rahad* agricultural scheme, he got the portfolio after a heated campaign to annul the original appointee, **Ibrahim Rudwan**, the Unionist and former director of the *Gezira* scheme.
- 12) **Dr. Hussein Abu Salem**. A member of the *Muslim Brotherhood* when he was a student, he rose to become a well-known brain surgeon and deputy president of the *Medical Association*.
- 13) **Anvin Makki Madani**, minister of construction and public works. A leading lawyer whose firm worked, among others, for the **American** oil company *Chevron*. Well-known internationally, he worked in the past for UNHCR and the *World Bank*, and taught at the *University of Khartoum*. He was another key figure in organising opposition to Nimeiri. His main role was to act as intermediary between the professionals and the traditional parties. During the last stages of Nimeiri's regime he came to the conclusion that there was no point in trying further to negotiate with the traditional parties. On 10 April he was to have announced from Addis Ababa that the professionals were formally joining with the SPLA -

a plan that was overtaken by the coup.

- 14) **Samuel Aru Bol**, minister of irrigation and water resources. Vice-president of the southern High Executive Council (HEC) until Nimeiri dissolved it by decree in 1981. He then became vice-chairman under **Clement Mboro** of the anti-revision *Council for the Unity of Southern Sudan* (AC Vol 23 No 4). Though a Dinka, he declined to join the SPLA. Ten days ago, together with a group of southern veterans (**Peter Gatkuoth**, **Oliver Batali Albino**, **Toby Madut** and **Ezbon Mundiri**) he formed in Khartoum the *Southern Sudanese Political Association* - ostensibly an alliance of longstanding southern parties. The association duly managed to acquire all three cabinet places reserved for southerners.
- 15) **Peter Gatkuoth**, minister of transport and communications. From the Nuer tribe (the second largest component of the SPLA after the Dinka), he was caretaker president of the southern HEC after **Joseph Lagu** was ousted in 1980. Like Aru Bol, he was an ardent anti-revisionist.
- 16) **Oliver Batali Albino**, minister of labour. A pro-revisionist, he was an executor of Nimeiri's revision decree in June 1983. He then became a minister of state working with Lagu, who was by then second vice-president. Batali is a widely discredited individual. His appointment is surprising. It is unlikely that he will survive in office.

Apart from the colossal task of limiting the growing famine in Sudan, the most pressing task of the new government is to negotiate an end to the southern civil war. Already following the expiry of its seven-day cease-fire, the SPLA has attacked the southern towns of Tonj (in Bahr el Ghazal) and Akobo (Upper Nile). The vehemence of Garang's denunciation of Gen. Sowar El Dahab and the military command almost certainly precludes a settlement for several months. Last week the Sudanese businessman **Khalil Osman** (AC Vol 26 No 4) went to Addis Ababa apparently in the hope of seeing Garang, who was not available.

The military council is clearly determined to establish straightaway working relations with neighbouring countries, the Soviet Union and the West. High-ranking emissaries have been dispatched to Egypt, Ethiopia and Libya. Serious negotiations with Ethiopia might well persuade Garang to begin negotiations with Khartoum. In a forthcoming issue we will report in detail on further developments in Sudan and on regional developments following the coup ●

Footnotes

1. The Military council consists of, in this order:-
Gen. Sowar el Dahab 2. Gen. Taj el Din 3. Lt-Gen. Mohammed Tewfiq 4. Lt-Gen. Youssuf Hassan 5. Lt-Gen. Mohammed Mirghani 6. Lt-Gen Youssuf Hassan el Haj (retired) 7. Maj-Gen. Fabian Agang Long (commandant of the staff college) 8. Maj-Gen. James Loro (president of the interim five-man southern High Executive Council) 9. Maj-Gen. Osman El Amin El Sayed 10. Maj-Gen. Ibrahim Youssuf el Awad el Gaali 11. Maj-Gen. Hamada Abdul Azim Hamada 12. Brig. Osman Abdulla 13. Brig. Fadlalla Burma Nasir 14. Brig. Abdulaziz Mohammed el Amin 15. Brig. Faris Abdulla Hosni.
2. The *Umma*, *Unionist* and *Communist* parties, and seven unions: doctors, lawyers, engineers, university staff, bankers, insurance employees and university students.

CSO: 4500/102

SUDAN

PRIME MINISTER ON TASKS OF NEW CABINET

JN231058 Khartoum SUNA in English 1030 GMT 23 Apr 85

[Text] Khartoum, Sha'ban 3, 23 April, (SUNA)--Prime Minister al-Jazuli Daf'allah has said that the task of his cabinet will be sincere and keen work for the faith of handing over power to the people after the election of constitutional assembly in a fair democratic way to set up the constitution of Sudan.

Daf'allah who was appointed last night as a prime minister for 15-member cabinet told the daily AL-SAHFAH in his first statement that the southern problem and its settlement is one of the priorities of his cabinet, unless this problem was settled the democratic trend will be hindered and the economic progress will be restricted, Daf'allah told the daily in his first statement last night.

The cabinet will work for removing of the relics of the defunct regime and will do its best to rectify the deteriorating economic situation, he said to the paper. The cabinet will work to secure the independence of the judiciary, independence of civil service, trade union and electoral committee, he said.

On foreign policy the new prime minister affirmed that his government will work to mend fences with the neighbouring countries and repair what was defiled by the former regime, particularly in the relations with Ethiopia and Libya.

On the Arab world level will work for bolstering Arab solidarity and avert the Arabs axes and line-up policies and will support the Palestinian cause positively by action not by blank utterance and without bidding, he said.

On [the] international level Daf'allah said we will abide by neutrality and establishment balanced relations with all world nations.

CSO: 4500/95

SUDAN

SSPF LEADER ADDRESSES MASS RALLY, SUDANESE VISITORS

LD231302 Tripoli JANA in English 0908 GMT 23 Apr 85

[Text] Tripoli, Sha'ban 3, 23 April, JAMAHIRIYAH NEWS AGENCY--'Abdallah Zakariya, secretary general of the Sudanese Socialist Popular Front, the Revolutionary Committees Movement (SSPF), delivered a speech before the mass rally, in [words indistinct] he greeted the two members of the Interim Military Council and their accompanying delegations. He also praised the victorious masses of the Sudanese people whose will prevailed by the toppling of the regime of butcher Numayri. 'Abdallah Zakaria also conveyed the greetings of the Sudanese masses in Jamahiriyyah to General 'Abd-al-Rahman Siwar-al-Dhabab, president of the Interim Military Council in Sudan.

'Abdallah Zakariya praised the popular revolution of the Sudanese people and the stand of the Sudanese Armed Forces by the Sudanese people and the decision of the forces to hand-over power to the Sudanese people. He stressed that the victory of the revolution in Sudan blocked the road forever on the Camp David pact.

'Abdallah Zakariya also conveyed the gratitude and thanks of the masses of the Sudanese people to the Libyan Arab people and their thinker, Leader Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi. He went on to say that the Libyan Arab people stood by us for 13 years aiding the Sudanese people until they gained their rights by toppling the fascist May regime.

'Abdallah Zakariya emphasized that the historic speech of the militant Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi on 5 April had a far reaching effect on the victory of the Sudanese popular revolution. He also stressed the right of the Sudanese people to implement people's authority. He called on the interim council and the Sudanese Army, from the land of great Al Fatih, where the masses of the Libyan Arab people emerged victorious with the declaration of the people's authority, to bring an end [to] the destructive struggle for power reaffirming that the decisive solution is the handing over of power to the masses in Sudan. He also urged the Interim Military Council in Sudan to form a General People's Committee to organize the masses for the hand over of power which the masses can practice through the formation of people's congresses and people's committees. Thus the solution of the problem of power becomes a true and scientific reality.

The delegation of the Interim Military Council in Sudan conveyed the meaning and aim of the slogans of the Sudanese masses that struggled and played their vital role in the downfall of agent May regime.

He praised the struggle of the armed detachments of the Sudanese revolutionary committees, stressing that these detachments have struggled and continued to struggle so that the Sudanese masses could come to power.

CSO: 4500/95

SUDAN

PARIS PAPER VIEWS 'CREEPING REVOLUTION' IN SUDAN

PM250855 Paris LE MONDE in French 23 Apr 85 pp 1, 6

[Eric Rouleau dispatch: "Creeping Revolution in Sudan"]

[Text] Khartoum--It's all happening at the university club in Khartoum. It is the scene of happy or moving reunions of exiled intellectuals, politicians, or trade unionists after many painful years of detention, exile, or clandestine activity. They can be heard discussing the dark years of Marshal Numayri's regime, but above all discussing the future of the democratic system they intend to build, each according to his own concepts.

The Staff Club, which was formerly a very British meeting place for teachers and students who indulged in abstract speculations over a cup of tea, is now the headquarters of the trade union federation and various political organizations--one of the main nerve centers of the Sudanese revolution. The flags, posters, manifestos, petitions and pamphlets which decorate the walls bear witness to the new-found freedom, and the legalization of all parties without exception. In addition to the three or four big parties which are struggling to pursue their secret activities in the country or abroad, there are around 40 new parties, mostly embryonic or mythical entities engendered by the imagination or enthusiasm of handfuls of so well-intentioned citizens.

Freedom also means the disappearance of the informers who haunted the streets and public buildings. People no longer lower their voices round the Staff Club tables when criticizing a particular general in the transitional military council which took power on 6 April "in the people's name." General al-Dhahab's junta has dismantled willingly or unwillingly the fearsome "security apparatuses"--a veritable army which Marshal Numayri maintained parallel to the regular forces--and arrested all their officers, more than 400 in all the around 3,000 of their members. Some 30,000 to 40,000 police informers are no longer carrying out their activities. And although the latter could go back into service at any time, nobody seems worried about it. On the strength of their victory following the people's uprising which virtually paralyzed the country from 26 March to 6 April, the Sudanese feel that they are the state.

The most remarkable thing is that the apparent power vacuum is not causing disturbances or anarchy. Aside from the guerrilla war which is continuing in the south, order reigns throughout the country. In a spirit of mutual trust,

and self-discipline. The public meetings held by the big parties which gather 5,000, 10,000, and sometimes 20,000 people, take place without incident. The speakers avoid mentioning rival parties by name and merely explain their own program. The consensus which emerged from the "national pact" concluded in the night of 5 to 6 April to which the parties, trade unions, professional associations, and the junta successfully adhered, is widely respected.

Aside from the Muslim brotherhood led by Hasan al-Turabi, all the parties uphold similar, if not identical, ideas: the arsenal of repressive laws, including the shari'a (Islamic law) introduced in September 1983 should be suppressed and not just "suspended" as the junta decided while awaiting the formation of a provisional government; Marshal Numayri (who has taken refuge in Egypt) and all those who committed crimes or were guilty of corruption ought to answer to the courts; the state administrations and public services ought to be purged and reorganized; the national charter also stipulates that the multiparty system, parliamentary democracy, the magistrature's independence, and public and individual freedoms according to the Universal Declaration of Human rights, will be codified by a constituent assembly elected by universal suffrage before the end of this transitional phase, the duration of which has been fixed at 1 year.

The Sudanese "Pasionaria"

The parties and trade unions are not merely making demands. They are resorting to direct action when they think that the junta is not keeping its promises. Since no legislative measure has been taken to restore press freedom, the journalists have the job of carrying out this task themselves. Last week they quietly occupied the offices of the two main Khartoum dailies, politely sent home the directors and chief editors, appointed under the previous regime, and installed in their place provisional committees elected by the members of the editorial staff. The newspapers immediately started selling so well that they were sold out almost before they were off the press. A purge of radio and television is planned for this week.

The creeping revolution is continuing in the trade unions, which had been given officials loyal to the old regime by fraud or intimidation. Grass roots members and trade union leaders, who have emerged from their clandestine existence, have held meetings in various enterprises to elect new leaderships. Trade union committees, which are operating illegally under the dictatorship, are acting as interim leaderships. The most eagerly awaited event is the meeting which will be held on 8 May to give the general confederation of labor new leadership bodies. One will then know whether or not the Communist Party--which, around 1970, was regarded as the most influential in Africa and the Arab world--has succeeded in restoring its traditionally dominant positions in the trade union movement.

In all the parties the Communist Party is the only one which has not yet come out into the open. Its pamphlets are certainly circulating and its posters are appearing alongside those of the Muslim Brotherhood in Khartoum University and other places. Mansur Tithman, one of its leaders, who represents the party in the so-called patriotic front (a grouping of parties) is certainly also taking

part in the negotiations being carried out with the junta generals with a view to the formation of a provisional government in particular. Similarly, Mrs Fatimah Ibrahim, the Sudanese "pasionaria," widow of al-Shafi' al-Shaykh, former secretary general of the general confederation of labor executed in July 1971, is to be seen everywhere.

Wrapped from head to foot in traditional veil, she moves from table to table in the Staff Club having lively discussions with members of all parties; she makes passionate speeches to trade union assemblies; she forces her way in to see the junta generals to "demand," on behalf of "half the Sudanese nation," that two women be appointed to the future provisional government. In her capacity as permanent chairman of the Sudanese Women's Union--outlawed under the former regime--she addressed the first public meeting held by her organization for 14 years on the evening of 21 Sunday April.

Nonetheless the Communist Party proper remains a vague nebulous entity, whose outlines cannot be discerned and whose substance cannot be evaluated. "Ours is a responsible party, and our violent experience over the past 15 years or so prevents us from taking pointless risks," Communist Party Secretary General Muhammad Ibrahim Nuqud explained to us, when he received us in a "supporter's" house in the middle of the night, after taking numerous safety precautions. But, he added: "I will appear in public in the next few days and we are planning a big meeting for 1 May." Since Mr Nuqud and his party have "won" their "legitimacy," he intends to "use all the advantages of legitimacy," but he only gave an enigmatic smile when asked whether we will see only the tip of the iceberg.

The Southerners' Refusal

Although the two big traditional parties, al-Ummah and the National Democratic Party, "bourgeois" projections of the Ansar and Khatimiyyah Muslim brotherhoods, do not seem to fear the future, the left-wing or secular parties show unswerving optimism about their potential.

And yet the professional associations which to some extent spearheaded the people's uprising are losing ground. Caught between the political parties, which are now trying to push them to one side, and the junta generals, who are demanding growing concessions of them, the leaders of this trade union grouping--doctors, lawyers, teachers, engineers, bank employees--have been unable to carry out the mission entrusted to them about 10 days ago: the formation of a provisional government, formed of independent technocrats enjoying the confidence of all the parties concerned.

Some of their candidate ministers were rejected because of "Islamic Leanings" in some cases, and "communist orientation" in others. But the failure of the enterprise can be attributed primarily to the refusal of the southern surrection movement, led by Omdurman, to withdraw to its headquarters before "the army withdraws to the north." Moreover, the Junta does not intend to give up its powers and its government until the formation of a progressive unless it comprised representatives from all the southern states.

The situation is therefore more than uncertain. It would become disturbing if the current deadlock were to continue, because the impatience of the population which is facing famine, and discontent in the forces of order--army and police--themselves divided between "moderates" and "radicals," is constantly growing.

CSO: 4500/95

SUDAN

BRIEFS

SUDANESE INTERNAL DISPUTES DESCRIBED--AL-SIYASAH has learned that separatist pressure in southern Sudan has delayed a reconciliation meeting scheduled for today between John Garang, the leader of the southern Sudan rebels, and Sudanese leader Siwar al-Dhabab. Informed southern Sudan sources have reported that a faction of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army which Garang leads has threatened to rise against its leader if he meets with Lieutenant General Siwar-al-Dhabab. The source added that this faction advocates total separation between southern and northern Sudan as a solution to the crisis. It is expected, however, that Garang will try to reach a compromise formula with this faction so that his assumption of power will not take place at the expense of his comrades, alongside whom he used to fight. On another matter, the sources have said that a last minute dispute erupted between the doctors' and lawyers' unions, which delayed the announcement of the formation of the government. The lawyers' union has demanded the creation of a deputy prime minister's post for their union leader, Mirghani al-Nasri Hamzah who has been nominated with Dr al-Jazuli Daf'allah to head the government. However, there is no provision for such a post according to the government structure which the "national alliance" agreed upon with the military leaders. ["Exclusive" report from Khartoum] [Excerpt] [Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 20 Apr pp 1, 22 GF]

EXPATRIATES TO HOLD CONFERENCE--Nairobi, 23 Apr (SUNA)--A Sudanese expatriates group has been formed to protect Sudanese democracy and guide the expatriates' role abroad. SUNA reports from Nairobi that a preparatory committee for the group has been formed under Hashim al-Sayyid. The committee distributed a statement to all expatriate groups abroad, in order to form preparatory committees, hold a general conference as soon as possible, and adopt a charter and bylaws. It has been decided that the group's preparatory committee will be located in Addis Ababa. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in Arabic 1440 GMT 23 Apr 85 JN]

MISUSE OF FOREIGN AID--Khartoum, Sha'ban 3, 23 Apr (SUNA)--A sum of \$5 million granted by the Government of Spain for constructing technical schools in Sudan was transferred for purchasing the military corporation buses, announced education under-secretary Muhyi al-Din Wahbi. The military corporation is a shadowy consortium emerged during the recent years of the former director Numayri. The corporation had been frozen by the TMC pending full investigation. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English 0922 GMT 23 Apr 85 JN]

FORMER SECURITY ORGAN'S ACTIONS--Khartoum, Sha'ban 3, 23 April (SUNA)--An authoritative source at the civil service selection board revealed that the disbanded state security body was given wide jurisdictions, during the defunct regime to determine graduates suitability for absorption in the defunct state security organ plainclothes internal police which was formed by former dictator Numayri to spot the movements of his opponents, its elements have have been accustomed to jail the people and persecute them without trial. The organ had been liquidated on the heels of the popular upheavals on 8 April. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English 0920 GMT 23 Apr 85 JN]

CULTURAL WORK PLAN--Khartoum, Sha'ban 3, 23 April (SUNA)--The Trade Unions Alliance has finished drafting and envision for the culture and information work during the transitional government. The project comprises the formation of an independant National Council for Culture and Information to be fully responsible for work process, planning, administration of all culture and information institutions. The National Council is assigned, according to the programme, to control the information institutions through regulations and a charter inspired from the alliance charter. The Council charter will be considered as a law that governs the institutions work. Representatives of 25 trade and federation unions, acting committees and voluntary persons with high experience in information field have participated in drawing up that envision. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English 0930 GMT 23 Apr 85 JN]

SUDAN'S UN REPRESENTATIVE--New Delhi, 23 Apr (SUNA)--Sudan's Permanent representative to the United Nations 'Umar Yusufd Baridu confirmed Sudan's keenness to participate in the forthcoming non-aligned countries' summit, particularly after the popular revolution which ended the despotic regime of Numayri. Mr Baridu, who represented Sudan in the non-alignment ministerial meeting held here recently, condemned the criminal policies of racist South Africa and its occupation of Namibia. He called on the United Nations to apply its Resolution No 435 and the 7th article of the UN Charter against the racist regime of South Africa. He expressed Sudan's unlimited support for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the sole representative of the Palestinian people. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English 1720 GMT 23 Apr 85 JN]

LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR SUDAN--Tripoli, 23 Apr (SUNA)--Member of the Sudan ruling Transitional Military Council Brigadier Fadlallah Burmah Nasir addressed a Sudanese gathering here yesterday and hailed the Libyan September revolution and its national role in supporting the Sudanese. Burmah greeted the leader of the September revolution, Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi, and promised the masses that he will carry large quantities of copies of the Green Book back home. He also informed the Sudanese community about what took place in Sudan, and stated the political reason behind the popular upheaval. Burmah reaffirmed that there will be a fair and just trial to the all politicians of the defunct regime, according to the wish of the people. The armed forces have taken the power and confirmed to the people handing the authority after an interim period, Burmah added. Members of the Transitional Military Council Brig Fadlallah Burmah, Faris 'Abdallah Husni and Ambassador 'Abd-al-Majid Bashir al-Ahmadi arrived here on Sunday. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English 1735 GMT 23 Apr 85 JN]

MESSAGE TO INDONESIA'S SUHARTO--Khartoum, 24 Apr (SUNA)--Sudan has reiterated its commitment towards the principles of Bandung Conference and the Nonaligned Movement. In a message he sent to the Indonesian President Ahmed Shuarto on the 30th anniversary of the Bandung Conference, Chairman of the TMC Gen 'Abd-al-Rahman Siwar-al-Dhahab the 1955 Bandung Conference had emphasized the right of the people in freedom and independence. On 6 April the Sudanese people and their armed forces toppled the oppressive regime which distorted the image of Sudan, the message read. What had taken place in our country is by all means a considerable contribution to the political thought in the Third World and in the same time reflects the people's will in defeating suppression, the message added. The message said Sudan would be an example for peaceful co-existence without interfering in others internal affairs. Siwar-al-Dhahab appealed to the world community for more food aid to drought-hit people and refugees in Sudan. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English 1050 GMT 24 Apr 85 JN]

CSO: 4500/95

BAHRAIN

BRIEFS

TRADE SURPLUS--Bahrain achieved an oil trade balance surplus with the rest of the world of 401.4 million Bahraini dinars during 1984, following the increase of the country's revenues from its oil exports from 972 million Bahraini dinars in 1983 to 1,019.8 million dinars in 1984. [Summary] [Manama AL-ADWA' in Arabic 20 Apr 85 p 1 GF]

CSO: 4400/134

ISRAEL

LABOR PARTY EXPECTS EARLY ELECTIONS

Tel Aviv YEDIT'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 15 Mar 85 p 5

[Article by Orly Azoulay-Katz: "Certainty Among the Labor Party:
Everything Points to Early Elections"]

[Text] At the Labor Party headquarters intensive preparations are underway for the Histadrut elections. Elections points have already been readied throughout the country, and appearances have been scheduled for the party leaders. The objective is, of course, to secure a solid majority for Isra'el Qesar, but there is also a rumor that those election points will soon serve as basis for Knesset elections. The Labor Party believes that the coalition government will disintegrate by the end of the summer and that early elections will take place in October or November.

The party leaders do not speak about it publicly, but in internal conversations they have recently begun saying that there is no chance that the rotation agreement will indeed be implemented. "No one intends to hold a ceremony and hand the flag to Shamir," one Alignment official told me, adding: "We are currently working on a program that will bring about the dismantling of the government without making us appear as seat stealers."

It is clear to all that Ezer Weizmann will probably play a major role in the dissolution of the government. It is already obvious that even if Peres, Rabin, and Navon want to implement the rotation agreement, Weizmann will not be a party to it. "If that will be the case, Weizmann will get up and leave just before it happens. When he went to the polls he did not mean to return the Likud to the government," one of the Alignment leaders told me.

Recently, Alignment officials have discerned a scheme being woven by the Likud. They uncover a Likud action program that focuses on two areas: one is to damage Peres' prestige as much as possible and thus erode his popularity among the public. According to Alignment's information, three people are in charge of this area: Moshe Arens, Dan Meridor, and Roni Milo. Alignment people note that the frequent personal

attacks directed at Peres by the three reinforce this assumption. The second plane on which the Likud is working, according to Alignment information, is preserving the unity of the party with a view to permitting the implementation of the rotation agreement. This objective is entirely in the care of Yitzhaq Shamir.

The Alignment leadership has recently decided that when the time comes, attempts will be made to "blow up" the government through the adoption of daring political initiatives with American cooperation, while at the same time exposing the policy of the Likud, which allocates money to settlements, but not to development towns. Peres, who in the past was hated by the population of the development towns, now pays them frequent visits, and his aides point out with satisfaction that he now has the support of formerly devoted "Herutniks."

The Alignment is convinced that all the roads lead to early elections. No actual date is yet clear, but what is clear, is that the election points prepared for the Histadrut elections will not be dismantled and will serve as the basis for electoral headquarters for Knesset elections.

"YAHAD Will Be Officially Dismantled"

The dismantling of the YAHAD movement will soon be announced officially. Its leaders believe that by the time of the next elections it will no longer exist and thus, they are aiming toward a complete merger with the Labor Party, on the basis of the agreement signed by the two parties on the eve of the establishment of the coalition government.

Ezer Weizmann, who is enjoying a great popularity with the public, will hold one of the first places on the Alignment Knesset list, and if everything goes according to plan, the Peres-Weizmann-Rabin-Navon team will lead the Alignment to the next elections. The Alignment is convinced that with such a team they will be able to relegate the Likud to the opposition.

Sharir To Examine Political Appointments

At one of their routine meetings, Prime Minister Shim'on Peres brought up with Yitzhaq Shamir the subject of political appointments in the Foreign Ministry. Peres had information to the effect that Shamir and his deputy Roni Milo had violated the agreements and had hastened to send Herut members as envoys to the four corners of the world.

According to the interparty agreements, only 15 heads of representations may be political appointees. In the past, foreign ministers took care not to make more than 9 such appointments. Now, however, Knesset Member Uzi Bar'am came upon an internal document listing the names of Herut people sent abroad. "According to my information," Bar'am said, "Shamir and Milo are planning many such appointments in the near future. The appointments already made do not reflect the composition of this government. They are scheming to fill the embassies with their people."

According to Bar'am's information, the following envoys were appointed from among the Herut: the ambassador to the United Nations, the general consul in Los Angeles, the consul in Atlanta, the general consul in San Francisco, the ambassadors to Colombia, Guatemala, Jamaica, New Zealand, Holland, South Africa and Norway, and the general consul in Sidney.

As we said, Peres brought this point up with Shamir, who promised to look into it. The Labor Party is waiting.

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CSO: 4423/27

ISRAEL

JOINT PROJECTS WITH LIBERIA REVIEWED

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 15 Mar 85 pp 1, 7

[Tzadoq Yehezki'eli article: "Israelis Building the Defense Ministry and a War Theater in Liberia"]

[Text] An Israeli building company is building Liberia's defense ministry with an investment of \$20 million. The cornerstone laying ceremony took place in the capital, Monrovia, a few days ago, and President Samuel Doe used the opportunity to praise the relations between Liberia and Israel.

He said: This project constitutes a clear answer to all those who think that we only turn to Israel for weapons. The people now know the truth. The Israelis also provide us with development aid."

The ceremony was attended by all the government ministers; invited also were all the ambassadors of the countries that have relations with Liberia, including the Soviet Union and the Arab countries, who appeared bewildered by the lofty height to which the Israeli flag was flown.

The Liberians publicized the event, which was discussed at length on radio and television broadcasts, with the mention that it is an Israeli project.

The project is being carried out by a daughter company of the Israeli building concern "Heptzibah," with an Israeli-procured Belgian investment of \$20 million, and it involves an enormous structure with four wings, which will also feature an underground war theater. The building will also house the Liberian security services, which are responsible for the safety of the military government.

The construction of the Liberian Defense Ministry is also one of the projects in which Israel is involved. In the past months there has been an upsurge in Israeli investment in Liberia. The Liberians are bringing pressure to bear on Israel to fulfill its promise to invest in and to develop the country, a promise given by Prime Minister Menahem Begin in exchange for renewed relations.

Liberia's economic situation is currently very bad. The Americans stopped pouring money into the country in the wake of the military coup that took place 5 years ago. Only recently has the United States begun to renew its aid to Liberia, after proceedings began in preparations for democratic elections.

The Israelis have concluded agreements with Liberia on a number of additional joint projects, such as the erection of a savings and mortgage bank, for which contacts were conducted by the directors of the Tefahot Bank who had come to Monrovia the week before. The purpose is to devise a way by which Liberians can save money for housing. The government will build the housing and the Israelis will procure the starting capital for the bank. Among other things, the preferential treatment accorded to young couples in Israel was also suggested to the Liberians.

Agreement has also been reached on a fishing venture, under which Israeli and Liberian vessels will fish for (hasilon) and other sea food along the Liberian coast and on its rivers. The proceeds will be earmarked entirely for export, and the profits will be divided between the Liberian government and the Israeli fishing company.

Several Israeli experts on banana growing from Kibbutz Ginnosar visited Liberia last week to test possibilities for growing bananas of a special strain. Liberia's climate permits four crops a year.

Another Israeli project in Liberia calls for uprooting an enormous jungle, as large as one fourth of the area of Israel; the trees felled are to be sold to various countries, among them the Soviet Union, to which the Israelis are directly shipping the wood.

12782
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ISRAEL

INTERVIEW WITH YUVAL NE'EMAN

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 15 Mar 85 p 8

[Interview with Yuval Ne'eman by Asher Wallfish]

[Text]

PROFESSOR Yuval Ne'eman, the leader of the Tehiya party and a senior member of its four-man Knesset faction, holds that the only way to make Galilee safe for Israelis to live in is to stamp out terror in Southern Lebanon in the same way that it was stamped out in Gaza in 1969-71, while Ariel Sharon was O/C Southern Command.

"I know enough about terrorism and about security to assure you that we shall not have peace and quiet if we content ourselves with half-measures," said the man who rose in the IDF to be deputy head of the operations branch at GHQ. (He served as number two to Yitzhak Rabin in the Sixties, when Rabin headed the branch).

Ne'eman said in an interview with *The Post* that until 1969, the Gaza Strip was "a veritable hornets' nest, with the PLO in complete control."

"But then the army went through the Strip house by house and street by street and passed every single resident through a security sieve. We must do just that in Southern Lebanon, in the entire area between the Litani river and the 1922 border [sic].

"We must use all the technical and administrative techniques at our disposal to pinpoint the hostile elements. We must check everybody, give them forgery-proof identity cards, and make sure that nobody escapes our dragnet.

"All those Lebanese who are ready to live in peace with us can

carry on living their lives as before. All those who call or work for the downfall of the State of Israel can pick up and move north of the river.

"I never accepted the theory of my former cabinet colleagues that we were in Lebanon as guests, and so could not afford to take any measure which might be interpreted as partitioning the country," Ne'eman went on, "and I had no compunction about telling the Likud ministers after the Tyre terror-bomb assault that the blood of our fallen was on their hands, because they did not have the guts to carry measures all the way through."

He recalls that at the time of Israel's siege of Beirut, he and Ariel Sharon were in a minority of two in the cabinet, calling for a tightening of the IDF stranglehold.

IN THE PRESENT situation after the Metulla blast, Ne'eman is pleased that Yitzhak Rabin is minister of defence and not Moshe Arens (who succeeded Sharon in the Likud cabinet).

"Rabin has shown that he knows how to carry out a tough policy in Lebanon. Arens could never have done what Rabin is doing. Arens is a gentle man. When I suggested all sorts of measures, he would reply that he did not want to stir up the Shi'ites against Israel. But all he proved to the Shi'ites was that Israel is weak, and thus fanned their fanaticism."

For the Tehiya leader, it is not just

a question of ensuring that the Arabs do not take restraint for a sign of weakness.

"All around the world," he pointed out, "realpolitik means maintaining your deterrent might at all times. Were it not for the balance of terror between the United States and the Soviet Union, the world would not be at peace today.

"I believe that 90 per cent of those who ever studied military history look at things the way I do, not excepting even Matityahu Peled, leader of the Progressive List for Peace."

Ne'eman says that while it so happens that from 1976, the majority of the South Lebanon population abandoned the area and fled northwards because of the civil war, only returning to their original homes after the IDF invaded, it does not matter to him where their homes were. "The only thing that matters to me is the peace of Galilee," he declared firmly.

He advocates the hermetic closure of all the area south of the Litani and the town of Nabatiye. "All the links of the area with the rest of Lebanon should be finally severed. The only residents permitted to stay in the area should be those who are sympathetic towards Israel and cooperative with Israel."

THE TEHIYA leader believes that one of the aims of the Peace for Galilee operation was to buttress and enlarge the 10km.-wide buffer

zone formerly patrolled by the late Major Sa'ad Haddad.

He recalls that he first raised his "clean out terror" proposals for the whole area south of the Awali river line while he was in the cabinet before the last elections.

"My cabinet colleagues tried to argue with me that the methods we used in Gaza, Judea or Sanaria could not be applied in Lebanon.

When I asked Ne'eman what practical purpose there could be in his lone voice calling for a withdrawal policy diametrically opposed to what the government had already decided, he replied:

"Although the government declares it will pull back to the former border [he does not call it the international border], I have a faint hope that the IDF will remain in a buffer zone alongside the South Lebanese Army. And if there is one man who can bring that about, that man may well be Yitzhak Rabin."

He recalled that when the invasion of Lebanon began and Tehiya had not yet joined the coalition, then prime minister Menachem Begin told the faction quite clearly that the IDF intended to push only 40km. northwards.

In retrospect he said, this was surprising, since in no previous Israeli war had the aims of the campaign been publicly defined beforehand. "I was at David Ben-Gurion's right hand in 1956 at the time of the Sinai Campaign and I know he had not worked things out to the last detail.

"As for 1967, before the Six Day War, Yitzhak Rabin, as chief of general staff, intended to call a halt at El Arish." But it was the late Moshe Dayan, the defence minister, who altered the plans and sent the IDF further in."

HE GRUMBLED about the way

the Lebanon war had been debated and analyzed day by day and stage by stage in a cabinet of 25 ministers.

"You can't run wars properly that way. Levi Eshkol ran the 1967 war with a handful of people. Golda Meir ran the Yom Kippur War with four ministers. Ben-Gurion ran the Sinai Campaign with even fewer. When I went to Begin and told him I never heard of anything so peculiar in all my life, he replied that he was upholding genuine democracy."

Ne'eman told *The Post* frankly that international law and peace treaties are "very low on my list of priorities, somewhere around fifth place."

Nor does he subscribe to what are regarded as conventional political moralities.

"I care about one thing and one thing only - Jewish survival," he said flatly. "That sums up my political morality. The only reason for my entering the political world is to ensure Jewish survival. I am not a politician at all. Within those terms of reference I am ready to be as moral as anybody else."

While conceding that every Israeli politician has his own interpretation of what must be done to ensure Jewish survival, Ne'eman said that some were ready to do more than others.

He also conceded that at times he had difficulty in dwelling in harmony with his political party, Tehiya, because of the fact that he did not consider himself to be a party man first and foremost. "I know they have some problems with me. But if they had been really dissatisfied with me, they always had the option of doing something about it."

NE'EMAN did not miss any opportunity to distance himself from Menachem Begin.

"I chided him for stating publicly

that Israel had no territorial claims on Lebanon when he made the first Knesset speech about the Peace for Galilee operation. He should have kept silent on that point. I agreed that the operation did not have such claims as its objective, but I still hold that Lebanon as far north as the Litani is part of Eretz Yisrael. So why go out of one's way to rule out such claims?

"Now that Lebanese President Amin Jemayel has called on his countrymen to fight Israel, however, we have to consider pressing our territorial claims against Lebanon. After all, he has turned Lebanon into a confrontation state even more aggressive than Jordan. Jemayel is no different from Muammar Gaddafi.

"I would never waive our claims to Gilead," he went on, referring to northern Jordan, "because it is also part of Eretz Yisrael. But I do not say that I would go to war to take Gilead."

He recalled that when Begin told the cabinet about the proposal for peace talks with Lebanon, he persuaded them that the only two possible venues must be Jerusalem or Beirut.

"I told him that what is important is what you say, not where you say it, but I did not object to stipulating the two capitals as the venue, since that's what most ministers wanted. However, when Begin came back a month later and asked the cabinet to drop their insistence on Jerusalem or Beirut as venues, I refused to tag along. I voted against Begin. For me, it's important to be consistent.

"Begin convinced the cabinet that a treaty with Lebanon was vitally important. For me, security is more important than a treaty, and I would never rely on a treaty for Israel's security."

CSO: 4400/122

ISRAEL

ECONOMICS MINISTER ON ECONOMIC GROWTH

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 21 Feb 85 p 8

[Article by Gad Ya'Acobi]

[Text]

AT A TIME when we are cutting our budgets and severely controlling prices in order to bring down the rate of inflation, we must also set our minds to Israel's other immediate economic problem – that of the balance of payments – and to the renewal of Israel's economic growth in order to move towards the attainment of a longer-term goal: economic independence.

In the short run, one can use administrative means to reduce the deficit; in the long run there is only one way to overcome it – through increased exports and import substitution.

In order to increase our production for exports and import substitution, in particular the production of sophisticated goods which require a great deal of know-how, there is an urgent need for capital investment to expand existing enterprises and to establish new ones. Much of this capital investment must come from abroad – from the world Jewish business community and from non-Jewish business interests whose involvement in the Israeli economy we are seeking to increase on a purely business basis.

Israel has many important attributes for the attraction of such capital investment: brain power, highly qualified manpower, a business community, part of which is oriented

towards high-tech industry, and strong links to the international economy.

Once the free-trade agreement between Israel and the U.S. is finalized, Israel will be the only state in the world with free-trade agreements both with Western Europe and with the U.S., which will place it in the unique position of being able to act as a production centre for exports to both Europe and North America.

POTENTIAL IS NOT what is lacking in the Israeli economy today. But we are not blind to one drawback: we know that until the rate of inflation is reduced, the economy stabilized and profitability ensured, no capital will be invested in Israel.

We also know that there are further steps and measures which we must take in order to attract the capital investment we so urgently need.

We must act with all seriousness to change the structure of the Israeli economy by drastically increasing the productive sectors as compared to public services.

We must change the *modus operandi* of our economy and create a new atmosphere which will encourage development in the desired direction.

Some of the immediate steps that must be taken are: to facilitate the

process of investment in Israel by reducing the number of authorities currently engaged in the issue and by accompanying the investor through the initial stages to ensure rapid and efficient treatment of each project; to vary the system of incentives offered to foreign investors; to reduce production costs by reducing the rates of taxation which must be paid by labour employed in export industries; to ensure that sufficient trained manpower graduates from our universities and schools of technology every year to meet the necessary demand; to ensure that the exchange rate is kept at a level which makes exports profitable; and to sell some government corporations and integrate private capital in others.

THE ISRAELI EXPORT performance, even under the adverse economic conditions of the last few years, has certainly been impressive. In 1984 exports amounted to 45 per cent of GNP – about \$10 billion worth of exports compared to a GNP of about \$22b.

Exports of Israeli produced R & D intensive products went up from \$750 million in 1979 to \$1.8 billion in 1984 – an average annual rise of 20 per cent.

We believe that by 1989 industrial exports alone can reach \$10 billion. We are currently engaged in setting up the framework for regular and

direct contacts between those factors abroad who have the means, capability and desire to invest in Israel, and the Israeli business community and relevant government authorities.

To this purpose a task force has been established in North America, comprising the most prominent Jewish business figures in the U.S. and Canada.

An Israeli counterpart has also been set up. These two groups are currently meeting in Jerusalem to work out an agenda for the coming years and mechanisms for working together.

Once the Israeli Government introduces the changes, which we all know to be so vital, and once the new mechanisms are set in motion, the road will be open for a new era both in relations between Israel and the Diaspora and for the Israeli economy. Together we can succeed.

CSO: 4400/122

ISRAEL

COST OF LEBANON WAR TO DATE

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 22 Mar 85 p 1

[Text]

The Treasury allocated some \$1.3 billion to finance the war in Lebanon in the past three years. This figure does not include other costs to the economy such as lost work days, Finance Ministry sources said.

The Defence Ministry budget will shortly be the subject of a cabinet debate. The Treasury fears the debate could lead to a large reduction in the sums the Treasury hopes to slash from the defence budget.

According to Treasury officials the planned cut in the defence budget totals \$300 million, from \$4.3b. this year to \$4b. in 1985/86. But this cut could be more apparent than real if the withdrawal from Lebanon and the army's redeployment are funded from other sources. This could save the Defence Ministry some \$250m. and thwart the efforts to axe its budget.

The officials complained about the degree of civilian control over army finances. They said that the army and the Defence Ministry do not always present the Treasury and the Knesset with all the relevant data. Even in projects such as the Lavi jet fighters, the Treasury has been kept in the dark on the updated cost figures, officials said.

The officials said that since August 1983 the sums allocated for defence from domestic funds have been axed by \$600m., but the army did not translate this fact into a reduction of its operations.

"Now the army feels that it has less resources and it is complaining, but it did not plan correctly when the cuts were first approved," the sources said.

They added that the decision to grant wage rises to standing army personnel only made the problem more acute.

CSO: 4400/122

ISRAEL

STUDY ON JEWISH, ARAB YOUTH

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 18 Mar 85 p 11

[Text] A comparison of findings by studies conducted in 1973, 1975 and 1984 shows a general decline in the willingness of Jewish youth in Israel to have social contacts with Arab youth. On the other hand, Arab youth show more willingness and openness to contacts and ties with their Jewish counterparts than the latter show toward them. These are the conclusions of a recently completed study. The study, "Willingness for Orderly Social Relations Between Jewish and Arab Students," was conducted by Prof Yohanan Hoffman and (student) Kamil Najar of the Psychology Department at Haifa University. The study is part of a series of studies intended to examine positions of Jewish and Arab youth toward each other, and especially their willingness to maintain proper social contacts with each other. The goal is to recognize the psycho-social aspects of relations between the two peoples in an effort to evaluate chances for improvement.

The study involved about 500 Jewish high school students from Haifa, Haifa suburbs and Kfar Hasidum, and about 700 Arab high school students from Nazareth, Tarshiha, Umm-al-Fahm and "Ar'ara. The questionnaire included 26 questions, assembled over the years, intended to elicit the views of the subjects and their opinions on the thinking of both groups. The assumption was that the thinking attributed to the subjects' group would tend to reflect social norms and could even be more candid than the individual's answer about himself or herself. As to the thinking attributed to the other group, it could be a gauge to the degree of inter-group understanding.

The study of relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel is marked by difficulties of definition and measurement. The study and documentation of social meetings on Friday nights, in coffee houses, cultural centers and other informal occasions is most difficult. The researchers state that in the area of encounters between groups, even when the meetings are specifically for the purpose of improving relations, there is no assurance that the stated goals will be accomplished. The tremendous amount of experience attained from meetings of high school students organized by the Jewish-Arab Center in Beit-HaGefen (Haifa) shows that in spite of all efforts of the organizers to keep to common interests, the meetings often drift to divisive issues, thus defeating the common goal. At that point the individuals see themselves as representatives of their people, while the members of the other group are regarded as representing the enemy.

There is not enough time in these meetings to overcome the communications gap and to strive toward the common human and social goals that were set to begin with.

The study concludes that large differences exist between Jews and Arabs on the issue of willingness to establish inter-group contacts. While Jewish students voiced very little interest, Arab students declared more willingness to meet Jews, to nurture relations; they pointed to larger difficulties of coexisting without such contacts and voiced less willingness to avoid contacts with the other side.

Responses to phrases expressing increasing degrees of social contact show the order in which the various aspects are conceived: work, friendship, neighborhood, finances, housing and marriage. It is interesting that on those aspects where the greatest differences exist (finances, housing and marriage) Jews are the ones to show more openness than Arabs. Moreover, contrary to some opinions, Arabs show very little interest in intermarriage, even less so than Jews.

As to peaceful coexistence among Jews and Arabs in Israel, the option of partial, gradual integration is the most preferred by all. The same consensus exists as pertains to the least popular option, maximal separation (gradual integration -- yes, Apartheid -- no).

The most willingness for coexistence among Arabs showed among Nazareth youth, and not necessarily those from the Catholic parochial schools. The least interest was in Ummal-Fahm, perhaps because the survey was conducted shortly after the hostile visit there by Member of Knesset Kahane. Opinions in "Ar'ara, a Moslem town in central Israel, are more sympathetic than those in Ummal-Fahm. Among Galilee towns it can be seen that Tarshiha residents consistently show less willingness for coexistence than do Nazareth youth who have a similar religious background. Tarshiha residents, who share a local council with (Jewish) Ma'alot, have more occasion to interact with Jews. Their responses in the interviews confirm that. It turns out then, that the frequency of contact is in reverse relationship to the declared attitude.

It would have been interesting to find differences between Galilee Arabs and those of the Triangle, but no such clear trend could be detected. The researchers point out that it is sufficient to state that opinions are influenced substantially by local events.

The survey shows that Arabs are more receptive to relations with Jews when their individual opinions were examined than is attributed to them by Jews. The researchers stress that although the individual Arab attitude is subject to local influences, there is a consistency of attitude. Perhaps this consensus should be seen as a social norm. It also turns out from the survey that more Jews than Arabs think that there is a future for Arab youth in Israel.

In the chapter analyzing their findings, the researchers say: "For the most part, when public figures voice their opinions in the media, they do

not voice too much hope for improved relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel. The impression is that there is no need for social contacts between the two peoples. For them it would be enough that Israeli Arabs identify with the goals of the Zionist state, that they resign themselves to their position as a minority and learn to live in peace and quiet. Recently some opinions were even voiced proposing abolition of all social contacts and the expulsion of all Arabs. These opinions have KACH's support and that of the controversial Rabbi Kahane. The common denominator to all these opinions is the solution of maximal separation between the two nations. The importance of the study is that it points out that this solution was rejected by most of the students." The researchers voice their hope that the present findings will serve to encourage those who believe that extremism has not yet taken root.

At the same time it should be remembered that the samples were small and localized. There still is, at least in these groups, a substantial potential of good will, on both sides. Although there has been some deterioration in this potential since the first survey in 1972, the researchers claim that the high percentage of those who maintain that such relations are possible and even desirable, confirms that. Jews seem to declare this more so than Arabs. The question is, if these relations are so desirable, why are they not encouraged more than they are? Many students said that they feel that no one in the educational system is interested in nurturing such relations. Arab youth, although less convinced than their Jewish counterparts that relations are possible and desirable, claim more emphatically than Jews that they are trying to nurture them and that it is difficult to live in Israel otherwise.

The researchers explain the gap between the willingness for social contacts as expressed by Jews and their opinions as to opportunities in this regard. In their opinion the explanation is that it is not difficult for members of the majority to voice nice thoughts, when no one prods them to act accordingly or to achieve what they perceive as desirable goals. On the other hand, striving to get close to Jews serves Arab interests. Members of a minority tend to be more realistic and try to get closer to members of the majority as long as they are dependent on them.

The conclusion is that the main responsibility for improved relations should be on Jews. They have the most power and the Arabs have the most willingness. The researchers think that more well planned contacts between youth of both nations should take place. They should be planned so they do not deteriorate to the emotional aspect but rather so that they concentrate on recognizing the problem and trying to find solutions.

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ISRAEL

CRIME STATISTICS REPORT FOR 1984 ISSUED

Tel Avia HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 14 Feb 85 p 9

[Text] Anyone wishing to get an idea on the crime rate in Israel had better not rely on the recent statistical report for 1984 published by the police, in spite of its title.

The report is, at best, a document from which one can draw some conclusions on complaints that were registered with the police. At the same time the Central Agency for Statistics conducted a survey among crime victims, in the course of which 921 Jewish households were questioned. The survey concluded that in 1981, 385,000 crimes took place while the police only reported 243,406 cases. It can thus be concluded that a full one third of the crimes committed were not reported to the police.

This shows, first of all, that the public distrusts the police. It would make sense to assume that if the police really wanted to know what is happening on the crime scene, another such survey would be ordered. This was not done. Police headquarters say that no new survey was conducted because of budgetary limitations.

In spite of its limitations, the annual report should cause concern. In 1984 the police opened 252,239 new investigative files, an increase of 5.2 percent over 1983. The report was preceded by an explanation which does not voice any concern with what is happening. In Germany, on the other hand, when last year there was an increase of 2 percent, the police voiced grave concern.

Everyone at the police interprets the report differently. Some say it reflects a rise in the crime rate. Others say that the increased number of complaints points more to a rising confidence in the police than to a rise in the crime rate. The truth probably lies somewhere in the middle. In any event, it seems that the best gauge of the effectiveness of the police is the percentage of solved cases. In Israel one out of four cases, according to the police, is solved. (In Germany, for example, almost every other case is solved.) The solution of a case, though, does not necessarily mean trying the guilty persons, let alone getting a conviction. As far as the police are concerned, they are

finished when they think they have the guilty party. When this reporter requested information on trials and convictions, it turned out that these data are not available.

Figures on the rise in crimes in 1984, and a 7.5 percent increase in 1983, put the police command in an awkward position. In an article by Yehezki'el Karti, head of the investigative unit, which was published in HA'ARETZ in 1982, he wrote: "I hope that the decline in crime in 1982 is but the beginning of a trend." This forecast turned out to be inaccurate.

The report reveals that every fifth household was a robbery victim. In one hour there are four break-ins, two robberies of businesses or institutions, two car thefts, five thefts of valuables out of cars, two cases of vandalism and five other cases of theft. Two persons are held up daily, there are four arson cases, two women and/or minors are raped or are victims of sexual abuse. A murder is committed every 5 days.

The most serious problem is robbery. In 1984 there was an increase of 6 percent. The percentage of such solved cases, which affect so many in the population, is only 12.5 percent, an increase of a mere 1 percent over 1983. On another front, drugs, the situation continues to be serious. Large quantities of drugs are being smuggled and the number of users is on the rise. In 1984 there was an increase of 32.2 percent in the number of drug dealers caught. But in order to view this in its proper perspective, it should be pointed out that in spite of the large inflow of drugs and in spite of the fact that it is the most important crime in the Israeli underworld, only 1.7 percent of the cases deal with drugs. In this context the police usually act on their own initiative, not on specific complaints. Moreover, more than half of these cases are for drug use. It is not the users who are targeted by the police, but rather, the drug dealers. The increase in cases there, impressive as it may be, is only so in view of the poor record in the past.

Serious offenses, murder, attempted murder, rape, violent attacks--the type that is usually not affected by police work--have remained on a similar level, compared with 1983.

Offenders' Profile

There are some interesting data on apprehended offenders. About 12 percent are minors, 5 percent of the crimes within the "Green Line" are committed by residents of the occupied territories. The involvement of residents of the occupied territories in sexual offenses is rather high--13.3 percent of all such crimes.

The report points to a lack of confidence of residents of the occupied territories in the police. While Israeli citizens reported 252,000 cases within the "Green Line," residents of the occupied territories reported only 20,000 cases.

Most crimes are committed in the Tel Aviv district, followed by the Northern district and the Southern District. The Central district is at the bottom of the list. The Central district, though, shows an increase of 15.9 percent over 1983, mostly property related crimes, more so than any other district. Officials of the Central district find it difficult to explain this. Beyond the fact that they have to gear for this increase, it should be recalled that in recent years the rise in the crime rate in this district was slower than elsewhere. The district is now paying the penalty for maintaining a relatively low crime rate. Another police report, this one unpublished, analyses crime in various settlements. Parts of it were released, from which it can be concluded that in some Israeli cities the crime rate is approaching that in the U.S.: 110-130 per 1,000. Tel-Aviv, Elat, Ramla, Lod and Nahariya are in this category (see table).

City	No. people	No. cases	per thousand	percent
Jerusalem	430,000	23,081	53.6	19.7
Tel Aviv Jaffa	270,000	36,126	133.3	19.6
Haifa	228,000	15,746	69.0	21.4
Netanya	101,000	8,981	88.9	26.1
Ramla-Lod	83,000	9,125	109.9	18.0
Beer-Sheva	116,000	9,405	81.0	20.8
Nahariya	28,000	2,910	103.9	32.4
Ashqelon	53,000	4,136	78.0	29.4
Elat	19,000	2,581	135.8	29.3
All Israel	4,100,000	252,239	60.1	23.9

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ISRAEL

AUTONOMY FOR GAZA STRIP DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 13 Feb 85 p 7

[Article by Elisha Efrat]

[Text] The writer, Prof Elisha Efrat, is geography professor at Tel-Aviv University.

Prime Minister Peres' statement that one should review the option of implementing autonomy in the Gaza Strip, as a first step, is a correct and constructive proposal for a possible solution for all the occupied territories, not just an experimental one for part of them. Whether or not success in Gaza brings about progress in Judaea and Samaria as well, at least the Gaza problem may be resolved. The Gaza Strip constitutes a heavy burden on Israel, financial, for its maintenance, and human, both civilian and military, for its administration.

It seems that although Gaza is part of the Land of Israel and a section of the southern coastal plain, it does not register in the minds of the Jewish people as part of the "fatherland." The area does not have any holy sites that people have been yearning for and it lacks anything special which justifies any argument of relating it to past history. Quite the opposite. At issue is a region which is just the tail end, geographically speaking, an outcome of the War of Independence. The 19 years of Egyptian rule left a legacy of demographic, economic, social and political problems which Israel inherited after the Six Day War.

What Is The Strip?

The Strip's area is approximately 363 square km, 1.7 percent of Israel proper, or 6.1 percent of the area of Judaea and Samaria combined. It is 46 km in length and varies in width between 5 and 8 km only. Near the Egyptian border, its maximum width is 17 km. The Gaza Strip has no big economic potential. It has no mineral deposits. Its western section consists mainly of sand dunes, 5 km in width. These are tilled in small plots and are watered by underground reservoirs. Good agricultural soil can only be found in its center, and it is intensively utilized there. This portion constitutes 70 percent of the Strip's area. It does not adequately support the needs of the population. The main crop in the Gaza Strip is citrus.

The majority of the population is Arab and it numbers about 500,000. It is one of the most densely populated areas in the world with 1,377 people per square km (!), compared with 136 in Judaea and Samaria, 200 in Israel proper and 300 in the area north of Be'er-Sheva. The Strip's population grows at an annual rate of 3 percent, double the rate of Judaea and Samaria. The population typically does not tend to emigrate, which adds another $\frac{1}{2}$ percent to its annual growth rate. The annual birth rate is 46 per 1,000, which is one of the highest in Arab countries. In Judaea and Samaria the rate is 32 per 1,000, whereas in Israel the figure is 20 per 1,000. The working age population is now 250,000 in size, one third of which is employed in Israel.

The population consists of local people, refugees and Bedouins who came here from the Negev plains and from the Sinai. It is concentrated in four cities: Gaza, Khan Yunis, Dayr al-Balah and Rafah, and in the refugee camps of al-Shati, Jabaliyah and others, as well as in large villages, such as Lahiye, Bay-Hanun and Nusayrat. Half of the population is under the age of 14, and is a sizable potential of job seekers in the future.

The original population was only one third of the current one. Half the population is defined as refugees, and the remaining, about 13 percent, are Bedouins. The refugees came here during the War of Independence from villages in the southern coastal region. This population was isolated physically and socially and the responsibility for it was left mainly to the United Nations. Originally camps were constructed to house the refugees. They lacked the proper infrastructure of services and over the years have turned into slums with a population density of 30,000 per square km. True, after the Six Day War the Israeli authorities started rehabilitating the refugees with a somewhat improved infrastructure. Some of the inhabitants built permanent homes. The solution was not complete and did not satisfy everyone. Of the 260,000 refugees now residing in the Gaza Strip, 170,000 are still in camps.

Between 1948 and 1967, during the Egyptian administration, no meaningful economic development whatsoever took place in the Gaza Strip. The high birth rate brought about increasingly crowded conditions and higher local unemployment against the background of a shaky economic base. These tended to increase social pressures with a rise of nationalistic sentiments. The takeover by Israel in the Six Day War brought about a positive economic change, because the route to jobs in Israel was thus opened. Since then the main source of income has been employment in Israel. This in turn has reduced the influence of Arab countries there. The standard of living went up, so did the standard of agriculture. Some industrial plants were constructed in the northern part. Yet, the Gaza Strip has not turned into a particularly prosperous region. Anything invested in it was but minimal aid to maintain its population on a reasonable level, while ensuring security in the area bordering the Sinai to the south, the western Negev to the east and the coastal plain to the north.

Thus, today's conditions in the Gaza Strip make it into a collection of burdensome issues. It is doubtful that with its demographic structure, problematic economy and poor infrastructure, it can seem attractive to any country.

A Jewish Strip?

Israel's approach in the Strip was similar to its approach in Judaea and Samaria, i.e., an effort was made to populate it with Jews in a growing system of agricultural settlements. Settlements were in groups, but with very few results and with no chance to really populate the Strip with a substantial Jewish contingency. The main thrust consisted of the establishment of the Qatif District in the south, which was to be a buffer between the Egyptian border to the south and the dense Arab population in the north. It was intended to maintain a permanent Israeli presence in the Strip and become a conspicuous settlement focal point in an area whose political future has not yet been determined. In addition to the Qatif district, settlements were established in Gush Nezarim in the center and around Lahiyeh to the north, near the industrial park in Erez. All three districts now consist of no more than 1,000 settlers, whereas the plan called for at least 15,000. This, with an Arab population of 500,000...

The settlements, 11 in number, were all part of the Hapo'el Hamizrahi organization. They were established on public lands which had no Arab population prior to that, or on empty, partially tilled land. All told 56,000 dunums were seized, or 15 percent of the Gaza Strip area. Since about two thirds of the population live on agriculture, they need land and water which are in short supply as is. Therefore, these settlements are dependent on the outside, which further reduces their economic viability. Spreading them out was intended to divide up the Gaza Strip. At the same time it also isolated them behind barbed wire.

Release the Gaza Strip

Considering the situation in the Gaza Strip today, the doubts as to its improvement, there is no justification for its continued occupation by Israel. As long as Israel does not have the potential to populate the Strip, as long as the Strip does not have the potential for economic viability, as long as the need for land is high, as long as the border problem with Egypt is taken care of by the withdrawal agreement, with the rest of the Strip being secured routinely, why continue with the occupation and not try to give autonomy to the Gaza Strip?

It should be recalled that in spite of what has been said, the basic population in the Strip is urban. It has a capital, Gaza, with a population of 120,000. It has medium size towns and smaller towns, all functioning reasonably well. It has a road system and basic services which make life there quite reasonable. There even is some local

leadership that can administer the area. All these are basics for self rule. In addition, the Israeli authorities, over the past 17 years, have established and organized many municipal and regional aspects of self rule. The only advantage Israel gets out of the Gaza Strip is a reasonably cheap labor force, and that can be maintained even with autonomy.

What is needed is political courage and an unconventional approach to relations between Israel and Arabs. That will bring about the beginning of change in this unhealthy situation which has been created over the years.

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ISRAEL

WIND GENERATED ELECTRICITY NETWORK PLANNED

Tel Avia HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 12 Feb 85 p 11

[Text] The general manager of the Electric Co, Maj Gen (reserves) Yitzhaq Hofi, who headed the Mosad for 8 years, seems a serious and taciturn individual. In a speech he recently made in Nazareth he referred to the project of wind generated electricity: "We have very few natural resources. There is wind, some natural and a lot which is created by people. The problem is that the second kind does not lend itself to generating electricity."

Even without the ability to generate electricity from people generated "wind," the Electric Co recently decided to embark on a bold step, rather in contrast to its usual stodgy nature, much like that of other utilities. The Electric Co decided to construct a wind turbine in the Yodfat mountain range in the Galilee. It seems that this will be the first in a network of turbines to be constructed on several mountain tops in Israel, in an effort to harness the wind for the production of electricity.

It was Prof Yehuda Na'ot of the Technion who originally proposed the idea during the oil crisis. The subject was put on a back burner in 1976. It was not until 1980 that serious considerations started. It was not easy for the Electric Co, which is not used to Don Quixote-like projects of the nature of wind turbines. It got to the point in 1980 that when the first meteorological tower to measure wind velocity was to be constructed, those in charge carried it up the mountain themselves and even set it up, just so as to not shake things too much at the level of the conservative management. Collection of data was necessary in order to have a first estimate of the feasibility of the project. The Energy Ministry joined the project. At some point geography professor Arnon Sofer of Haifa University was approached. He marked 23 likely sites in the Galilee which seemed to be the windiest.

Engineer Eli Ben-Dov, project manager for wind generated electricity, tells the story: "We roamed the Galilee for 3 months selecting sites. On 12 of them we constructed wooden meteorological towers, 10 meters high, to record wind direction and velocity. These measurements were

done for a year and also included kite flying and other measurements in wind tunnels. The data that was collected pointed to five promising sites, of which the Yodfat mountain range seemed the most promising."

The next stage, under way at the present time, is two-phased. The one phase consists of the construction of four meteorological towers, 60 meters high, in order to obtain data on the wind at higher elevations. These measurements will be conducted for a year and are intended to obtain enough data for a feasibility study. The budget, \$150,000 was allocated by the Energy Ministry. Ben-Dov says that in the process of work in the wind rich area, between Yodfat and Hararit, there were some problems with Arab residents. They burned down the first meteorological tower. When a concrete tower was constructed in its place, they tried to known it down and even threw rocks at the instruments.

The other phase of the present stage is a preliminary project with a single wind turbine, the acquisition of which, from a Belgian manufacturer, was recently approved by the Electric Co. The tower will be 24 meters high and will be constructed in the Yodfat mountain range. The diameter of the blades will be 22 meters. It is expected to be in operation within a few months at a cost of \$250,000.

If data collected at 60 meters confirms that collected at 10 meters, the Electric Co plans the construction of the first network. This network is seen as having 15 turbines, producing 1.5 megawatts each, or 20-25 megawatts in total. They will be constructed on 60-meter steel towers, with reinforced fiberglass blades. Fiberglass was chosen because it is light, durable and least likely to interfere with television broadcasting. The investment is expected to reach \$20 million. The turbines will be constructed along the Yodfat mountain range, which stretches over 10 km at a distance of 600-700 meters from each other.

Wind generated electricity is at a rather advanced level in the United States and Europe. In the United States there are, to date, 4,000 such operating units, mostly small and privately owned, usually by California entrepreneurs. They usually receive tax incentives (in order to encourage research), which makes it into a feasible business.

All told, about 300 megawatts of electricity are produced by wind all over the world. The first project started in the United States in 1975. The idea really caught on in 1980 to the point that now there is what almost amounts to a master plan to develop wind generated electricity projects. Unlike early projects, which were usually small and intended to realize profits quickly, the trend today is to increase capacity and produce more reliable turbines. It is the Europeans who are really the leaders here. They produce turbines capable of generating 300 kilowatts. They have even reached the range of megawatts.

The Danish, Swedes, Dutch and Belgians are the leaders among European countries. Recently projects were started in Germany and Great Britain, too. The Swedes, for example, already have turbines 80 meters high, with a blade diameter of 80 meters, capable of producing 1 megawatt each. These have already been sold to the United States. They are now planning turbines of 1.5 megawatts capacity. The Danes have developed 300 kilowatt units and are now working on the development of a 1.2 megawatt one. The English have developed turbines of 250 kilowatt capacity and are now working on a 3 megawatt unit. The EEC is encouraging these projects and is supporting them financially.

Ben-Dov says that wind generated electricity has two advantages--free energy, which saves foreign currency, and its modular nature, which does not require that the whole project be financed right away. According to him, the Meteorological Service has conducted a study on the subject and has concluded that Israel has the potential of producing 24,000 megawatts. Although this fantastic figure should be taken cautiously, he says that even 2.5 percent of it is 600 megawatts. If things live up to expectations, then by the year 2000, 5-7 percent of the Electric Co fuel needs can be saved. The Energy Ministry is looking for sites in the south, too. There is no need for investing all the money at one time. The turbines can be constructed one at a time, one network after another.

Ben-Dov also points out some drawbacks, such as ruining the mountain scene. He says it is a matter of opinion. To him it is a soothing sight. When he first saw this kind of a windmill in Sweden he was impressed. But beyond the debate which will undoubtedly take place on the issue of scenery, there are also other issues, such as electromagnetic disturbances, to address. Placing a windmill too close to a residential area may cause problems such as television interference.

It is believed at the Electric Co that these problems can be resolved. In addition, there is the feasibility issue. Calculations done by the Electric Co mention an investment of \$1,200 per kilowatt. In Sweden the figure is \$850, but a safe approach was taken in Israel. This will mean it will take 25 years to realize the investment. Much depends on wind velocity. If it is similar to what was measured at 10 meters the investment will be realized in 12-14 years (that included maintenance and other capital investments). If velocity is higher, the payoff may be in a 9-10 year range. The plan is that by the year 2000, 300 megawatts will be wind generated. The wind pattern in the Galilee, with the wind starting early in the morning and subsiding toward evening, matches the peak demand hours. "All told," says Ben-Dov, "the attitude toward the project has taken an about-face recently. Whereas at first every mention of wind generated electricity was met with a smile, today there is a fight over allocating the money for it. I do not know whether Don Quixote and Sancho Pancha are turning in their graves in view of the revolution now underway as regards windmills. What I do know is that if measurements at the Yodfat range are correct, we will be able to start the first wind generated electricity project within 2 years.

ISRAEL

TURNING POINT FOR LAVI PLANE

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 1 Mar 85 p 11

[Article by Ze'ev Schiff]

[Text] The giant project to develop and produce the Lavi plane in Israel has again arrived at a turning point. The question on the agenda is not whether to discontinue development, with 4,000 jobs at stake, but whether to substantially change direction and continue with the stated goal of producing an Israeli fighter or make it an American-Israeli venture.

The author stresses the order, American-Israeli vs. Israeli-American. If present trends continue, there is no doubt that this grandiose project will face some more economic turning points in the future, the most serious of which will be upon arriving at the production stage.

Considering the present economic conditions, Israel will not be able to bear the cost of production by herself. If she persists and mortgages her meager resources, production schedules will not be met, which will in turn raise the price. Various tests and examinations have already been concluded. The government now has to decide whether to instruct the defense minister and his staff to transfer the major portion of production to American companies.

In a discussion held by Mr Rabin in his office on 22 Feb the irony connected with the Lavi re-surfaced -- the projected customer, the IDF, does not show much enthusiasm. Former Chief-of-Staff Refa'el Eytan was against production. The present Chief-of-Staff is not too enthusiastic either. The land based forces understand that they and their development plans will suffer if too much is allocated to the project because not much will be left over for them, in either dollars or shekels, of the aid funds. Air Force Commander, 'Amos Lapidot, who at one point headed the Lavi project, supports production, but other top Air Force officers are afraid that the force's flexibility will suffer inasmuch as airplane equipment is concerned.

The author does not accept the view that participants in the meeting convened by Rabin were surprised to find out that there is a sudden increase in development costs. These have indeed grown, but if they did not know about

it, it is a scandal. The experts should have known from the financial audits of 1981 and based on the changes repeatedly introduced since the original plans were submitted in 1980 that development costs had doubled. That year the estimate was \$1 billion. Doubling the costs does not necessarily stem from mistakes, but first of all from revised specifications. At first a smaller engine was considered and less avionics. Then changes in the wings and type of material was introduced. In 1984 additional electronic improvements were agreed upon (in the quality of the radar equipment).

In other words, production costs went up steeply. In Jan 1982, a long time after the larger and more expensive engine was agreed upon, production costs were estimated at \$10.8 million at 1984 prices. Although calculations have been refined since then, the government still has to assume that \$15 million per Lavi plane is not the final price tag, even if Aerospace Industries meets all production schedules.

With these new figures in mind, it is no wonder that economists who examined the Lavi project and who compared it with acquiring American F-16 planes (partially produced in Israel) concluded that from the economic standpoint, and in view of the risks involved, it is better to purchase the F-16's.

This is the economic consideration. But it should be stressed that the Lavi project, if expectations are met, has other advantages. It will let Israel enter new and sophisticated technological areas, it will improve the ability to manage and carry out large projects and will create many jobs. As for the employees, there is both a stick and a carrot. At the height of the project there will be about 13,000 employees, but in the nineties most of them will be looking for new jobs. Many of the development engineers will already be looking for new jobs in the eighties. At that point Aerospace Industries is likely to propose the development of the next plane, or else there will be a shake-up both in Aerospace Industries and in related industries.

To date all, or most, funds necessary for development were received from the U.S. The Israeli investment was minor, if any. It can be assumed that this kind of support, including conversion to shekels, will continue throughout the development phase. On the other hand, chances are very slim that Washington will agree to pay for production as well. Anyone hoping that the U.S. will finance production in effect expects that the U.S. will pay for production of the fighter planes in Israel and then purchase several hundred of them for the Israeli Air Force.

Former Defense Minister Arens' policy was to continue development and start production even if the U.S. does not support the project. Yitzhaq Rabin changed this policy altogether. He said that development and production will continue as long as funds are available. It follows that the project faces a real danger of coming to a halt just before production, or that production will be so curtailed as to render the plane not feasible.

Israel therefore faces three main options. The first is to discontinue development. This option is unacceptable to the government and is not

recommended even by economists of the Defense Ministry. The second option is to continue development and count on Uncle Sam to pay for production of hundreds of Lavi planes in Israel. The chances for realization of this option are slim. This will enrage American industry and many others in the U.S., as well.

The third option entails changing the approach to production of the plane in Israel. Even today it is not conceived as being totally produced in Isreal, but as an Israeli-American joint venture. It was concluded in 1984 that almost 40 percent of the parts for the Lavi have to be produced in the U.S. But this is not enough. There is no choice but to change this proportion and completely reverse it. In other words, 60 percent should be produced in the U.S. and only 40 percent in Israel. This proportion will gain American support. The American industry will partially change from being an opponent to being a proponent, and may even create a lobby for the joint project. This approach will also minimize the main risks, economic and others, facing the Lavi project. Although it will be an American-Israeli plane, it will be designed according to Israeli specifications and will accommodate operational requirements of the Israeli Air Force. The percentage of parts produced in Israel will indeed be small, but the advantages of entering new sophisticated production fields will still be there.

It can be assumed that there will be those who may try to torpedo the third option and who will propose to rely on the second one, which, as was explained, counts on miracles. They will also argue that an American-Israeli Lavi will increase Israel's dependence on the U.S. rather than decrease it. This is a preposterous argument, because it is a mistake to assume that production of the Lavi in Israel will reduce dependence on the U.S. With this option Israel will be dependent on the U.S. for production of the Lavi as well as for other needs. Production in Israel may buy her temporary maneuverability, in case of an embargo on weapons sales. It should be remembered, though, that Israel has arrived at the embarrassing situation where the U.S. is bearing the cost of developing the plane as well as that of maintaining most of the IDF. The only option remaining is to turn the Lavi into an American-Israeli venture. The decision cannot be postponed any longer. Not only because of budgetary pressures and the economic crisis, but also because of the need to reorganize for the change so as not to be forced to last minute decisions under pressure.

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ISRAEL

BRIEFS

RPV MANUFACTURERS MERGE--Production of RPV's will be monopolized so that the various manufacturers will not be able to compete with one another. On the other hand, this will bring about the centralization of production resources which in turn will save money. Ze'ev Galmor, in charge of business practices, announced the signing of a binding agreement in the business of developing, manufacturing and marketing of RPV systems and related equipment. The parties involved are Aerospace Industries, Tadiran and MAZLAT Ltd. of Qiryat Wezmann in Nes-Tziona. The binding agreement will apply to development, production, service and maintenance of these systems, which consist of RPV's and land based control units. Our correspondent reports that Tadiran and Aerospace Industries have already established a joint firm, having previously competed with each other. The agreement is meant to enable the new firm to do business legally. [Text] [Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 5 Mar 85 p 9] 8646

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LEBANON

BEIRUT MAYOR REVIEWS MUNICIPALITY'S LIMITED EFFECTIVENESS

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 23 Feb 85 pp 42-43

[Interview with Shafiq al-Sarduk, mayor of Beirut; date and place not specified]

[Text] Ten years of war, destruction, anarchy and security lapses have transformed Beirut from the "Pearl of the East", a growing, modern city attracting the services and activities of the region, into a city full of misery and poverty, its infra structure destroyed, its municipal services at a shameful level. What is more important, the Arab University of Beirut recently issued warnings that the city is dying and that its cultural and material levels are quickly deteriorating to a degree which would make any future treatment useless. Cities, like people, die as a result of causative agents and diseases. We carried these warnings and concerns to the mayor of Beirut, Attorney Shafiq al-Sarduk. The interview follows.

[Question] Everyone knows that anarchy is responsible for the deterioration of municipal services. However, the question which remains is: has the city of Beirut been abandoned to this situation?

[Answer] Not at all. Naturally, we are doing what we can to increase the city's effectiveness. We have been able to make some progress on this level, with the help of the Ojeh Lebanon Company. I can say that this company has spent a billion pounds to improve the city of Beirut and restore it to its former condition. However, it seems that all of the efforts of the city and Ojeh Lebanon have been destroyed in the "mill" of the contact lines of war, anarchy, lapsed security, and wanton instincts which destroy light poles and sidewalks and erect the ugliest structures on public and private property. Unfortunately, we have not been able to stop this.

Although everything we have tried has been hopeless, we have concentrated our initiatives on planning and implementing two large projects. The first is to rebuild the Beirut municipal stadium, which is located in the al-Tariq al-Jadidah section, to make it a modern stadium seating 15,000 spectators and including parking spaces for 2,000 cars, a market, a hotel and office buildings, at an estimated cost of 250 million pounds. The British company which designed the project has offered to finance and build it, because its income is guaranteed. However, biased campaigns which do not understand the facts and nature of the project have kept it from being carried out.

The second major project for which plans have just been completed is the conversion of the "Beirut Forest" to a public garden which would be the only one of its kind in the world. The 700,000 square meters of the forest would be divided into 20 or 25 sections, each one representing a different country. In fact, this is an old project for the city. The new factor is that we, with the help of two Beirut engineers, have added to it a 170 meter tower. It will be in the form of a pine tree, and it will be in memory of the pines of Beirut which were burned and cut down by the Israelis. We will preserve the remaining trees, whose history goes back hundreds of years. These trees were even mentioned in Phoenician manuscripts.

We hope that we will be able to carry out this project soon with the help of the city's residents, leaders and representatives. However, we realize the dimensions of the fiscal and economic crisis from which the country is suffering.

[Question] But are projects like this useful, with municipal services destroyed?

[Answer] We are doing what we can to improve municipal services, but quite frankly the city is unable to reach the goal, first because of its strange structure contrived by the sectarian mentality. More than 40 years ago sectarian minds agreed on one of the strangest concepts in the world. They invented the position of governor of the city of Beirut, and they convinced the city council at that time that the city council should be a reporting and planning authority only, and should not sink to the level of implementation. Since that time the city of Beirut, in contrast to the rest of the cities of Lebanon, has reported and planned while the governor implements. But what is implementation? If the city council decision does not agree with the governor's mood and trends, then he does not implement it. It has therefore become clear to us that the decisions which we make may be reversed by the governor. Thus the city council remains weak and paralyzed. I am inclined to believe that it is his plan to destroy the city and place it on the list of cities in decline. This belief of mine coincides with recently published press reports indicating that the belt of poverty, misery and chaos which has grown up in the districts of Beirut was an international plan carried out through paid agents. The goal always was to put an end to Beirut as a city of finance and business, the tourist focus for Arabs, the capital of thought and art. I can say that a large part of the goal has been achieved. I have explained this situation to the leaders of Beirut, but I have not found anyone to carry the cares of this incomparable city.

Let us go back to the governor. I say that there is no personal dispute between us, but a dispute over the requirements of the public interest. The city council adopted several resolutions which the present governor (Eng Mitri al-Numar) did not implement, for reasons which I explained earlier. I was forced to resort to the media many times. For example, after the destruction of Beirut in 1982, I decided to raze the tin shops which had been built on the sidewalks in the al-Rawshah area. When the governor was informed of this decision, he told me: "I will not do it." I was forced to launch a media campaign in the press, until the workshops of Ojeh Lebanon razed them.

For another example, when the Nasr Cafe in al-Rawshah was destroyed, the owner of the cafe began to rebuild it in a way which violated the building codes, especially those which prohibit tall buildings along the shore so that the view of the sea is not obstructed. When I advised the governor to stop the construction, he refused. I was again forced to launch a media campaign until senior officials intervened and the construction was stopped. Later I was surprised when the Nasr Cafe obtained a special permit from the cabinet and I said nothing.

There are many examples. Every time I went to the media to force the governor to act, until Minister of the Interior Joseph Skaf summoned us and asked each of us to explain his actions toward the other. I told the minister of the decisions which had not been carried out. When Minister Skaf asked the governor why he had not acted, he could not answer. He was ordered to implement the decisions immediately, but he refused and still refuses.

This in short is the origin of the problem and the distress. The city is divided within itself, like a case of "split personality." Then you ask me why we do not increase the municipality's effectiveness? Frankly, no one wants to restore Beirut to its former glory.

[Question] We have heard that there are efforts to put a stop to your disputes with the governor.

[Answer] President Rashid Karami asked me to stop the media campaign to wait for solutions, but what are these solutions? I don't know.

[Question] But does anything you mentioned justify this paralysis of municipal activities or at least planning work to remove the bottlenecks?

[Answer] We have done what it was easy for us to do. To ease the city's traffic congestion, we have built and are planning to build several parking lots, and when one of them was completed it was occupied by one of the organizations. I must mention that the governor opposed building one of these parking lots. We also moved the greengrocers market from its location under Abi Haydar Bridge to a location near the athletic complex. I intend to open Burj Abi Haydar tunnel and bridge in the near future, since it is not possible for the project to cost hundreds of millions of pounds, as the greengrocers market. I believe that the parking lots which we have decided to build and the opening of the Burj Abi Haydar highway with its tunnel and bridge will reduce the congestion from which the city is suffering.

[Question] But there are some who believe that building the greengrocers market in the Bi'r Hasan area has defaced that section.

[Answer] First, this market is temporary, and second, as soon as security stabilizes we will try to establish the vegetable and food market which was planned more than 10 years ago for the al-Shuwayfat area. It is to be built on 100,000 square meters of land and will include vegetable, meat, fish and other markets (wholesale and retail). That market building is well designed and will not mar the area.

[Question] What is the situation for municipal services after the Ojeh Lebanon Company's decision to halt its operations in Lebanon?

[Answer] I do not believe that Rafiq al-Hariri has stopped his company's operations in Lebanon permanently. My information indicates instead that the decision is temporary, until the obstacles which hinder his company are removed. Also, it is known that al-Hariri has prepared plans to rebuild the commercial center on a modern basis, and at his own expense he has developed plans drawn up by French and Lebanese experts in 1977 for the commercial center. We all know the exorbitant cost of drawing up new plans. In addition, he made a model of the commercial center which illustrated the beauty of the new plan. He also drew up other plans to build housing units in the southern suburbs of Beirut. I believe that the man was thwarted by obstacles included in the course of the conspiracy against Beirut.

[Question] What is the city's fiscal situation?

[Answer] I feel that Beirut's fiscal position is sound, although our tax collection is weak. It is known that our budget is 400 million pounds a year, most of it financed by loans advanced by the state, but a large part of our income comes from direct or indirect taxes which the state allocates to the municipal administration. For 10 years the municipality did not collect a piaster from the state. Furthermore, after an accounting and a determination of what we owe and what we are owed, we will be balanced. Hence, the city's fiscal position is very good. However, I must mention that if the stability of peace arrives and our ability to collect taxes improves, our budget will reach 1.2 billion pounds, and this will be sufficient to achieve our ambitions.

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LEBANON

MOSAIC OF SECTS IN SIDON ANALYZED

Beirut AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 25 Feb-3 Mar 85 pp 11-12

[Article: "In Sidon Also the East is Christian, the West is Islamic, and the Suburbs are Shi'ite!"]

[Text] With the Lebanese army's peaceful entry into Sidon, welcomed with open arms and rice, and with the completion of the first stage of the Israeli withdrawal from the south, Sidon enters a new era in its political history and its southern role. However, the feeling of great delight prevailing among southerners in particular and Lebanese in general over the return of Sidon and its surroundings to the nation must not conceal from us another fact about the Sidon situation. We must realize that there continue to be many internal and regional dangers and problems. These may take the form of an acute clash, as embodied by a widespread military eruption, or a strong political attraction with some limited unleashing of goals and results. Hence, a calm reading of Sidon's situation seems necessary.

Four Elements

The structure of Sidon's society includes the following elements: the Sunni in Sidon, the Shi'i in Sidon's suburbs, the Christians in the east of the city (the 'Abra and Khatt Jazin regions), and the Palestinians distributed among the camps of 'Ayn al-Hulwah, and al-Miyah wa Miyah, and some parts of the city.

The Sunni

Sidon has a history filled with political action. The first sparks of the beginning of the Lebanese war came from here, and this is what drove the Sidon Sunni into the sea of political and military battles. With time, these facts have set apart three currents which attract the residents of Sidon.

The first current is represented by the conservatives, whose symbols are Deputy Nazih al-Bizri, Eng Kalash and Rafiq al-Hariri. This current has a good relationship with the regime and an effective role in paving the way to bringing the legitimate authority, with its military and political powers, to Sidon.

The second current is represented by the Popular Nasirite Organization. This organization had a large role in the Sidon arena, but the absence of its leader, Eng Mustafa Ma'ruf Sa'd (following an assassination attempt) has left a negative effect. The organization has a close relationship with the Progressive Socialist Party, good relations with Libya, and a rapprochement with the Palestinian National Alliance and the "General Command" in particular.

The third current is represented by the Islamic Group opposed to the Syrian regime. They see in Islamic thought a unifying concept bringing together Sunni and Shi'ite, and they feel that the basic problem lies in Israel's occupation of Jerusalem. Thus their struggle with Israel is a long-term one which will not end until Israel is eliminated. At least, that is what their statements and declarations say. Therefore, the current has domestic extensions. On one hand, there are close links with the Islamic Unification Movement in Tripoli, and on another, the movement is intertwined with new Islamic movements in Beirut, including the Grouping of Muslim Scholars, Hizballah and other forces which oppose any security arrangements with Israel or any attempts at peacemaking, negotiation or recognition. Among the more prominent faces of this current are Shaykh Mahir Hamud and Shaykh Salah Arqadan, members of the Grouping of Muslim Scholars.

Shi'a

The Shi'ites in the quarters of Sidon play a prominent role in Sidon society. Although these quarters form the suburbs of the city, in the past few years they have seen significant growth from the population and social standpoints until they have reached the point where they are considerably intertwined with Sidon itself. It is also known that the Amal movement has the wider role in the Shi'ite organization and represents them as the organic link between the center of the movement, under the leadership of Minister Birri in Beirut, and the south in a more comprehensive form.

The other face of Shi'ite representation in Sidon is embodied in two forms: the Grouping of scholars of Jabal 'Amil, and the complete civil resistance. The grouping of scholars of Jabal "Amil is the most prominent framework for the role of Shi'ite men of religion in the South. This combative role has taken on a new dimension, especially after the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran, for Shi'ite religious leaders have entered the field of political and organizational action in Lebanon through its wide gate. The ideal of the shaykh who wants war is ever-present in every scholar. The basic motivating factor for these men is to stir up a state of enmity toward Israel and deepen the holy war instincts among the Shi'ites toward Israel. The slogans "Israel is absolute evil," "Liberating Jerusalem is the duty of Muslims," and "Shaking hands is recognition, and negotiation is treachery," form a vital topic for the work of the scholars of Jabal 'Amil and a long-term political action program for them. As for the scholars of the "Complete Civil Resistance," these slogans which were raised by Shaykh Muhammad Hamdi Shams-al-Din, deputy chairman of the Supreme Shi'ite Islamic Council, are a true extension of this path and a factor not to be overlooked politically.

The Christians

The Christians form an eastern belt for the city, connecting with the Christian depths in the Jazin region. The Christians want this "contact" between "Christian" east Sidon and its "Islamic" west to be a "cool contact." The interests of the Christian presence, beginning from al-Kharrub region, passing through Sidon and al-Zahrani and ending at Jazin, makes necessary the creation of a new state of coexistence among all factions and sects in the south in general and Sidon in particular. The conditions of "self-defense" and "the extended hand" are the true expressions of this presence, especially since the Phalangists and the "Lebanese Forces" have clear decisions in this context.

The Palestinians

The Palestinians are distributed among three basic locations in Sidon, including roughly 60,000 Palestinians. About 40,000 live in the 'Ayn al-Hulwah camp, about 6,000 in the al-Miyah wa Miyah camp, and the rest are scattered throughout the city.

The 'Ayn al-Hulwah camp constitutes the most prominent stronghold of the Palestinian presence in the South, after the al-Rashidiyah camp in Sur. This camp contains a true organization for Palestinians, beginning with UNRWA and ending with military action. The Popular Committees are active, and political representation in this form is most prominent. The strongest party is the leader of the Liberation Organization, Yasir 'Arafat, who enjoys political and military decision-making over the camp. The "loyalists" are active here, from the standpoint of numbers and equipment. The mass weight which 'Arafat still carries as an historic leader gives true power to his followers. In contrast, there is the Palestinian National Alliance, which includes the "General Command," the "Popular Struggle Front," "al-Sa'iqah," and Fatah forces in rebellion, or "dissidents," the followers of Colonel Abu Musa, and the considerable presence of the "Popular Front" of Dr Habash and the "Arab Liberation Front," which is close to Iraq.

The Palestinian situation in the camps of Sidon reflects the true picture of the fragmented and divided condition of the Palestinian situation in general. On one hand there are the "loyalists," who are working quickly to revitalize their own structure, armed with an abundance of material potential and with the possibility of re-forming alliances with some of the local forces in Sidon, especially since these also have more than one interest in that in order to confront the potential of regional change. Restoring military authority over the camps and the dynamics of politiacl initiatives appear to be the main goals of the "loyalists" after the Israeli withdrawal from Sidon.

As for the "dissidents" and the parties of the National Alliance, we expect the dissidents to act by taking the initiative to strip 'Arafat and his followers of the most important Palestinian stronghold in the south. From

summoning fighters from al-Biqa' and the mountain to the region, to calling upon old and new allies in the south in preparation for entering the camps, the "dissidents" appear determined to act.

In the face of this charged scenario, it seems that the "war of the camps," which has been talked about so much these days, is not inconceivable. In our estimation, this "war" could take one of two forms:

First: The form of complete political and military elimination of the "loyalists," the partisans of 'Arafat, after the pattern of what happened in the camps of the North (al-Baddawi and al-Barid).

Second: Tightening of the military strangulation of the "loyalists" through occupation of the hills surrounding the camps, preventing 'Afafat's followers from using the port of Sidon as a means of supply, and, by stronger observation of the coastline which links Sidon with the camps of Beirut, preventing any contact between the "loyalists" in the camps of Sidon and Beirut.

It seems that the second course appears more likely for internal and regional reasons, not the least of which are:

First: A Palestinian is a Palestinian, before all else. He is "loyal" to Syria when he is in Damascus, a "dissident" in al-Biqa' and the mountain, and finally, a "loyalist" of 'Arafat in the camps, whether they are in Beirut or the South.

Second: Any wide explosion may not be confined to the camps alone but may spread to Sidon and perhaps beyond, in view of the map of alliances of the parties to the local and areawide struggle.

"The Mosaic"

We must make the following observations on this intertwined Sidon "mosaic":

1. There is considerable similarity between Beirut's situation and Sidon's situation: the east is Christian, the west is Islamic, and the suburb is Shi'i, with one difference. While the Palestinian camps in Beirut are considerably isolated geographically from the theater of the internal Islamic-Christian battle, the position of the Palestinians in the "Ayn al-Hulwah camp in Sidon is intermeshed to a great extent in this battle and cannot be neutralized.

2. There is a clear desire on the part of the Lebanese regime to make the recovery of Sidon an introduction to revitalizing the Lebanese structure and bringing about internal peace, at the very least between the Shi'ites and the regime. On this basis, the 12th Brigade, which has a Shi'ite majority, was sent to spread out in Sidon and around the camps.

3. Any victory achieved by the "loyalists" in the camps of Sidon with their political and military infrastructures must be reflected by the situation of the Palestinians in Lebanon in general and in Beirut in particular.

4. The Syrian regime knows with certainty that any base of action which is given to "Arafat and his followers in Lebanon will run the risk of the same thing that happened in Tripoli. Therefore, indulgence in a question such as this is highly unlikely.

5. As the first stage of the Israeli withdrawal is attained and the completion of the remaining stages is anticipated, the city of Sidon becomes the center of military activity in the South, especially since there is general agreement among all factions of "the national and Islamic ranks," despite the conflicts, on military escalation against the Israelis.

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SAUDI ARABIA

SAUDI CP REPORT DETAILS DETERIORATING SAUDI ECONOMY

Nicosia AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic 17 Feb 85 p 27

[Article: "Saudi Communist Party Report Backed By Figures: Severe Economic Decline In Saudi Arabia"]

[Text] In a report issued by the Saudi Communist Party Central Committee after its regular plenary meeting in January 1985, the party expressed its view that Saudi Arabia is facing a severe economic decline the likes of which has not been seen since the big jump in oil prices in 1973. This deterioration clearly reveals the lamentable condition of the country's economy and the deep-seated shortcomings of its infrastructure, and dispells the propagandistic halo which had surrounded the true facts about the hollow prosperity which Saudi Arabia is experiencing. Meanwhile, the international oil market is facing its first slowdown since the early seventies, which has had immediate, strong repercussions on the Saudi economy and has shaken it up in its entirety. At present, widespread economic stagnation prevails throughout the country, and has led to the shutdown of many national and foreign organizations, the laying off of thousands of laborers, a noticeable reduction in government expenditures for development, and an accompanying decline in economic activity in various sectors. There is widespread bankruptcy and deterioration in state organizations such as SABIC of al-Jubayl and Yanbu', for example, whose shares are still up for sale on local and gulf markets, a fact which the party has condemned in previous statements. Bankruptcy is also affecting vast numbers of small and intermediate investors and many of the national bourgeoisie. Many people dealing in the stock market and the real estate market have been ruined. The state has cancelled or postponed the implementation of many projects, and a huge deficit has emerged in the general budget and the payments budget.

The report added, "In looking at the structure of state expenditures, we find their distribution becoming increasingly disorganized with the economic distortion and deterioration. According to official figures, general expenditures on armament and security are basically on the upswing, increasing from 29 percent in 1981-82 to 31 percent in 1984 (approximately US\$23 billion), while the basically scanty economic revenues from the agricultural and industrial sector dropped from 7.6 percent in 1981 to 5.1 percent in 1983. The agricultural sector (the Ministry of Agriculture and Water, the State

Organization for Saline Water Conversion, and the Agricultural Bank) received 4.2 percent (approximately \$3 billion). The industrial sector (the Ministry of Industry and Electricity, the State Organization for Grain Silos and Flour Mills) received less than 10 percent. Government appropriations for these areas, the nesting ground for a handful of parasites from whom foreign companies are reaping fantastic profits, are continually increasing, inasmuch as the ministries' expenditures on such projects, most of which are marginal and are primarily for show, are growing. In addition, there has been a huge increase in appropriations for specialized loan organizations (the Agricultural Bank, the Real Estate Development Fund, the Industrial Development Fund, the General Investment Fund and the Credit Bank) on which these groups basically feed. In 1983, these organizations spent approximately 26.5 billion Saudi riyals, a 10.2 percent increase over the previous year. The proletariat has been beset by a wage freeze, the cancellation of allowances, raises, compensations and overtime, a reduction in job opportunities, and rising prices for some popular consumer goods, especially basic ones such as food-stuffs (because of the withdrawal of government subsidies). The lines of those looking for work are getting longer, and thousands have been laid off from their jobs at local and foreign companies and organizations."

For the Aden Agreement and PLO Unity

With reference to the PLO crisis, the report contained the party's position of support for the Aden-Algiers agreement and for the democratic Palestinian forces' struggle to protect the unity of the PLO. The report pointed out, "The reactionary regimes have deliberately supported the course of the Palestinian capitulatory right and have dragged it into the separatist 'Amman meeting--a boorish affront to the legitimacy and unity of the PLO's representation of the Palestinian people, and a step towards the elimination of their national cause by completely going along with the treacherous Camp David conspiracy."

The party expressed its view that "in order to repudiate and thwart this plot, King Husayn's initiative and Jordanian-Egyptian activity must be resolutely rejected, the harmony among the parties to the democratic Palestinian alliance must be reinforced so that it can effectively take part in unification, and the comprehensive national dialog based on the articles of the Aden-Algeria agreement and the resolutions of the sixteenth session of the Palestine National Council must be promptly resumed, in order to restore the PLO's unity on the basis of its nationalist, anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist line."

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SAUDI ARABIA

SABIC'S PROJECTS, PLANS SEEN SUCCESSFUL

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 5 Apr 85 pp 54-55

[Interview with SABIC's Deputy Board Chairman Ibrahim bin 'Abdallah bin Salmah: "We Have Achieved Rates Higher Than Projected, and We Are Working Towards a New Generation of Industries;" date and place not specified]

[Text] When industrial development began in the Kingdom and the Saudi Basic Industries Company [SABIC] was established, many of the world's industrial nations doubted that such industry would succeed, and some people within the country thought that the hundreds of thousands of Saudi riyals being spent on industry would never yield returns commensurate with such enormous costs.

But planning officials were confident that the returns would make up for the expenses, and that the real value would lie in the establishment of an industrial infrastructure, which would be a basic way to diversify sources of revenue.

This year, many SABIC companies have begun producing and yielding actual returns. In the challenging battle into which the Kingdom, as a developing nation, is plunging, production is the truly tangible factor which stands with drawn sword against the attempts to frustrate and disparage Saudi determination and keep it from entering the industrial arena.

During an interview with SABIC Deputy Board Chairman and Delegate Member Ibrahim bin 'Abdallah bin Salmah, light was shed on this huge industrial edifice which consists of 13 companies and three joint-venture industries with Gulf states.

[Question] To what extent can we say that SABIC's industrial production has become commercial and can be counted among world production?

[Answer] The fact is that more than one of our companies has begun commercial production and has won international esteem, as indicated by the fact that we are exporting that product. In fact, production began ahead of schedule. For example, the Saudi Petrochemicals Company (SADAF) began producing ethylene 3 months ahead of schedule. SADAF is considered the primary nucleus for the Kingdom's largest petrochemical complex, which will have a yearly production capacity of 565,000 tons.

[Question] Before going on with our questions and answers, could you give us an idea of what ethylene is?

[Answer] Ethylene is one of the raw materials essential for the finishing industries at the SABIC complex as well as elsewhere in the al-Jubayl industrial area. It is essential for producing solvents, plastics and chemicals, and is an intermediary substance used in turn as the raw material for the production of various substances including paints, cosmetics, personal care preparations, cleansers, artificial fibers, and plastics used in all fields.

[Question] Shall we go back to the production indices for SABIC companies?

[Answer] The Arab Petrochemicals Company (PETROKEMYA) will join the list of producing SABIC companies before the end of the current Hijrah year, with a yearly production capacity of 500,000 tons of ethylene. Once PETROKEMYA enters production, production will then begin at the Eastern Petrochemicals Company (SHARQ) which will take the ethylene and convert it into low linear density polyethylene, producing 130,000 tons a year, in addition to 300,000 tons of glycol ethylene.

PETROKEMYA will also supply its product to another SABIC project, the National Plastics Company (BIN HAYYAN), which will start production in early 1986.

We hope to finish up our projects, begin production this year, and make use of these products, either through SABIC, its partners, or private sector investors.

Also, ever since the Saudi Iron and Steel Company (HADEED) started up, its production has increased, reaching full production capacity last year (1984). Higher-than-planned rates have also been achieved there as a result of the high productivity of those working at this complex, be they workers, technicians or managers.

In fact, HADEED began taking its first steps in marketing its products on the local market in April 1983, with the sale of 900 tons of reinforcing bars, and in September 1983 it succeeded in raising its sales to 15,000 tons. During that time, it conducted negotiations with several major iron dealers in Saudi Arabia, in order to reach an agreement to supply them with reinforcing bars. In mid-October 1983, contracts were signed with 15 companies for the sale of most of HADEED's stock. Thus during 1983, 240,000 tons of reinforcing bars were sold, whereas the company's balance sheets had provided for the production of 225,000 tons. In another context, in 1983 the company also began selling reinforcing wire to clients in Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] countries, and exported quantities of this item to Bahrain, the UAE, and Kuwait. Prior to this item's production in the al-Jubayl Industrial City, it had been imported from abroad into Jiddah.

Up to the end of May 1984, the company's production of final products amounted to 296,993 tons of reinforcing wire and bars, all of which was marketed.

During the same period, the company's plants produced 60,363 tons of steel blocks measuring 100mm by 100 mm, which were sold to the steel plate-bending company (the steel mill) at Jiddah.

During 1984, production at the HADEED plant at al-Jubayl amounted to 800,000 tons of bolts and bars, which satisfied a large part of local consumption, and which in turn was reflected in the high rate of nation-wide building and construction activities.

The SAMAD Company at al-Jubayl produced 500,000 tons of urea, most of which went to meet local agricultural needs, the rest going to foreign markets. From the beginning of the second quarter of 1984 to the end of that year, it sold approximately 180,000 tons. With current commitments, these sales are expected to rise to 500,000 tons.

The SAFCO fertilizer company produced 350,000 tons of urea fertilizer this year, and its sales amounted to 325,000 tons, of which 125,000 tons went to the local market and 197,000 tons to overseas markets.

[Question] What about methanol production?

[Answer] The AL-RAZI plant produces 600,000 tons of chemical methanol each year, most of which is exported. From the beginning of the second quarter to the end of last year, this plant sold 450,000 tons to the local, European and Japanese markets. By the beginning of the second quarter of 1985, these sales will rise to 600,000 tons.

[Question] A contract was recently signed whereby HADEED would supply several companies. What are the details of this agreement?

[Answer] On 6 March 1985, a major agreement was signed between the Saudi Iron and Steel Company (HADEED), a SABIC company, and Ballast Needham and the al-Zahid Company Ltd, which produces iron reinforcing mesh and bars.

According to the agreement, HADEED will supply the Ballast Needham group, through the al-Zahid Company, with 100,000 tons of weldable reinforcing iron to be delivered over two and a half years, beginning in March 1985.

This agreement is important because the item requested has never before been produced in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In order to meet this request, the technicians at HADEED developed production techniques which would permit the production of the required type of weldable reinforcing bars. Samples which were produced before the agreement was signed passed all the various quality tests run on them in Saudi Arabia and in Dutch laboratories.

[Question] Have other SABIC companies besides those you have mentioned begun production?

[Answer] Yes. There is the Saudi Yanbu' Petrochemicals Company (YANPET), all of whose units became productive ahead of schedule. On 4 March 1985,

YANPET began producing glycol ethylene for the first time. This substance is used in medical analyses, insecticides, thin wrappings, and industrial fibers, as well as for automotive antifreezes and to melt ice on runways.

Last month the company began producing low and high linear density polyethylene. Part of its production has been marketed locally and internationally. The YANPET complex was designed to produce 455,000 tons of ethylene, 220,000 tons of glycol ethylene, 205,000 tons of low linear density polyethylene, and 91,000 tons of high-density polyethylene.

[Question] We have talked about production at completed plants. What about the SABIC projects which are under construction?

[Answer] Besides those I have mentioned, there are six basic industries and one support industry, all of which are expected to begin production this year or next. These industries include a second methanol plant to produce an estimated 650,000 tons a year, and five ethylene-based petrochemical complexes which will have a combined production capacity of 1.6 million tons of ethylene, which will be converted into approximately 2.6 million tons of assorted petrochemical products each year, most of which will go to world markets.

[Question] And the support industry?

[Answer] A gas plant is being built to produce 1,200 tons of oxygen and 400 tons of nitrogen a day, to meet the needs of SABIC, PETROMIN and other industries in the al-Jubayl area.

Actual construction is ahead of schedule for each project; on the average, each component was more than 85 percent complete as of the beginning of this year.

Engineering works and procurement are more than 95 percent complete for most of the projects, and construction work on four of them is between 35 and 69 percent complete.

[Question] How much are these projects costing?

[Answer] Total capital investments for first generation SABIC industries, both those completed and those under construction, amount to 38 billion ryals in 1983 prices. The rates and trends of actual expenditures indicate that actual costs will be less than estimated costs for more than one of these projects.

[Question] What about the future?

[Answer] As the first generation of SABIC industries nears completion and operation, SABIC has begun, over the last 2 years, to get ready to implement its second generation projects, which will complement or support its basic industries. Consideration is being given to linking the production lines in

the existing industries and the new industries. Plans are being made so that the private sector can participate in the investments whenever possible, and so that materials will be available, either for national industries now in production or to encourage the establishment of new industries.

[Question] How far have these preparations progressed?

[Answer] The study for the industrial gas project has been completed, and construction has actually begun. Studies for the vinyl chloride monomer (VCM) and poly-vinyl chloride (PVC) project have also been completed; the project will produce an estimated 300,000 tons of VCM and 200,000 tons of PVC. The BIN HAYYAN joint company was established late last year, and is expected to begin production in the first quarter of 1986. This plant will produce the primary material used to make pipes, plastics, cables, synthetic leather, and other items. Production will meet the needs of the local market, and there will be a small surplus which will be exported to foreign markets.

Furthermore, last year the major portion of the final economic feasibility study for the MTB, butane-1 and butadine project was completed, and construction began this year.

[Question] For some time now, studies have been conducted on programs for fertilizers, plastic and other products. What about them?

[Answer] This particular study was completed at the end of last year. We have begun construction on some of these programs, and the rest will be constructed as part of SABIC's 5-year plan which begins this year. Initial capital investments for these programs, which involve fertilizers, metals, plastics, petrochemicals and other products, are estimated at 16 billion riyals.

[Question] We have talked about SABIC's production projects, but we have not yet discussed its plans to develop and train Saudi personnel to manage and operate these plants and equipment. Could you give us a brief idea of what is being done here?

[Answer] For the projects which are now in operation, we need only 7,000 workers and employees, and at present our labor force on all projects is about 55 percent Saudi. On some the manpower is about 70 percent Saudi, on others 60 percent, and on others 50 percent, depending on the level of the project. We hope to further the "Saudization," especially in sensitive positions like operations, maintenance and management. Within a few years, which you can count on your fingers, these projects will be completely managed and maintained by young Saudis.

[Question] How is the public participating in SABIC projects?

[Answer] In the beginning, the state made all the preparations for these projects, and also did the construction. But they were not intended to be state property, and the basic structure of SABIC was geared to having the public contribute to its capital. The first group of SABIC shares, which

consisted of 2 million shares worth an estimated 2 billion riyals, was offered for public subscription this year. This figure represents 20 percent of the company's 10 billion riyal capital, divided among 10 million shares. A percentage of the shares offered were allocated for GCC citizens, with a view towards regional economic integration.

8559
CSO: 4404/284

SYRIA

PROJECTS, SERVICES IN GOVERNORATES STEPPED UP

Damascus SYRIA TIMES in English 30 Dec 84 p 2

[Text]

GOVERNORATES.
(SANA) — The Governor of Homs, Mr Mahmoud Kallo, on Saturday, presided over a meeting of Directors of construction companies undertaking to carry out the city's services projects.

Road, sewerage, park and drainage projects and obstacles which hamper work progress in these projects were studied.

Mr. Kallo stressed the need for carrying out the projects according to schedule as well as for providing contracting companies with needed materials.

In Hassaka, the governorate Council yesterday held its fifth meeting headed by the Governor Mr. Hussein Hassoun.

The 1985 budget, amounting to LS 29.8 million, and the government subsidies to the municipalities amounting to LS 14 million were studied.

The governorate's budget for projects for 1985 totalling to LS 162 million was approved.

In Lattakia, the Governor Dr. Aziz Saqr, held a meeting yesterday which was attended by some members of the Ba'ath Party branch, the Executive Bureau of the Local Administration and high officials.

Dr. Saqr listened to citizens' demands regarding public services. Roads, schools, health and services in the districts of al-Qneis, Bustan al-Rihan and al-Reije were discussed.

Earlier, the Governor had met with heads of the governorate's municipalities and town councils. The municipalities' future plans were discussed.

It may be noted that the number of the governorate's municipalities has become 48 and 1,500 villages.

CSO: 4400/129

SYRIA

BRIEFS

AL-DAR'A STORAGE DAM--DARA'A (SANA)--Within the framework of the Yarmouk Valley project to produce citrus fruits and vegetables, a storage dam will be built at Abdin, in the governorate of Dar'a, with a capacity of seven million cubic meters, the Director of the Southern Area branch for Irrigation and Land Reclamation, Mr. Zuhair al-Khatib yesterday told a SANA correspondent. He added that this dam will cost LS 22 million and will irrigate large areas of land which are being reclaimed in the al-Yarmouk Valley. Technical studies of the said dam are being prepared and work will start during the current year. The Directorate of the Southern Area branch had carried out the first stage of the Yarmouk Valley project last year and spent about LS 30 million on road building, land reclamation and pumping station works. [Text] [Damascus SYRIA TIMES in English 8 Jan 85 p 2]

FLOUR PRODUCTION INCREASE--DAMASCUS (SANA)--Sources of the Supply Ministry said that the amount of wheat ground in 1984 increased by 165% over the product of 1979. This increase in production was due to the construction of 11 new flourmills during the past five years. Each of these mills has a daily production of 350 tonnes. Approximately 46% of locally consumed flour were imported in 1979. This figure was cut down to 7 percent in 1984. During 1984, work started to build 10 new mills each with a daily production capacity of 350 tonnes distributed all over the country. Existing mills have warehouses with a storage capacity of 550,000 tonnes of wheat. More warehouses will be built for the new mills under construction. [Text] [Damascus SYRIA TIMES in English 14 Jan 85 p 2]

CONSUMER ESTABLISHMENT SALES--DAMASCUS. (SANA)--Last year's sales of the General Consumer Establishment (GCE) amounted to LS 2.175 million. The establishment netted a surplus of LS 75 million, a GCE source said here on Saturday. In the same year, four new warehouses were completed in Tartous, Sweida, Damascus and Hassaka. Work on building three other warehouses in Aleppo, Lattakia and Quneitra has also ended, thus bringing the establishment's total storage capacity to about 20,500 square meters, the source added. The 1984 sales of the Retail General Company were in excess of LS 882 million achieving a profit of LS 10 million. During 1984, 100 sale centers were opened in various parts of the country, a Company official said yesterday. The said centres have 800 branches selling food, and household commodities required by citizens. [Damascus SYRIA TIMES in English 20 Jan 85 p 2]

ALEPPO TEXTILE SALES--ALEPPO. (SANA)--Within the framework of its current year workplan, the Aleppo branch of the General Establishment for the Distribution of Textile Products (SUNDUS) will open six new sale centres all over the city and the countryside. Last year, the branch's sales were worth over LS 127 million. This figure is almost double the 1983 sales figure of LS 68 million. In 1984, the branch purchased textile products of public and private sector companies worth LS 119 million. This figure was LS 71 in 1983. The total value of the contracts signed by the branch with textile manufacturers was about LS 150 million. These contracts will be implemented in the current year. [Text] [Damascus SYRIA TIMES in English 22 Jan 85 p 3]

PHOSPHATE PRODUCTION--DAMASCUS. (SANA)--Overall Syrian phosphate products of last year reached 1.5 million tonnes, official sources of the Oil and Mineral Resources Ministry said yesterday. [Text] [Damascus SYRIA TIMES in English 22 Jan 85 p 3]

CSO: 4400/129

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

BRIEFS

DEPUTY STATE SECURITY MINISTER APPOINTED--Brother Haydar Abu Bakr al-'Attas, member of the Political Bureau and chairman of the council of ministers, issued a decree on 23 March appointing Thabit 'Abd Husayn, first deputy minister of state security. [Summary] [Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1500 GMT 23 Mar 85 GF]

EDUCATION WITH USSR--A cultural and scientific cooperation agreement for 1985-86 was signed between the PDRY and USSR today. The agreement was signed by brother Rashid Muhammad Thabit, member of the YSP Central Committee and minister of culture and tourism; and by Soviet Ambassador to PDRY Vladislav Pelrovich Zhukov. The agreement includes a number of articles in the fields of arts, culture and education. [Summary] [Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1630 GMT 30 Mar 85 GF]

GDR DELEGATION RECEIVED--Brother Haydar Abu Bakr al-'Attas, member of the YSP Political Bureau and chairman of the Council of Ministers, today received in his office the delegation of the Secretariat of the GDR Council of Ministers led by Dr Schumann, the science assistant to the state secretary in the GDR [name and title as received]. The prime minister was briefed in detail on the results of the discussion sessions which the delegation held with the cadres of the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers, within the framework of exchanging expertise and experiences in the field of planning and directing the national economy. Brother al-'Attas lauded the aid which the GDR extends to the PDRY in the sphere of training national cadres. He said: This indicates the depth of friendship relations between the governments and peoples of the PDRY and the GDR. Present at the meeting was Brother 'Abdallah Ahmad Ghanin, candidate member of the YSP Central Committee and minister of state for cabinet affairs. [Text] [Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1230 GMT 31 Mar 85 GF]

DEPUTY PLANNING MINISTER APPOINTED--Haydar Abu Bakr al-'Attas, chairman of the Council of Ministers, today issued a cabinet decision appointing Dr Ja'far Hamid Muhammad as deputy planning minister. [Summary] [Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1230 GMT 6 Apr 85 GF]

CSO: 4400/133

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

BRIEFS

OIL AGREEMENT SIGNED--An agreement was signed today between the YAR and the Heinz Oil Company to construct an oil refinery in Ma'rib. Initial capacity of the refinery will be 10,000 barrels per day. It will take 1 year to build. [Summary] [Sanaa Domestic Service in Arabic 1830 GMT 15 Apr 85 GF]

AGREEMENT WITH GDR--An agreement was signed today at the Ministry of Education for the executive program for cultural and scientific cooperation between our country and the GDR for the years 1985-1986. The agreement encompasses cultural and scientific cooperation between the two countries to the benefit of both. The agreement was signed for the YAR by Education Minister Hasan al-'Amri and for the GDR by Ambassador to the YAR Lothar Eichelkraut. [Excerpt] [Sanaa Domestic Service in Arabic 1830 GMT 28 Apr 85 GF]

SPORTS PROTOCOL WITH USSR--The assistant secretary general of the Higher Council for Youth and Sports, who is currently visiting the USSR, has signed a protocol for cooperation in the sports field between the YAR and the USSR for 1985-86, which includes the exchange of sports teams and the training of YAR nationals in Soviet sports institutions. [Summary] [Sanaa Domestic Service in Arabic 2000 GMT 25 Mar 85 GF]

COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH TUNISIA--An agreement for economic, technical, cultural and scientific cooperation between our country and Tunisia was signed at the Central Organ for Planning today. The agreement will expand cooperation between the two fraternal countries in all fields, particularly in the scope of economy, trade, scientific research, study of economic and social development programs, exchange of expertise, and scholarships for vocational training. [Excerpt] [Sanaa Domestic Service in Arabic 2000 GMT 27 Mar 85 GF]

CSO: 4400/134

AFGHANISTAN

COOPERATIVES PROVIDING ADEQUATE GOODS, PRICE STABILITY

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 12 Mar 85 p 4

[Text]

After the victory of the April Revolution under the leadership of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, in order to combat hoarding and in an effort to raise the level of production, the cooperative movement began its activities in our country. Establishment of cooperatives took place on the basis of decisions and resolutions of the 11th plenum of the PDPA CC and expanded its activities throughout the country.

The workers, peasants and other working people of the country in a view to combat economic banditism of the enemies in the sphere of production and marketing, ever increasingly join cooperatives.

The consumer and handicrafts cooperatives which started functioning beside other cooperatives for the first time were established in the middle of the year 1359 (1980) in the cities and localities and in present have a membership of 55,000, throughout the country.

The main purpose behind establishment of these cooperatives was stabilisation of prices of the primary essential commodities and ensurance of peoples' access to their requirements particularly the peasants and other working people in far-flung areas. Likewise, establishment of these cooperatives were aimed at encouraging and promoting collective works and joint administration between the members of the cooperatives, raising the living standards of the working people and training the cooperative members with revolutionary spirit. The cooperatives as a whole provide its members with foodstuff, agricultural products, household essentials, cooking utensils, electrical appliances, agricultural implements etc.

These products are usually provided by the central departments of the cooperatives union and the department of consumer and handicrafts promotion cooperatives, commerce department

and agricultural products, the vegetables and fruit procurement department from local and foreign sources and are put at the disposal of cooperative members and other working people of the country.

Since the commodities of these cooperatives are directly put at the disposal of consumers, therefore its whole sale and retail prices are 15 to 20 percent cheaper than the market prices. In some cases, even they are offered 30 to 40 per cent lesser than the market prices. For instance, the vegetable ghee is being sold in the market for Afghanis 120-140 while it is available at the cooperatives for Afis. 80 a kg.

The existence of consumer cooperatives plays a prominent role in the family economy. Because, most of the families have a fixed income, and in case of price rise they get the most affected. For this reason, maintaining membership of consumer cooperatives are in the best interests of the families.

The peasant families who have already joined the cooperatives are satisfied with its services, therefore, the number of cooperatives and its members are on the rise with every passing day in all nooks and corners of the country.

The cooperative members have on one hand found these cooperatives a good place for selling their saleable commodities and on the other hand can receive their needed requirements with easy access and reasonable prices without any difficulty.

Stating the above a source of the consumer and handicrafts promotion co-operative department in an interview with the reporter of the KNT said:

"During the course of the current year, Afs. 212 million worth of commodities have been provided by the department and put at the disposal of cooperative members. Meanwhile, the cooperatives have sold Afs. 240 million worth of commodities to its members and clients, cutting short the hands of hoarders from gaining illegal profits.

At the same time, Afghanis 62 million worth of agricultural products of the peasants have been purchased by the cooperatives through various sources. Similarly, Afghanis 62 million worth of grains and vegetables have been provided to the National Defence Ministry, Interior

Ministry, and other state institutions and cooperative members which brought a total sum of Afs 88 million for the cooperatives.

The source added that these cooperatives are social and economic organisations being created by the demand and wants of the people and with their own capital.

The highest leading organ of the cooperatives in the DRA is the Union of Peasants' cooperatives of the DRA. All the activities of the Union are organised by the executive body and the secretaries of the cooperatives union. Likewise, the cooperative unions in the provinces, districts and Kabul city are functioning as the liaison organ between the peasants cooperative union of the DRA and those of the similar cooperatives of the provinces and the capital.

The consumer cooperatives endeavour to establish similar cooperatives in every part of Kabul city thus the network of retail selling stores are being further expanded and strengthened. At present, eleven such cooperatives have already been created in the eleven city precincts and the number of consumer stores in these areas exceeded fifty. Extension of such stores to a larger extent has solved people's problems.

The cooperatives union plans to increase the number of such stores especially in the populated

and those areas which do not have access to markets. This department is dutybound to procure all the needed commodities of its members and the working people of the centre and the provinces through various sources, i.e. Afghan KART and others.

It also imports some of its commodities from the friendly country of the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries.

For the obvious reason, that such a transaction beside offering cheap prices, as well have various payment facilities.

In addition to that the consumer cooperatives of the Soviet Union for the purpose of expansion and strengthening of Afghan cooperative movement will provide a credit of three million rubles on five years duration.

The department has also signed contracts with the GDR for the purchase of foodstuff, consumer commodities and other essential goods. It is intend-

ed to sign other agreement for the same purpose with other socialist countries as well.

The source added that the union of peasant cooperatives of the DRA intends to change the cooperative movement into a big socio-economic body and expand its services to all spheres of life of the working people of the country during the years 1985-1990 which covers the five-year future development plan of the country as well.

Moreover in accordance with the direction of the party and the revolutionary state of the DRA, at the moment, work is continuing on construction of large godowns in the capital and provinces and various districts of the country for the purpose out of this, two stores in Farah province, and eight stores in Kabul city are under construction which would be inaugurated on the occasion of the seventh anniversary celebration of the April Revolution.

CSO: 4600/400

AFGHANISTAN

STEPS TO UPROOT ILLITERACY CONTINUE

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 14 Mar 85 pp 2, 4

[Text] We are in one of the literacy courses of the agriculture and land reforms institution of Herat province. The classroom was full of adult students. The students are looking to their teacher and awaiting what will the lessons of today would be and what the teacher will write on the black-board.

The lively faces of these students are pleasant because of the opportunity to acquire literacy, given to them by the revolution. It is the literacy movement that has opened their eyes and taken away forever the darkness of illiteracy, this ominous heritage of the past. I have a talk with one of these students. He is Abdul Qayum, a peon of the agriculture and land reforms institution. This person was able to find the opportunity of attending a literacy course after 45 years of his life in "darkness." It is not only a story about the light in the life of this person, but the life of overwhelming majority of our working people who were in poor and illiterate due to the domination of past decayed regimes.

Abdul Qayum says: "Brother, in a time when I got literacy, I understood that being illiterate is big disaster. Really, the deprivation of a man from the literacy which is as important as bread and cloth, is genuinely unfortunate. Somehow it is not good if one cannot help himself or others to read some papers or to write a letter. Now I know well that illiterate person is really blind and faces problems wherever he may go. He really does not know the meaning of the life."

"However, only after the revolution that takes our hands and urges us to read and write for the sake of opening our eyes."

Abdul Qayum, who is one of the best students of his class while responding to another question, said: "Before I was enrolled in the literacy course, I was thinking that literacy could not help me. Because I became old, but when I learnt the first word and then learnt something more, I realised that I can learn. I thought it is enough since so far I had spent my life in vain. By now, I know a lot of things, and can distinguish my friends and foes. I get more strength when I see more people attend literacy courses."

A slogan fixed on the wall of the classroom, attracts my attention. However, this slogan is not mere words now, but I practically see its materialisation. I ask Sayed Jan, another student of the class to read the slogan. He reads it in haste: "Literacy increases the wisdom and enhances the knowledge."

It is right that when a student can find his way toward knowledge and science, he can certainly see everything and take an active part in the literacy competition with profound interest.

The teacher says: "Really, they are good students. They always come to their classrooms ten minutes earlier, and ask questions from me. Sometimes they bring newspapers with them and ask me to read some parts of them. Then they themselves read some articles. Really, they have keen interest to get literacy."

Around 11 a.m. I leave the school for the Literacy Directorate of Herat Province and ask questions from the director concerning the literacy movement, the number of literacy courses, literacy students and graduates of such courses. He says: "Illiteracy, this ominous heritage of feudalism is being gradually uprooted in our province. After the new and evolutionary phase of the revolution, vast and extended struggle has been commenced for the annihilation of illiteracy in Herat province. Right now, 4,464 individuals are acquiring literacy in 195 literacy courses in the province. In the course of first nine months of the current year, a total of 4,500 volumes of textbooks of literacy, 4,990 note-books were distributed to students. We have also 45-minute broadcasting programme through radio which are very useful. So far 18 seminars on methodology have been convened with the assistance of professional members of literacy for the new and volunteer teachers, which have been useful in improving the literacy movement."

He concluded: "In the course of first nine months of current Afghan year, a total of 257 persons graduated from the literacy courses."

CSO: 4600/399

AFGHANISTAN

POWER OUTPUT INCREASING

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 10 Mar 85 p 2

[Text] One of the achievements of the revolution is the development and expansion of power generation networks in the country. Despite the continuous destruction of the counter-revolution, the power output has increased by 125.46 percent in the course of post-revolutionary years.

Right now the power generation is on increase, for instance, during the month of January of this year 17456 mln. kw/h power energy was produced which means 5,813,333 kw/h in 24 hours.

After the victory of the April Revolution, increase of 57.8 mega watt electricity occurred in the production capacity of existing networks. For example, right now the capacity of power generation networks (including hydro-thermo and diesel plants) of the country is (361) mega watt.

Greater part of the electricity is consumed for heating and lighting purposes of government institutions, offices and residential areas of the people, and only 8-10 percent of the total power production goes for the industrial activities.

The number of electricity consumers during the first year of revolution was 98,000 but up to the March 1984 reached to 130,000. This shows in itself the increase and consistent attention of the state to thhis vital need of the people.

During the post-revolutionary years the gas project of second turbine, the hydro-power project of Kunarha, Faizabad city, power networks of Mazari Sharif, and the third network of Kabul city, have been completed and being utilised. Moreover the diesel based power plant of Herat city with a capacity of three megawatt will be utilised shortly.

Since 79 till now, some 30 sets of diesel generators with a capacity of (3628) kw/h have been installed in various parts of the country and put in use already.

Likewise, a 25-megawatt ampere transformer has been installed in the fourth power project of Kabul city.

The pylon making factory of Pulicharkhi in Kabul, which has been created

in a bid to manufacture cement pylons, has commenced its activities. The construction of this factory was completed in 1982, and it is ready for utilisation.

Likewise, during the post-revolutionary years, the transmission lines of Sarobi-Kabul, Kandahar, Kajaki, Lashkargah, and all other parts of the country were reactivated.

The spokesman in conclusion said: The Ministry of Power Energy, based on the developmental plans of the state and in order to develop and enhance power energy has undertaken a series of long and short-term plans including 18 projects at the level of the country for expansion and development of power generating networks.

A spokesman of the Ministry of Power Energy, in an interview with a Kabul New Times correspondent said: "Since the power energy has great role in the development and enhancement of industry and improving people's living standards, therefore the state of the DRA attaches great value and gives priority to the development of this sector. The ministry, for realizing the objectives of the April Revolution and for ensuring the social and economic life of the working people of the country has undertaken a series of measures in order to expand, transfer, and distribute the power energy all over the country.

CSO: 4600/400

AFGHANISTAN

WESTERN DIPLOMATS: EX-AFGHAN DEFENSE MINISTER JAILED

Kuala Lumpur NEW STRAITS TIMES in English 4 Apr 85 p 8

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, Wed. — Afghanistan's former Defence Minister, Major General Abdul Kadir, who was sacked last year, has been jailed because of differences with the country's Soviet-backed ruler, Babrak Karmal, Western diplomats said here today.

They also said that several Soviet soldiers were killed last week when their convoy hit mines planted by Afghan mujahids in the south-east provinces of Ghazni and Kandahar.

Heavy fighting was continuing around the city of Kandahar, the second largest in the country, where resistance activity was said to be greater than last year, the diplomats said quoting travellers from the area.

Maj. Gen. Kadir was dismissed late last year amid reports that the regime had failed to check high Soviet casualties at

the hands of the Muslim fighters. Recently his name has been linked to reports of corruption.

The diplomats, quoting unconfirmed reports of his jailing, said there were no details of the charges, and that they did not know where he was being detained. They said his house remained under police guard, however.

There were reports from Kabul that Finance Minister Ali Kabir was also in disgrace, but no details were available.

There was no exact death toll on the number of Soviet citizens killed in the mine explosions, but witnesses said several Soviet helicopters had flown to the area to carry away bodies, the diplomats said.

The incident occurred near Jalatu, south of Ghazni.

CSO: 4600/415

AFGHANISTAN

REBELS REPORTEDLY CONTROL THREE-QUARTERS OF QANDAHAR

Kuching THE BORNEO POST in English 2 Apr 85 p 4

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, Mon:- Soviet troops have mined vast orchards near Kandahar, killing up to 50 people since mid-March and condemning the local Afghan economy to ruin to win greater security for forces based nearby, guerrilla sources said.

The mines were strewn along orchard paths to block rebel attacks on the city or the U.S. built airport nearby, the sources based in the Pakistani city of Quetta say.

Muslim rebels, who control about three-quarters of Kandahar, have recently stepped up rocket attacks on the airport, now the largest Soviet airbase in southeastern Afghanistan. Western diplomats say several squadrons of Soviet Mig-23 and Mig-25 fighter planes are stationed there.

Rebel sources in Quetta, only 200 km from Kandahar, say Soviet strength at the airport has been boosted recently from 8,000 to over 10,000 men.

The victims were mostly peasants from fruit-growing villages south of Afghanistan's second-largest city. The sources said the mining would effectively destroy this year's fruit crop, one of the country's leading export items.

CSO: 4600/414

BANGLADESH

PAPER REPORTS ERSHAD REMARKS ON RETURN FROM SAUDI ARABIA

Concessions No Longer Valid

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 4 Apr 85 p 1

[Text] President and Chief Martial Law Administrator Lt Gen H.M. Ershad on Wednesday announced that whatever concessions he offered to the Opposition political parties before the March 21 referendum were 'no more valid' and he hinted that he was no more bound by his promise that the parliamentary polls would be held first.

Talking to newsmen at Zia International Airport on his arrival from Saudi Arabia, President Ershad said that he had got the massive mandate from people to continue as the President till the elections were held. 'It is my duty now to complete the election process,' he added.

Asked whether he would hold the presidential election first General Ershad said that the people had given their mandate to his programmes through referendum and there was now no bar to hold any election before the other. He, however, said that he had not yet taken decision on this.

Replying to a question whether he would hold the upazila elections before the Ramzan, President Ershad said that this election was very important. He stressed that local body elections would ensure the people's democracy and 'sooner it is held it is better.' He informed that decision has not yet been taken on this issue.

The President told a correspondent that there was need to expand the cabinet. Asked whether he would form a political cabinet the President replied that he had just come from abroad and would think over it.

Replying to a question whether he would release Sheikh Hasina and Begum Khaleda Zia, the leaders of the two alliances in view of massive support in the referendum, President Ershad said, 'I think they are free.' When the correspondent pointed out that the two leaders were not being allowed to come out from their houses the president told him 'You will find soon.'

Later addressing a crowd who converged on the airport to accord him a rousing reception, President Ershad said that after receiving the confidence vote in the referendum he went to the holy Kaaba to express his gratitude to the Almighty Allah and pray for the country and the people.

The President told the cheering supporters that the referendum was not the end. 'You are to be ready for the next elections and our future programmes,' he urged the crowd who reciprocated by chanting slogans in his favour.

Before addressing the reception, the President shook hands with the Dhaka Municipal Corporation ward chairmen and the leaders of Janadal and its different front organisations. People from different parts of the city came to the airport with banners of Janadal Jubo Sanghati Natun Bangla Chhatra Samai Jana Swadhin Sramik Federation and wards.

Results of Talks

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 4 Apr 85 pp 1, 16

[Text] President and Chief Martial Law Administrator Lt Gen H.M. Ershad who returned home on Wednesday after a three-day official visit to Saudi Arabia said flow of external aid was dependent on peace, stability and unity which in turn would hasten development and prosperity of the country.

Terming his trip to Saudi Arabia his first to a foreign country after the March 21 referendum as "very fruitful," President Ershad said that he had over two and a half an hour talks with King Fahd on matters of bilateral interest and discussed Iran-Iraq War, Middle East situation problems related to Islamic Ummah and global issues of common concern. He said that Saudi Arabia was eager to extend economic assistance after he had appraised the King of the development efforts now in progress and the policy being pursued by his Government to restore peace and stability in the country.

Talking to newsmen at Zia International Airport on his arrival from Saudi Arabia, President Ershad said that King Fahd had assured him of all possible help from Saudi Development Fund in constructing Jamuna bridge. He expressed gratitude to the Saudi King for his initial support to the proposed Jamuna bridge project. He informed that King Fahd also assured him of his sympathetic consideration to Bangladesh's request for the third Saudi grant of 250 million US dollars.

Fahd To Visit Bangladesh

President Ershad said that he had renewed his invitation to King Fahd to visit Bangladesh. The Saudi King assured him that he would visit the Muslim countries including Bangladesh in the South Asia in near future. President Ershad disclosed that the second Saudi Prime Minister, Crown Prince Sultan Bin Abdul Aziz would visit Bangladesh after the next Hajj.

President Ershad who exuded confidence told newsmen that his visit to Saudi Arabia would further strengthen the relations between the two Muslim countries.

The President said that during his visit to Saudi Arabia he prayed for the peace, unity and prosperity of his country and its people at the holy Kaaba in Makkah.

Iran-Iraq War

President Ershad said that in Jeddah the OIC Secretary-General informed him about the latest position of the peace move of the OIC to bring an end to the fratricidal war between the two Muslim countries Iran and Iraq. He said that Bangladesh would be very happy to play its assigned role in the OIC peace move.

During his stay in Saudi Arabia President Ershad had talks with a delegation of the Bangladeshis working here. He assured them that his government would look into their problems and make efforts so that they could invest their money in Bangladesh.

On arrival at Zia International Airport, President Ershad was received among others by the Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrators Rear Admiral Sultan Ahmed and Air Vice Marshal Sultan Mahmud, members of the cabinet, heads of diplomatic missions and high ranking military and civil officials. Former members of his cabinet and Janadul leaders were present at the airport to greet the President. Prominent among them were former Prime Minister Mr Ataur Rahman Khan, Mr Mizanur Rahman Chowdhury, Mr Korban Ali, Capt (Retd) Abdul Halim, Mr Shamsul Huq, Air Vice Marshal (Retd) Aminul Islam, Dr M.A. Matin, Mr Reazuddin (Bhola Mia), Mr Shafiqul Gani Swapan, Shah Moazzem Hossain, Mr Mansoor Ali and Mr Abdur Rahman, former BNP Minister. Among the political leaders present at the airport to welcome the President were Mr Ali Amjad Khan and Mr Jamir Ali of Muslim League.

CSO: 4600/1494

BANGLADESH

DROP IN REMITTANCES FROM ABROAD THREATENS ECONOMY

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 4 Apr 85 pp 1, 16

[Text] Shrinkage of remittances through the Wage Earners Market (WEM) by Bangladesh overseas nationals have caused a concern in banking and financial circles. The lower remittances have threatened to worsen the balance of payments situation further during the current financial year (1984-85) which has already seen a massive foodgrain imports by the government to recoup the food crop losses due to the floods. External resources availability for supporting the trading, industrial and other economic activities with the Wage Earners Scheme (WES) as the prop will adversely be affected in the face of a sharp drop in remittance inflows, the same circles note.

Remittance flows have now come down to around 33 million US dollars per month from about 50 million US dollars around this time last year. The remittances with the current trends in view are like to fall further to 30 million US dollars in the coming months.

According to a World Bank (WB) projection, the wage earners remittances in 1984-85 will not exceed 435 million US dollars as against 535 million US dollars in 1983-84. The official projection about the remittance flows during the current financial year was made at the level of 600 million US dollars at the time of the announcement of the national budget on June 27 last.

While the remittance flows tend to level off now, banking and financial circles attribute the reasons to a host of factors. But they are almost unanimous in their view that the wage earners remittances cannot have a robust growth at a time when there is a slow-down in economic activities in the petro-dollar Arab countries. But the same circles feel that the lack of buoyancy in the country's wage earners market now, as contrast to the situation even two or three years, cannot be explained purely in-terms of investment cutbacks and low expansion programmes in some Middle Eastern countries.

It may be recalled here that wage earners remittances to the country stood at 210 million dollars in 1979-80, 379 million US dollars in 1980-81, 424 million US dollars in 1981-82 and 519 million US dollars in 1982-83.

In Taka terms, the earnings under the scheme amounted to Taka 1200 crores in 1984 (calendar year) as against Taka 1500 crore in 1983 (calendar year).

Some bankers note that the economic slow-down in the middle east countries cannot solely be attributed as the reason for the sharp fall in remittances. The net migration of the overseas Bangladeshi nationals (i.e. the number of Bangladeshis returning home leaving the overseas jobs) has not been on the high side during the current financial year. Moreover, 56,000 Bangladeshi nationals according to official figures, got new employments in the overseas market in 1984 notwithstanding the investment cutbacks and economic slow-down in some Middle East countries. This should alone lead to some positive neutralising effects on overall level of remittance flows, the same circles observe.

When asked whether the salary cuts for Bangladeshi overseas employees in some Middle East countries and also enforcement of some controls on remittance outflows by those countries were responsible for the fall in remittance inflows to the country, the same circles are of the view that such factors could have some effects but these alone would not amply explain the situation. Some private bankers stated that if the workers wages had declined there would be another potent factor for encouraging them to go to the black market to get better price for their remittances.

Some quarters ascribe the reason to falling remittance flows to an increased level of activities by an organised group of operators having powerful links within the country to mobilise the remittance funds of the overseas Bangladeshi workers for siphoning off the same to third countries by offering higher exchange rates in the black market. Moreover, political and other factors have encouraged some remittances to flow to financial and capital markets in the west and also to Singapore the same quarters feel.

The authorised private dealers in wage earners funds and some other circles are of the view that the policy of intervention in WEM has exerted the depressant influence on the growth of remittance flows. They point out that the secondary exchange rates under WES are now determined by a strong banking cartel on the basis of assumptions known only to them. The introduction of administered price which provided a sheltered market to the banks to buy foreign currency has come as an interference in the market leading to adverse reaction on remittance flows, they observe.

Another opinion about the falling level of remittances to the country suggest that the adverse economic climate in the UK where a substantial number of Bangladeshis work has caused the remittance inflows to suffer a jolt.

CSO: 4600/1494

PAPER REPORTS FINAL RESULTS OF 21 MAR REFERENDUM

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH TIMES in English 23 Mar 85 p 1

[Text]

President and Chief Martial Law Administrator Lt. Gen. H. M. Ershad received an overwhelming vote of confidence in countrywide referendum on Thursday.

According to final unofficial results announced by the Election Commission, the President won 94.14 per cent affirmative votes supporting his policies and programmes and also his continuation in the office of President till holding of elections under suspended constitutions.

According to Election Commission, out of total 3,45,63,442 votes cast, 3,25,39,264 were affirmative and 19,01,217 negative. The total number of votes rejected was 1,22,961.

The turn-out of voters was calculated at 72.14 per cent of the total 4,79,10,964 registered voters in the country.

The percentage of negative votes was 5.50 while the percentage of rejected votes was 0.36.

BSS adds: Thursday's referendum, second of its kind since May 30, 1977, was marked by spontaneous enthusiasm and jubilation of the electorates, both male and female, everywhere in the country.

Enthusiastic voters from every nook and corner of the country turned up at the polling centres to cast their votes. They stood in queues at the polling centres to record their verdict in the referendum.

This time female voters showed themselves up in great numbers at some of the polling centres to cast their votes. They came on foot, by rickshaws and other means of transport.

Makeshift shops of betel leaves, bldis and sweets sprung up near the polling centres in connection with the yesterday's referendum. They did brisk business for the whole day.

In all 22,984 polling centres were opened in the country to enable the eligible voters to give their verdict. Separate arrangements were made for the female voters whose total 2,26,73,396

For the smooth conduct of the referendum 64 returning officers, 475 assistant returning officers, 22,984 presiding officers, 68,868 assistant presiding officers and 1,77,132 polling officers were appointed by the Election Commission.

Five crore ballot papers and two lakh ballot boxes were

despatched to polling centres for the referendum.

Besides, 24 lakh posters, 10 lakh leaflets and 5 lakh folders were distributed in the country to motivate the people to participate in the referendum.

Earlier, the government declared March 20 and 21 as general holidays in connection with the referendum which was called by President Ershad to ascertain people's verdict in favour of his policies and programmes.

The President, who left no stone unturned to hasten the country's process to democracy through election, has announced his decision on March 1 for holding the referendum after all his previous persistent endeavours failed to persuade the opposition to take part in the election scheduled for April 6.

President Ershad had to shift the date of general elec-

tion four times in course of last one year in his bid to persuade the opposition to take part in it.

The series of measures taken by President Ershad from time to time to facilitate the opposition participation in the general election included abolition of military tribunals, dissolution of Jnadal-dominated Council of Ministers and partial restoration of fundamental rights and writ jurisdiction of the High Court.

The President also held out the solemn assurance that his government and he himself would remain absolutely neutral in the election so would be the Election Commission.

While announcing the date of referendum President Ershad, whose decentralisation policy has taken administration to the doorsteps of the masses in rural areas, declared in unequivocal terms that referendum also aimed at paving the way for election.

CSO: 4600/1487

BANGLADESH

NOTES ON DEBT RELIEF EXCHANGED WITH JAPAN

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 4 Apr 85 p 1

[Text] Japan has agreed to extend an amount of 2.37 billion yen (Taka 24 crore and 17 lakh approximately) as debt-relief grant to Bangladesh under an "exchange of note" signed in Dhaka on Wednesday, reports BSS.

The exchange of note was signed by Mr Yasuhide Hayashi, Charge d'Affaires of Japan in Bangladesh and Mr M.A. Syed, Additional Secretary, External Resources Division of the Ministry of Finance, on behalf of their respective Governments.

The present grant was the 7th of its kind extended to Bangladesh in accordance with the 1976 UNCTAD resolution. Under the present grant a gas turbine generator and a 33.6 K.V. substation for the Polash Urea Fertilizer factory would be procured during the current fiscal year.

It is learnt that the Japanese food aid to Bangladesh during the current fiscal year was significant. The estimated total quantity of rice under Japanese food aid would be around 53,000 metric tons for the fiscal year 1984 which is around 8000 metric tons more than last year's food grant. The total Japanese food aid to Bangladesh amounted to Taka 553.10 crores since the liberation.

It is also learnt that the Japanese grant assistance has also been playing an important role in the economy of the country. Another grant assistance under Kennedy Round-II Programme for 3.35 billion yen (approximately Taka 34.00 crore) has already been signed during the current fiscal year. The grant would be utilised by Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation (BADC, directorate of plant protection and the Ministry of Food for procurement of agricultural inputs such as urea fertilizer, deep tubewell engines, pesticides and spars for silos and vehicles.

CSO: 4600/1494

BANGLADESH

FOOD MINISTER TELLS PLANS FOR 1984-85 IMPORTS

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 4 Apr 85 pp 1, 16

[Text] About 23 lakh tons of foodgrains have reached the country during the last nine months of the current fiscal year, Food Minister Major General Mahabbat Jan Chowdhury said Tuesday, reports BSS.

He said everything has been finalised to import 28.70 lakh tons of foodgrains during the fiscal 1984-85.

Last year 20.50 lakh tons of foodgrains were imported from abroad. The country's food deficit for the current year was initially estimated at 13 lakh tons, which shot up to 22 lakh tons following extensive crop damage due to floods.

The Minister who visited the Central Storage Depot (CSD) at Maheswarpara on Tuesday was talking with officials about stock position. He asked them to see that foodgrain stocks at every local Storage Depot (LSD) were built in such way that it could run for a minimum period of three months.

Gen Chowdhury who was touring southwestern Bangladesh to see for himself the procurement drive and movement of foodgrains visited Mongla Port on Monday. He was informed at the port that out of the total import of foodgrains during current year, 8.5 lakh tons came through Mongla. The Minister witnessed the unloading of foodgrains during his stay at the port.

Later at a meeting with the food and relief officials of Khulna and Patuakhali districts in the evening at Khulna Circuit House, the Minister was told that target of wheat procurement in 16 districts under Khulna Division was almost attained. He, however, instructed the officials to continue procurement even after the target to ensure price support to the growers.

CSO: 4600/1494

16 May 1985

IRAN

MINISTER: GOOD INTELLIGENCE WOULD HAVE PREVENTED CONSPIRACIES

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Perisan 18 Feb 85 p 2

[Text] Yesterday afternoon in a press, radio and television interview our nation's minister of information elaborated on the objectives and operation of this ministry and expressed appreciation for the cooperation of the hezbollah people and unknown soldiers of Islam.

Hajjat o'-Eslam Rey Shahri revealed that hypocrites had planned to overshadow the festivities of the ten days of Fajr [anniversary of Kheybar operation] by hijacking two airplanes to Iraq. In the beginning of this interview after elaborating on the necessity of an information system for the country Hojatol-eslam Rey Shari said: "If a strong information system existed in the country from the beginning of the revolution's victory, many plots including the incident of June-July 1981--the prime minister's palace explosion and the assassination of personalities valuable to the revolution would not have occurred."

In regard to the history of the establishment of the Ministry of Information he said: "Beginning with the discovery of the Nowzeh coup d'etat in June-July 1981, we gradually felt the lack of an information organization. Then, after the declaration of the armed war of the hypocrites and the explosion in the Islamic Republic party building, this concept was seriously pursued and various centers started to work and collect information. Among these were the revolutionary guards corps, committees, general prosecutors offices and the prime minister's information and research office. The main problem in this area was the lack of centralization, until the law for the establishment of the Ministry of Information was approved by the Majlis and the Council of Guardians."

The minister of information stressed the reliance of the Ministry of Information on information from 42 million people and their role in the protection of the Islamic Republic's gains. He then analyzed the operations of the Ministry of Information from the start of its work up to now and called its activities more than what was expected and said: "At present the Ministry of Information has established its organization in all the provinces and cities. Based on the laws of the Ministry of Information, the employees of this ministry must not be members of any party or group."

Regarding the arrest of the members of the majority Fada'ian organization, Hojjat ol-Eslam Ray Shahri then said: "Before the capture of the Tudeh party leaders the dissolved Tudeh party and the majority Fada'ian were condemning most of the practices and propaganda operations of the hypocrites, democrats and other groups. Sometimes, to pretend servility and execute influence, they revealed some information about the hypocrites and called the hypocrite's leadership traitors. But since the East and West have reached a joint position about the Islamic Republic of Iran, these mini-groups have formed a so-called united people's front in order to inflict a blow on the revolution." "In continuation of his talk about the arrest of the majority Fada'ian staff he revealed that: "They had a group called the special group, which under the disguise of revolutionary corps and committees through the forgery and use of false identification cards were terrorizing and robbing homes. Their purpose from these actions was to defame the humane and revolutionary institutions."

In continuation of this statement the minister of information said: "The policy of the majority Fada'ian mini-groups is mainly the policies of the Tudeh party. They had the following tactics which were revealed after their arrest:

- 1 - Ideological and political confrontation with rulership to deny true Islam and confirm vulgar or commonplace Islam.
- 2 - Coordination of their propaganda and operations with hypocrites, members of the Tudeh party, democrats and other mini-groups.
- 3 - Designing the slogan of the united people's front with other groups.
- 4 - Struggling to pave the way for ending the war without victory and instigating people to use pressure in this regard and accept the proposed peace by the superpowers.
- 5 - Paving the way for comfort seekers in society.
- 6 - Instilling doubt into people's minds in order to separate the iman from the Muslim nation of Iran.
- 7 - Coordination with the superpowers in regard to confronting the Islamic Republic of Iran. This mini group also pursued different faceted and short-term aims as follows:
 - 1 - Training and protection of the cadres inside the country and abroad.
 - 2 - Establishing decentralized nuclei and party groups.
 - 3 - Preferring the quality of the cadre rather than its quantity.
 - 4 - Making an effort to regain the lost prestige resulting from the interview of the heads of the Tudeh party which revealed their treason before the public.
 - 5 - Making an effort to establish the so-called united people's front with other groups.
 - 6 - Making an effort to assassinate the personalities and responsible authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran and accusing them of the imposed war.
 - 7 - Propagating baseless rumors about the existence of suppression in Iran, Iran's affiliation with imperialists and the rulership's dependency on capitalist domination.
 - 8 - Making every effort both from inside and abroad to isolate Iran.
 - 9 - Aggravating antagonism and differences.
 - 10 - Creating dissatisfaction and aggravation and using this to cause strikes

and social protests in the army, government organizations and public institutions.

- 11 - Forcing people to leave the scene and join the united people's front.
- 12 - Intensifying pressure against the sovereignty of the Islamic Republic."

In another part of the interview about the activities of the ministry, the minister of information stated: "The Ministry of Information in its short existence has had some successes. Among them, with information received from the people it was able to identify six cases of planting bombs and capturing the agents. The other action was preventing two cases of hijacking during this year's celebration of the ten days of Fajr. Also the administrative core of many of the hypocrites has been discovered and they have been arrested. This very day and yesterday another administrative core of hypocrites with a record of several assassinations in Tabriz was identified and their agents arrested."

In conclusion, he called the extreme helplessness of the hypocrites the cause and motive for recent assassinations and the need of the hypocrites for the financial and political support by their masters.

9815

CSO: 4640/475

IRAN

TABRIZ RADIO DOUBTS SUCCESS OF MURPHY'S BAGHDAD VISIT

GF231654 Tabriz International Service in Azeri 1800 GMT 22 Apr 85

[Excerpts] Dear listeners, Richard Murphy, who is Ronald Reagan's special representative, has begun a visit to the Middle East in connection with the failure of the Iraqi regime's Ba'thist military operations, the failure of Saddam's efforts to attack Iranian cities, the defeat suffered in Lebanon by the forces of the regime occupying Jerusalem, the withdrawal of these forces from South Lebanon, and the question of the talks between King Hussain and Yasir 'arafat concerning the implementation of the peace plan drawn up by the imperialists. After conferring in (?Jordan and in occupied Palestine) with the leaders of those countries, he proceeded on to Baghdad.

On 20 April, Richard Murphy held talks with Tariq 'aziz, the Iraqi regime's minister of foreign affairs. According to various news agencies, their talks centered on the imposed war, the problems in the Middle East, and the relations between Iraq and the United States. Reports say that Richard Murphy will also meet with Saddam Husayn during his visit to Baghdad. Political circles believe that the objective behind Murphy's visit to that city is to learn about the situation of the Iraqi regime's military forces. The Iraqi regime's political and military positions will also be discussed in light of the bitter defeats that regime has suffered during the imposed war. Meanwhile, it seems that the U.S. leaders wish to inquire about the results the Iraqi regime has achieved in executing the task assigned to it--the task of attacking the Islamic Republic of Iran. They also wish to learn about what the United States has gained from Washington's aid to the Iraqi regime. [passage omitted]

In addition to studying the situation of the imposed war, Murphy will also be briefed during his visit on the views of the Iraqi leaders on the preparations being made by Yasir 'arafat and his supporters to reach a reconciliation with the regime occupying Jerusalem in accordance with the special peace plan drawn up by the United States. The PLO Executive Committee and the Fatah Central Committee held a joint meeting under 'arafat in Baghdad last week. By briefing Richard Murphy on the talks with 'arafat, Saddam Husayn will be trying to draw closer the views of the PLO leaders and the U.S. officials.

Meanwhile, Kamal Hasan 'ali, the prime minister of Egypt, arrived in Amman at the time of Richard Murphy's visit to Baghdad. His objective was to brief

King Hussain on the talks the Egyptian leaders held with Murphy. He conferred with King Hussain on the negotiations in the region as well--particularly on the talks Husni Mubarak held with the Zionist negotiator 'ezer Weizman.

Some of the leaders of the Arab governments in the region hope that Richard Murphy's visit to the area will shed more light on the part the United States is playing for the removal of the Middle East crisis and give impetus to the efforts made by the [word indistinct] for the commencement of the talks for peace. [passage omitted]

In Damascus, however, Richard Murphy will be confronted with Syrian opposition to the commencement of any kind of talk between the Arabs and the regime that occupies Jerusalem. It will be recalled that Syria made it known at the beginning of Richard Murphy's Middle East visit that its opposition to the talks with the Zionist regime had not changed.

After concluding his talks with the Iraqi leaders, Murphy will proceed on to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia's capital. His objective is to study the part the Saudi leaders are playing in the imposed war which the Iraqi regime has been waging against the Islamic revolution in Iran. There, Murphy will also be briefed on the Saudi view regarding the peace plan for the Middle East.

Political circles believed that after conferring with various leaders in the Middle East, Richard Murphy will brief Ronald Reagan on the situation in the region--particularly on the situation of the Iraqi regime. He will ask for further U.S. aid for the Iraqi regime with a view to helping it continue resisting against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The question at this point, however, is to what extent has the U.S. aid given to the Iraqi regime been useful in creating obstacles against Saddam's bitter defeats? It should be noted that the reply is negative. Likewise, future U.S. aid to that country will not save the Saddam regime.

CSO: 1831/416

IRAN

LAJEVARDI'S TRIAL COULD REVEAL OTHERS INVOLVEMENT

Paris MOUVEMENT 'IRAN LIBRE' in French 4 Mar 85

[Paris Mouvement 'Iran Libre' in French, weekly published by Azadeh Shafiq, daughter of Ashraf Pahlavi]

[Text] Assadollah Lajevardi has been placed under house arrest. There is some question of his being arraigned. "The Tehran Butcher", "The Evin Executioner," "The Dracula of the Republic", such were the epithets associated with his name. He would no doubt have been indicted long ago had he not been able to count on the support of Khomeyni himself. Montazeri and his allies have been waiting for his downfall for 2 years. It means an important victory for them.

IRAN PRESS DIGEST explains the reasons for the elimination which has just occurred in these terms: "Lajevardi was a tyrannical person. No one could control him, not even 'the Iman.' He had built up his clan, starting with the prison at Evin, and from there he had woven so dense a net that one might almost speak of a state within a state. He ended by angering everyone. He was the one who, through his crimes, had given the Islamic Republic its most damaging image. He tracked down the families who had dared to complain about him to the government and hounded them with his malevolence. On some days he ordered as many as 150 executions. He claimed one must relentlessly wipe out opponents who persisted in rebelling. He subjected repented persons to such a regime as to turn them into robots at his orders and who, even when freed, would stoop to anything on his behalf.

Over the past 3 years he was responsible for at least 5000 deaths. Even certain pasdars could not tolerate his sadism and resigned from the Evin prison.

But Lajevardi was not only an executioner. He was also a racketeer. His brother, Mohsen, was arrested last month for having "blackmailed" 2000 families of prisoners and for having extorted 500 million tomans from them. When he was arrested Mohsen acknowledged that he had turned the greater part of this money over to his brother. If certain rumors are to be believed, Assadollah Lajevardi sent all these funds abroad through his businessman, Fazlollah Manuchehri, who had been seen recently in Switzerland, France, and Austria.

But who is this Lajevardi? He is an Azerbaijani around 55 years old; he formerly had a shop in the Bazaar. In 1963 he participated in Khomeyni's uprising at Qom. He was arrested several times, but each time he was released by that imperial police so often accused of tyranny. After the triumph of subversion, he published his autobiography, portraying himself as Khomeyni's right hand, and a member of the Fadayan Eslam group.

He relied on Khamene'i, the president of the Republic, and Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri, Interior Minister. In addition to Montazeri, his principal enemies were Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kani and the ayatollah Janati Ata'i. His downfall may be due to two factors: his refusal to free the Tudeh prisoners, bringing down upon himself the wrath of his protector, Khamene'i, who had asked him for a measure of leniency. Also, his opposition to the prisoners' pardon granted by Khomeyni on the feast of the Revolution. He reportedly even had thirty of them executed. It should also be added that he is blamed for the thousands of disappearances which have remained unexplained.

Lejevardi has threatened that if he were brought to trial, he would name his accomplices: Musavi Tabrizi, Mohammadi Gilani and Sadeq Khalkhali.

9772

CSO: 4619/4.

IRAN

DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OPPOSED TO SENDING STUDENTS OVERSEAS

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 17 Feb 85 p 15

[Text] To stop sending high school graduates abroad is a basic step for preventing the influence of foreign culture in the country and for relying on ourselves to increase the capacity of the universities.

Friday night, in an interview Brother Mansuri, the deputy foreign minister, while making this statement, called the influence of Islamic culture in foreign countries very extensive and said: "Through limitations that different countries of the world have created for us they have virtually confessed to the influence of the Islamic revolution's culture in these countries." He added: "We do not permit foreign countries to have cultural activities in our country as in the past, especially the big countries who follow the extreme objectives of domination. For the same reason, for a few years after the revolution, we closed several cultural institutions connected to the big countries. If other such centers do not follow our regulations, they will also be closed." In regard to sending students abroad he said: "We have taken a basic step for preventing foreign cultural influence in our country and building more self-reliance for ourselves and that is by not sending high school graduates abroad to study. First, I think it is possible that by increasing the number of students, the capacity of the universities could also be increased. Second, it has been proven to us in the long run that the costs outweigh the profits in sending students abroad." He added: "Sending graduate students for specialized studies will be continued for the time being and we hope that through the expansion of facilities for higher education this will not be necessary in the future."

In regard to the cultural activities of the Islamic Republic brother Mansuri said: "Considering the importance and the role of culture in the world and the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran, due to its Islamic orientation, has voiced feelings, messages and responsibility in this regard, it is necessary to expand its domestic cultural activities in order to eradicate the roots of the past colonialistic cultural traces. For foreign cultural activities, steps have been taken in the past few years, and thank God, most of our embassies have one or two publications in two different languages. Most of the Islamic Republic delegations have translated our basic and Islamic books in the language of the residing country and the most famous is the literary work of Martyr

Motahari. Also in many countries, preparations for the establishment of a cultural house is complete and we have cultural homes in a few countries which have become active in recent years and the effects of these activities are completely evident in some corners of the world." In this regard he added: "If we consider having cultural activities in the world in the future, we definitely must become acquainted with the language, literature, political and social conditions of the different countries of the world. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by establishing the higher learning institute, has taken steps to train some people, but certainly its capacity does not meet our needs and we have to expand it."

Brother Mansuri said: "We do not have cultural relations with all the countries that we do not have any diplomatic relations and in some countries where we are able to establish cultural relations, we are in the process of making the necessary preparations."

In conclusion, he called the activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran's delegations abroad during the ten days of Fajr extremely noteworthy and said: "These activities were welcomed by foreigners, Iranians residing abroad and the foreign press. The foreign press allocated more space for reporting the Islamic Republic's issues this year.

9815
CSO: 4640/475

IRAN

KHOMEYNI: DEFENSE OF ISLAM, COUNTRY RESPONSIBILITY OF ALL

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 6 Apr 85 p 14

[Text] Simultaneous with the blessed birthday of the child of the pious, the commander of the faithful, 'Ali ebn Abitaleb, the Friday imam of Qom and a group of the military and Guards Corps personnel, accompanied by Hojjat ol-Eslam Mahallat, the representative of the imam in the Guards Corps, and a group of brothers from the mobilization, accompanied by the commander of the mobilization, a group of the inhabitants of south Tehran, and a group of orphans met with Imam Khomeyni, the leader of the revolution and founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, on Thursday in the Jamaran religious center.

In this meeting, first one of the clerics of Qom expressed congratulations on the occasion of the blessed birthday of the chief of the pious, 'Ali ebn Abitaleb. Then, the imam of the nation made an enlightening speech, as follows:

In the name of God the compassionate and the merciful.

I congratulate all the gentlemen present, the revered nation of Iran, and all the Muslims of the world on this blessed day. I hope that with the blessings of this day, God will extend his blessings to all the Muslims of the world, particularly the noble nation of Iran.

Today cannot be described. Whatever has been described is less than his dignity deserves. Whatever poets, mystics, philosophers and others have said about him is only part of what he was. Often they realized certain issues, and we do the same about 'Ali ebn Abitaleb. What we cannot comprehend, and the mystics and philosophers are also incapable, cannot be mentioned. If a person does not comprehend, he cannot say it. And so much is

available to us that it would require a great deal of time. Hence, we must apologize to his sacred presence and ask for forgiveness that we are unable to express his perfection. What is unfortunate is that they have not allowed the Commander of the Faithful to be presented as he should be and as Islam wants.

During the short period of his apparent rule, three wars occurred among the Muslims. Those deviants who accuse Iran of fighting Muslims, in addition to the fact that we do not consider the Ba'th Party to be Muslim but anti-Islamic, and the people of Iraq as well as the people of Iran are suffering from it, [must know that] it is not a war against Muslims. Although he has made a shield of Muslims and brings them to the fronts, it is not a war against Muslims. In addition, let us suppose that they are Muslims. Do you consider Saddam to be more of a Muslim than the companions of the Prophet? Some of the Sunni clerics in their courts consider Saddam and those like him above the sacred persons in Nahrawan, those whose brows were calloused and who performed night prayers. The three wars of the Commander of the Faithful were against the companions of the Prophet, those close to the Prophet and the hypocritical holy men. This was in the interest of Islam, although some people criticize the Commander of the Faithful in their hearts but do not dare ask why he fought the Muslims. The Commander of the Faithful followed Islam. He fought Muslims when Islam instructed him to do so and fought the infidels for the same reason. When a tribe of Muslims conspired to eliminate the Islam which was being born and deceived another group, the duty of the Commander of the Faithful was to draw his sword in three wars against Muslims and kill those who professed they were Muslims, claimed to support Islam and were more Muslim than Saddam. He fought Muslims in three wars to obey God and to protect the foundation of Islam. At the time that the foundation of Islam and the Islamic religion depend on fighting against those who profess Islam or may truly be Muslims, when it is decided, Muslims must draw their swords and fight them. These unenlightened people who object to Iran, the Iranian combatants and Islamic scholars in Iran in support of the monarchists, the hypocrites and the like should refer their objections to the dawn of Islam and see what they can say. They believe in the Commander of the Faithful. Let them see what occurred there, why it did and what the motive was.

They wanted to return Islam to the situation of the Age of Ignorance even in the name of Islam. What was the duty of the Commander of the Faithful at this time, other than what he did? We believe that Saddam wants to return Islam to heathenism and atheism. We believe that the United States is afraid of and wants to destroy Islam. It states so explicitly. We believe that those who oppose the Islamic government of Iran are opposing Islam. We must fight for our beliefs to the end, because Islam has made it our duty. We have no choice but to fight a person,

all of whose allies consist of deviants from Islam, the deviant United States, and everyone else who is deviant, and treats Muslims in his own country in the way he does and does the same with our Muslims. We will pursue this course to the end and will not pay attention to the empty statements of those who are logical and mental deviants. We realize our duty. All the great Islamic scholars in Iran agree on this issue and so do the faithful, the merchants, the farmers and others in government offices. The purest of the faithful agree with this issue. On the other hand, if, God forbid, the United States wins this war and Saddam becomes victorious, Islam would be slapped in the face, unable to raise its head for a long time. Faced with such a situation, it is a religious duty for everyone to defend Islam. Furthermore, the issue is not that we make war, we are defending ourselves against the person who has attacked us and caused so much destruction. We need to defend our country. There is not one Muslim or one religious scholar who would say defense does not exist in Islam. Defense does not require a religious guardian or an imam. When it is required, all Muslims must defend themselves. They are independent in this issue. In Iran, independently, even if the religious guardian or religious scholars would not instruct it, it is the religious duty of the people and dictate of their wisdom to defend their country, their honor and their property. If this Ba'th Party finds the opportunity and is given the opportunity, God forbid, do you know what it would do to Iraq and to our country? We will stand to the end and follow Islam and Islamic injunctions. This is the injunction of Islam today.

We ask God Almighty for the success of all Muslims in rising up against this banner of heathenism, against a person who opposes all international laws and openly says, We will attack at a certain hour and launch missiles on Iranian cities and residential areas of Iran, but whom no country condemns. We state openly that we do not want to invade another country. We are defending ourselves. All the propaganda is against us because Islam and heathenism are at issue, not Iran and Iraq. The issue is that they are harmed by Islam. Islam does not allow them to achieve their illegitimate interests. They rise up or force others to rise up against Islam. But they must know that a country in this situation, with the morale of its young and old Muslims and children, cannot be opposed. Those who are at the top are too wise to get involved. They did so before and were slapped. Now, they no longer do so. They force one person or another to do so and to instigate conspiracies. These evil ones must know that they are powerless. In a country in which everyone is alert and prepared for martyrdom, of what do they think they are frightening us? Are you trying to frighten the person who says, I want martyrdom and pray that I will be martyred, with being killed? Are you trying to frighten a person with missiles who stands in his tracks after being struck by

missiles and says, War, war until victory? This is a situation created by God; it cannot be opposed. I ask God Almighty to protect us all with steadfastness and perseverance in order to continue resistance and to have the power to confront anyone who wants to fight us. Peace and God's blessing upon you.

10,000
CSO: 4640/525

IRAN

KHOMEYNI: WE REJECT A PEACE WORSE THAN WAR

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 25 Mar 85 p 2

[Text] Tehran, IRNA. On the occasion of the coming of the new year [21 March 1985], his holiness Imam Khomeyni, the leader of the revolution and founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, made an important speech addressed to the various strata of the Muslim people of Iran and the Islamic people of the world.

The text of this message, which emphasizes the importance and necessity for the patience and resistance of the Islamic nation in order to attain the sacred goals of Islam and the Islamic revolution, is as follows.

In the name of God the compassionate and the merciful.

I congratulate all the Muslims of the world, particularly the brave Iranian nation, the various strata of our nation, those who are serving Islam on the fronts, those who are serving behind the fronts, the families of the martyrs, the disabled and their relatives, on the coming of the new year.

God willing, this will be a blessed year for the Muslims of the world. May God Almighty make it possible to stop the hand of the superpowers and those connected with them in order for the people of the world to live in tranquility. All the problems of the world stem from the great powers, who claim they are working for peace. They commit so many crimes; they drag so many countries into blood and calamity that they cannot see human rights being destroyed. These are only claims and are not true. They are, in fact, contrary to the truth and the Muslims are negligent. The oppressed people of the world are negligent. In regard to this disturbance which has appeared in Iran, if other Muslim countries were to join Iran, to join hands to stand against so many crimes which have been committed, the problems could be resolved. But, it has not been done and I do not know what will happen. I hope that God Almighty will give us the power to resist. Today, resistance is vital. The Prophet of Islam was worried about whether or not his nation would put up resistance. As it is

stated in the reported traditions (Sureh Hud), the verse was descended: "Therefore, stand firm, as thou art commanded, thou and those who with thee turn [unto God]." At the same time, this verse has been repeated in another Sureh, Showra, but it is not pursued further. The Hud Sureh, which is pursued further, states that it seems that he was worried about, God forbid, his nation not putting up resistance. The nation and government of Iran, the Iranian army, the Guards Corps of Iran and all the strata must [as published] and I do not forget the events of that Friday, the magnificent, dignified self-sacrificing resistance of the people, despite the casualties and the shower of bullets. I watched it and looked especially to see the condition of the people. I did not see one person who was hesitant. And then the Friday imam spoke so strongly and the people listened and cried out that they were prepared for martyrdom. One of those who was martyred, I was told, left a will, knowing that he was going to martyrdom. He is one of those who was martyred right here. No one can stand up against such a nation--a nation that on the day they announced they were going to bomb the Friday prayer assembly, came out in more numbers than ever before to the Friday prayers, even those who do not usually come came this week. No one can change the mind of such a nation with bombings and other conspiratorial acts.

In addition, how can our nation change its mind? Islam is at issue and God has entrusted it to us--the Islam that from its dawn was born of hard work and hardship and has always progressed with hardship. The Prophet of Islam was at war from the day that he met his call to the day that he passed away to meet God. Even then, when he was on his death bed, he was mobilizing for war. Despite all the hardships that he suffered at the hands of strangers and non-strangers and the hardships that later the Muslims and our imams suffered, the Commander of the Faithful suffered because it was for Islam and it was sweet to him. We must make our tastes become like his, so that everything is sweet to us. This is the meaning of God's will. At one time, there is submission and one submits. At another time, one is content with what He does. It does not make any difference whether calamity comes from Him or blessing. He would consider everything a blessing and say He is beloved. Even if the outward beloved of a person says something unpleasant, for the person who is in love, it is pleasant. If we achieve this meaning, and we hope to do so through hard work, this meaning that we take pleasure in these meanings [as published]. Now, we see that our young people are going to the fronts to be martyred. This is what they are. They do so because they take pleasure in it and consider it what God means. Therefore, it is not difficult for them. We must train ourselves to be content with what God Almighty grants us. If it is calamity, it is good, and this is the truth of the matter. Sometimes calamity is a blessing for human beings and sometimes a blessing is a calamity. God Almighty wants to train the people.

To those who pay attention to him, He sometimes sends blessings to train them. When there is pressure, souls travel to another world. Under pressure, this happens. Therefore, we want such a nation. Thank God, the nation itself is like that and the pressures are no problem to them. If we Muslims were like other groups in the world and were to work for wealth, riches and position and to satisfy our stomachs and carnal desires, we would be upset if there were shortages. But a nation that supports martyrdom, a nation whose men and women love martyrdom and cry out for martyrdom, such a nation would not complain about shortages and about its economy. It does not have its heart set on the economy. This is a problem for those who are dependent on the economy. Those who have given their hearts to God are not concerned with having plenty of something or no shortages of something else. These things are not what they are being martyred for. If you tell them, for example, that they have been robbed, they pay no attention at all to such things.

You can tell them that the price of a particular item has increased, but they have not gone to bring spoils. The spoils that they want to bring cannot decay. They cannot be defeated. It is a task that no one else can do, except God Almighty. And our nation is doing this. I hope that we all become like that. Of course, I am saying it is not like that, but I wish others to be like that, and I would like to be like that. We must all become like that, God willing. We hope that this new year will be a good year for all of us. I find it necessary to mention that we do not wish even our enemies to be harmed, if they do not stand up against us, if they do not oppose Islam and are Muslims. We do not want them to be harmed at all. We do not want the economic and population centers of Iraq to be harmed. Let Saddam stop such actions and the government will stop as well. But when he does this, then it is out of our hands. The situation is such that it is out of the hands of the governments as well. Therefore, we do not want to be at war. From the very beginning, we did not want war; we do not want it now and we will not want it in the future. But neither do we want a peace which is worse than war. We do not want the world to follow again and cheer on this corrupt person who has committed so much corruption. The world is now trying to hold him up under his arms and keep him in power. Why should they keep him? To disturb the situation? To eliminate Islam? They are all worried that Islam may come, because Islam does not agree with such debauchery, crime and tyranny. They are afraid of this, and so they support Saddam, who opposes Islam, in order for such a thing not to happen.

But if God Almighty has willed it, these conspiracies will turn back on themselves. Our duty is to stand up against injustice and hit the person who has invaded as on the mouth, as long as the world does not accept that this war exists; they started it and they are responsible for the bombing of these centers. You

come and bomb our Friday prayers, do you think that our nation will retreat? You see what our nation has done. This is an issue which is worth telling; it is a historical issue. Before a person sees such he cannot believe that a woman with a child in her arms and a man with a child at his side would not move--so much pressure from the explosions by these dishonorable people--and on the other hand, the shower of bullets that you saw. Nevertheless, they sat calmly in their place and did not move. This is the kind of nation it is. It is a nation which is not worried about whether the price of meat is cheap or expensive, whether there is plenty of it or not. This nation wants to make Islam great, as the Prophet wanted to strengthen Islam. Now, if I am killed, my child is killed, I am ruined, or my child becomes a prisoner, it is not important at all. We see in the reported traditions that as the noon of 'Ashura approached, the face of Hoseyn became more radiant, because he saw that he was going to God. He was looking at Him, not at others. His looking at others is related to God, otherwise, he did not think about his son and his child. This was not the case. Therefore, we must put up resistance and we must not allow it to be proven about us what the Prophet was worried about, that his nation would not resist and would disobey God. I ask God Almighty to guard the health of all the strata of this nation, including the wounded and the disabled, their families, those who have disappeared, and all of our prisoners. May God bless the soul of our martyrs and grant them a place next to Him and may He keep the rest to achieve victory, God willing. May our prisoners and those who have disappeared return to their homeland. May our nation advance strongly and not be afraid of anything. What has been proven to our wakeful nation is that if you want to be alert and independent, you must suffer for it. If you want to be miserable, go and establish ties with the United States. All of this will end, but the war will not end. Go, establish ties with the Soviet Union; that will not do it either. Thus, you would have a backward, miserable and weak nation to the end. But if a nation wants to be proud and to have value, it should no longer think about measuring this value of seeing how much our yogurt or our butter will cost. If such were the case, we would go now, but we see that it is not so. Thank God, our nation is not so, and I hope it becomes stronger and happier during this new year. May God Almighty grant power and health to everyone, to awaken all of us and help us in resistance, God willing.

10,000
CSO: 4640/525

IRAN

COUNTRY'S VERY EXISTENCE SAID TO BE IN DANGER

London KEYHAN in Persian 14 Mar 85 p 2

[London KEYHAN weekly in Persian; founder and publisher Dr Mesbahzadeh]

[Text] The freedom movement issued a declaration warning the people of Iran that the country's very existence is in serious danger and the only way for overcoming this danger is the active presence of the people on the scene.

The freedom movement, under the leadership of Engineer Mehdi Bazargan, the first prime minister of the Islamic revolution regime, has opposed and cautioned the people from expecting another coup d'etat. The freedom movement declaration, issued on the occasion of honoring the sixth anniversary of the Islamic revolution, was signed by 25 officials and ministers of the provisional government of Bazargan. The declaration was issued before the occupation of the freedom movement office and the temporary arrest of Engineer Bazargan and 40 officials of this movement.

The preface of this declaration refers to the unpleasant events and disappointments occurring during these six years for the people and stated:

The sixth anniversary of the revolution is now being held under conditions where our country is engulfed in an enormous crisis from every direction and if we do not think of an immediate cure its ailments not only will threaten the destiny of the Islamic Republic, but also they will threaten the very existence of the country and the future of the nation.

Each compassionate and devout Muslim and open-minded Iranian who perceives these conditions will be gravely distressed. The economic crisis, unemployment, gradual annihilation of our national production resources, inflation, exorbitant prices, decrease of income level especially for employees, workers, villagers, retail tradesmen and teachers, increase of direct and indirect taxes felt mainly by low income people, scarcity of general public maintenance and livelihood, the continuation of war and economic and human loss caused on the one hand by the ignorance and selfishness of some of the responsible authorities and on the other hand by numerous decisionmaking centers and administrative anarchy, lack of condescension of government officials toward national sovereignty and the principles contained in the third chapter of the constitution about the

rights and freedom of the nation and as a result the absence of basic freedoms including freedom of speech and expression, the freedom of press and right of assembly and the lack of political, social, economic and social security all have placed the country in a grave situation. It is a crisis which is getting more severe every day and expanding in its dimension.

Attention to these affairs has made us aware of protecting the country and guarding those values and goals that our nation stood up for and had a revolution. We have decided to fulfill our national and Islamic duties and for the sake of benevolence, direct others to do what is proper by religious laws and guide them not to do what is unlawful, caused by rumors, ambition or a desire to attain rulership, to advise and warn the government authorities in power and proclaim the danger. In order to reduce the crisis and prevent the possible occurrence of any dangerous events, we express our views as follows:

In the opinion of the undersigned, only the people of Iran with their presence and direct participation, must seek a remedy for the present crisis. Certainly, we must provide conditions in this regard since the basis is still the vote of the people and the only way to attain these goals is to safeguard the recognized freedoms and rights of the nation which are specified in the constitution.

The constitution is a national alliance, a treaty between the people and the governing body, and both sides are committed to it. The breach of commitments by rulers and conniving or violating the rights of the nation will eventually lead to the elimination of popularity and privation of the legitimacy of the ruling body by the nation.

The rulership must consent to the nation's rights and guarantee its certitude, then the people will withdraw from being indifferent and will have the chance to express their views freely and without fear in regard to the destiny of their country and activities of the responsible authorities. With execution of the duty to direct others to do what is recommended by religious laws and to enjoin others not to do what is unlawful in the society, the deviated paths will be distinguished and prevention of corruption and deviation will be possible. To expect a coup d'etat or look toward the East or the West will not solve the crisis, but only the active presence of the people on the scene will be able to cure the existing chaos. Certainly, without lawful freedoms, like the freedom of speech and expression, the freedom of press, the freedom of assembly, and safeguarding the necessary securities, the presence of people on the scene and finding the roots of the crisis and looking for ways to solve them the chaos can never be resolved. Continuation of the absence of political and legal freedoms will result in the elimination of the nation's independence, since freedom and independence comprise both sides of a coin and one without the other does not have any meaning or sense.

The freedom movement's declaration continues to support the Islamic regime and emphasizes: The people must not put the activities of the present rulership and its officials to account for the Islamic Republic system. Likewise, the administration is not entitled to consider the people's protest

or their efforts for reform to change the administration according to the constitution synonymous with opposition to the Islamic Republic system.

We invite all strata of the people to become united and together use their efforts to protect and safeguard the existence of the country and the Islamic Republic and work toward fulfillment of all aspects of the revolution's goals. We request the responsible authorities and officials to condescend to people's rights and their demands in order to pave the way for eliminating the people's indifference, the possibility for them to participate in determining their destiny and to seek a remedy for curing the present crisis.

"I tell you, whatever the condition, deliver a message; either learn from my advice or be weary" (Persian poem)

Bahman, 4 February 1985

Dr Mohammad Hassan Eslami, Engineer Ali Entezam, Engineer Mehdi Bazargan, Dr Hoseyn Bani Assadi, Engineer Reza Puyan, Dr Nurali Tabandeh, Engineer Abbas Taj, Engineer Mohammad Tavasoli, Hassan Ruhani, Mehdi Chehel Tani, Dr Yadollah Sahabi, Hoseyn Shah Hoseyni, Engineer Hashem Sabaghian, Dr Reza Sadr, Ahmad Sadr Haj Seyyed Javadi, Engineer Yusef Taheri, Dr Khalil Zarabi, Dr Hassan Farid Alam, Engineer Mostafa Katiraii, Engineer Reza Gol Ahmar, Dr Assadolah Mobasher, Engineer Ali Akbar Moen Far, Dr Mohammad Movlavi, Naser Minachi, Engineer Alireza Hendi, Dr Ebrahim Yazdi

9815
CSO: 4640/488

IRAN

MAJLIS APPROVES 1 BILLION-RIAL ADVANCE TO 'OPPRESSED' LEBANESE

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 6 Mar 85 p 2

[Text] KEYHAN political service--The open session of the Islamic Majlis was held this morning. After reading passages from the Quran and the deputies' notifications to the executive officials of the nation, amendments to the budget bill [of March 1985 to March 1986] and relevant proposals were studied and discussed.

First, proposals related to amendment 7, which had remained from the previous session, were discussed. The State Accounts Commission suggested that in the section "A" of amendment 7 after the phrase "unforeseen expenditures" the clause "expenditures resulting from unexpected events such as floods, earthquakes, fires and epidemic diseases" be added. Dr Sheybani and Movahedi Savozi talked in favor of and against this recommendation, respectively, and Haeri Zadeh, the plan and budget commission spokesman and Morteza Alviri, the government representative gave their explanations and expressed their opposition.

Then the proposal of the State Accounts Commission was put to a vote and was not approved. After that, Gholam Reza-Fadaai and a few other deputies suggested the omission of section "J" of amendment 7. Hadi Ghafari, opposing the suggestion said: "If section J of this amendment is omitted then segments D and H will be ineffective and more explanation is needed in this regard. If we decide not to act outside the accounting law we will be impeding government activities if nothing else."

Seyyed Ali Avazzadeh, in favor of the amendment, said: "My suggestion is for the omission of all the public accounting laws and other government general regulations. On one hand we say that we have a budget deficit and loans to pay and on the other hand we increase the ceiling and credit of the programs. We must accept one side of the situation. We approved 70 cases to act without obligation or observance of the public accounting law and other regulations. Therefore, I recommend the omission of this segment."

The plan and budget commission spokesman gave some explanation about section J and said: "Section A of this amendment contains 10 billion rials and section J contains 5 billion rials and segments D and H are separate from Section J. Only 5 billion rials from section J are free from the

obligation and observance of the public accounting law and other government general regulations and it is not advisable to omit this section." Then the suggestion for omitting the sentence of public accounting law and other government general regulations was put to a vote and was not approved.

Thereafter, Mohammad Reza Rihini in this amendment suggested omitting the word 'until' from section J and H. It was put to a vote and was not approved. Then Movahedi Savozi and Fadaai made a proposal in regard to section D of this amendment. They proposed that the sentence "to be used by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Islamic Guidance according to the situation" be added at the end of this section. Hadi Ghafari and Abasi Fard talked in favor of and against this proposal and the committee spokesman opposed the proposal. Then, the amendment proposal of Movahedi Savozi and Fadaai for section D of amendment 7 was put to a vote and was not approved.

Allocation of 1 Billion Rial Credit to Injured Lebanese

Then Mohamad Ali Qoreyshi and a few other deputies proposed that the credit ceiling of section D of this amendment, which is related to the expansion of Islamic culture and the protection of the oppressed of other nations be raised from 2 billion rials to 3 billion rials. Huseyn Harati opposed this proposal and said: "The government itself is involved and acquainted with the situation and it has allocated 2 billion rials for this matter and besides the government's hands are not tied--and it is also mentioned in this amendment that the government could use more than this allocation. Therefore, I am against this increase."

Mehdi Karubi, in favor of this proposal said: "We defend our own proposal that 100 million tomans be increased in regard to Lebanon. All the gentlemen are aware that Lebanon is a Muslim country which has been maliciously invaded by Israel. The great powers like America protect such aggression but with God's kindness and the resistance of the Lebanese people, they are fighting back. Therefore, it is proper that the funds of this section be increased."

Thereafter, the proposal for the allocation of a 1 billion rial credit to Lebanon in section D of amendment 7 was put to a vote and approved. The proposal for the increase of funds of section D from 2 billion rials to 3 billion rials was not approved.

Then, Seyyed Abol Ghasem Davoudol-Musavi suggested that 500 million rials in section H be increased to 1 billion rials. Ezatollah Denghan and Seyyed Reza Akrami talked in favor of and against this proposal. The commission spokesman and the government representative gave their explanations and this proposal was put to a vote and was rejected. Then the proposal of 900 million rials credit of section H was voted down.

Subsequently, Gholam Huseyn Nadi and several other deputies proposed allocating the sum of 2 billion rials from amendment 7 for the unexpected current expenditures of education and training. Those for and against this proposal expressed their views, likewise the committee spokesman and the government representative gave their explanations and the proposal was put to a vote and was approved.

Next, Sadeqiou and Seyed Mostafa Faregh proposed that 2.7 billion rials from amendment 7 be placed at the disposal of the Islamic Majlis to be used, based on the request of the deputies and approval of the prime minister, for unexpected emergency cases in the constituency regions. Hoseyn Harati and Hassan Sadeqiou talked in favor of and against the proposal and the committee spokesman opposed it. Then the proposal was put to a vote and was not approved.

Seyyed Reza Zavarehie and some other deputies suggested a new amendment-- amendment 2, based on the proviso that any payment of money from the funds of this amendment for salary, wages, benefits, rewards, bonuses allowance or the purchase or expenses of a car be strictly prohibited.

Hadi Ghaffari and Movahedi Savoji talked in favor of and against this proposal and the committee spokesman and government representative gave their explanations and opposed the proposal. This proposal was put to a vote and was not approved.

Auditing Amendment 8 of Budget Bill

Then amendment 8 of the budget bill was brought on the carpet. Amendment 8 is as follows:

- A. In regard to the policy of transferring execution authority to the people with the technical, guidance and support role of the government, if the Ministry of Agriculture determines that the execution capability of any operation falls within its jurisdiction, it is authorized after due appraisal to sell reclaimed land, production plants and pertinent machinery to those with the necessary qualifications.
- B. The sales price of the transferred materials will be based on the equitable price of the current appraisal and calculation of marginal expenses. Money thus obtained will be deposited directly in the government treasury without any appropriation or changes at all.
- C. The transfer goods will be sold to the employees of the Ministry of Agriculture and other government employees whose services are bought back, to specialized banks and to the private sector. Priority is given to those qualified candidates who have formed cooperatives or partnership corporations to purchase the transferred goods.
- D. The execution charter for this amendment will be prepared within three months after the approval of this law by the Ministry of Agriculture and the cabinet.
- E. The operational report of this amendment will be sent by the Ministry of Agriculture to the plan and budget commission and the agriculture commission of the Islamic Majlis every six months.

The open session of Majlis was recessed and adjourned at 10:15.

9815
CSO: 4604/481

IRAN

HEAVY INDUSTRY MINISTER DETAILS RESULT OF TRIPS

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 6 Feb 85 p 1

[Text] The volume of capital investment to construct Iran's oil and gas pipelines to Turkey totals 14 billion dollars. Upon completion of construction of these two pipelines Iran will be able to export approximately 1.5 million barrels of oil daily and 50 billion cubic feet of gas annually.

Speaking about the outcome of his trip to the three countries of Turkey, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, Eng Behzad Nabavi, minister of heavy industries, while announcing this statement, also said: Based on preliminary studies the capital investment for the construction of Iranian gas pipeline to Turkey is estimated to be a sum of 11 billion dollars. Of this sum about 2.5 billion dollars will be invested by Iran, and Turkey and Greece will each invest more than 4 billion dollars.

He said: The gas exported from Iran by means of this pipeline will be carried first from the port of Iskenderun in Turkey to Greece and then to southern Italy. He said: Along the course of the gas pipeline from Iran to Turkey, a portion of the gas will be exported to Syria and some to Turkey. Eng Nabavi also stated: The amount of capital investment to construct the Iranian oil pipeline to Turkey has been estimated at 3 billion dollars. The two parties will make equal investment. Meanwhile, the share of Iran's capital investment in the construction of these two pipelines is payable through the barter of oil.

He added: According to the memorandum of understanding signed by Iran and Turkey, the results obtained from preliminary studies and investigation concerning the construction of these two pipelines are to be made clear during the next six to twelve months. Following that, if the results thus obtained show that the technical and economic costs are viable, construction will begin. In this press conference, the minister of heavy industries also said: According to the signed memorandum of understanding, the volume of trade between Iran and Turkey during the current Christian year will reach about 3 billion dollars, and the share of Iranian sales to Turkey will be 1.5 billion dollars. He stated that Iran's major purchases from Turkey would be industrial raw materials, industrial and agricultural machinery, foodstuffs, spare parts for machinery, fibers, thread and fabrics, industrial and construction steel, chemicals, plastic materials, and so forth.

He said: In return Iran will export to Turkey crude oil, various agricultural and livestock products, caviar, laundry detergents, paraffin, zinc and copper concentrates, aluminum sheets, buses, mini-buses, automobiles, and construction stone.

Eng Nabavi went on to add: In light of the change in consumer culture, some limitations have been developed in the production of some nonessential domestic products. However, if the export market for these goods is proved viable, their production will be increased and they will be exported. In this regard he mentioned domestically assembled trucks and wallpaper. He added: In light of the enormous volume of gas reserves in the country, even with the construction of the aforementioned pipeline, it will take two hundred years for the existing gas reserves to be depleted.

He added: Iran's payment of 2.5 billion dollars to construct the pipeline will even be less if some of the gas pipes used come from her own stock.

The minister of heavy industries once again noted that the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based on developing economic and trade relations with countries which are not enemies of the Islamic revolution, and said: In the purchase of goods from abroad, the competitiveness of the price on an international level will be thoroughly considered.

9597
CSO: 4640/472

IRAN

ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION REPORTEDLY DOUBLED SINCE REVOLUTION

Tehran BURS in Persian 17 Feb 85 p 2

[Text] During recent years the production of energy has been twice what it was prior to the victory of the glorious Islamic revolution.

In an interview with IRNA's correspondent, Dr Ghafuri, minister of energy, while making the above statement also described the activities in the area of production and distribution of energy during the past years and said: Despite the fact that the production of energy in the years following the Islamic revolution has doubled, the 15 to 20 percent rate of growth in consumption has sometimes caused outages in some areas.

Pointing to the importance of the people's conservation in the consumption of energy, he said: Policies have been adopted so that through greater production the people will not have to face any difficulties next summer. However, conservation in consumption will certainly reduce our difficulties.

Pointing to Esfahan's power plant's second 200-megawatt unit operation the minister of energy said: Two other units at this power plant will also go into operation next year. He added: The power plant at Bandar 'Abbas, with four 300-megawatt units, is also under construction. There are two units on line and its third and fourth units will go on line next year. The Tus power plant with four 150-megawatt units and the Tabriz power plant with two 387-megawatt units will go on line next year. Smaller gas power plants in Mashshad and other areas of the country will go on line in the future. He added: It should be known that the construction of one power plant takes a minimum of five to six years and a typical 1,000 megawatt power plant costs approximately 10 billion toman.

In conclusion, the minister of energy described the energy production and distribution situation in Fars Province and the plans to expand power plants and electrification activities in the province and said: Right now a portion of Fars Province is covered by the national network, and in the larger plan now under consideration the Larestan region will also be connected to the national network from the south. At the present time he put the production of the Fars power plant at 140-megawatts and said: The plan to expand the big Fars power plant to 1,000-megawatts is being implemented, and we are considering to construct and put into operation a 10-megawatt hydro-electric plant at the Dorudzan dam.

9597
CSO: 4640/472

IRAN

CLERGY ISSUE STATEMENT, DENOUNCE ATTACK AGAINST QOMI

GF061738 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian 1500 GMT 6 May 85

[Text] Iranian religious ulema and clergy have condemned the attack by Khomeyni's ruffians against the home of his holiness Ayatollah Tabataba'i-Qomi. According to our Tehran correspondent, the clergy not attached to the regime in a statement published in Qom and Tehran, have called the attack against the person of Ayatollah Tabataba'i-Qomi by the ruffians of the regime of Khomeyni a clear violation of shi'ism and a direct insult against the sources of emulation.

The statement reads: The regime of the Islamic Republic is after Ayatollah Tabataba'i-Qomi in the same way it plotted against Grand Ayatollah Shari'atmadari, by ordering its ruffians to attack his home, put him under arrest, and cut off utility supplies to his home. The statement then stresses that issuing decrees on issues related to Islam is the right of the sources of emulation and no one can deny them this right.

Ayatollahs in Qom, Mashhad, and Tehran who have no ties with the ruling clique severely condemn the latest move by the Islamic Republic to insult the ulema and source of emulation and persecute them.

CSO: 4640/535

IRAN

HEAVY INDUSTRIES MINISTRY CORRUPTION NOTED

GF061717 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian 1330 GMT 6 May 85

[Unattributed commentary]

[Excerpts] The Ministry of Heavy Industries in the Islamic Republic is a sad joke. This ministry, which was established on the basis of a 3-year trial law, will be illegal from 22 April 1985, as the 3-year trial period for this ministry will end on this date.

The mullahs Majlis on 15 April placed the law for the Heavy Industry Ministry on its agenda and supporters and opponents spoke on this subject. However, the plan for the renewal of this ministry, which is a complete joke, never reached a vote. It was decided that it will be discussed at future sessions. The ministry of Mr Behzad Nabavi has remained illegal, and maybe in future sessions in 6 months time the law for its establishment will be renewed. It is interesting that a few days ago Behzad Nabavi told Khomeyni's mercenary newspapers: Everything we have is assembly, our chickens are assembly, and our baby chickens are assembly. Dear sirs, our inventor brothers are coming and inventing electric guillotines and they expect us to manufacture these and sell them to the world. After all, this kind of thing was built for the past 200-300 years, who is going to buy them from us.

As if the Islamic Republic had everything else except a Ministry of Heavy Industries, they kept the previous Ministry of Industry, and to 1 minister and 14 deputies they added another minister and 8 deputies. In this way they established the Ministry of Heavy Industries. It was not long before the two ministries began to show aggression. Since the distribution of imported machinery does not benefit from receiving bribes, this was the cause of arguments and rivalry.

We still have not forgotten that in the Ministry of Heavy Industries, which up to now has been unable to build a spanner, never mind a bicycle, they discovered a band receiving bribes and a few of the managers and deputies were arrested. However, the truth of the matter was that the opposition to the Heavy Industry Ministry, who disliked the interference from the newly appointed idiots, revealed the corruption and consequently the fighting and struggle between the

two ministries were in such a state that the supreme industrial council was established. Apparently the duty of this council is to provide coordination between the two ministries. No one knows why in a country where there are no signs of industry or industrial production left, there should be such a need for coordination to make the president the chairman of the supreme industrial council.

The illegal Ministry of Heavy Industry, the renewal of which has not yet been approved, has not had any purpose, except that it began its work with a budget of 150 billion rials. This amount has been used to meet the payment of salaries of the personnel, rental of buildings, and the costs of missions and plans, which prove that the payment of bribes and making gifts to the mullahs of someone else's property have been the major costs of the Heavy Industries Ministry of Khomeyni's republic.

CSO: 4640/536

IRAN

BRIEFS

JIROFT DAM CONSTRUCTION -- Dr Ghafurifard, minister of energy who has traveled to Kerman in order to participate in a seminar studying water and irrigation problems in Kerman, accompanied by Kerman's governor-general, "ojjat ol-Eslam Hassani, the imam's representative in the Reconstruction Crusade and the accompanying delegation went to Jiroft region in order to visit the contruction operation of Jiroft dam. According to IRNA's report, during his inspection tour the minister of energy visited construction operations, earth removal from the riverbed, cutting and tunneling through the mountain, and the construction of the power plant of the dam. In each section the responsible officials and experts gave necessary explanations. It should be noted that the construction operations of this dam--which is located 40 kilometers from the city of Jiroft on the Halil River--were turned over to the Peymab Company, affiliated with the Ministry of Energy in July 1983. At the present time, construction is being completed by the committed experts and workers from the country's hydro-industry establishments and it is predicted that it will go into operation sometimes in 1988. Furthermore, with the operation of this dam, more than 11,000 hectares of land of this region will go under cultivation. And after all the projected turbines go into operation, the dam will produce a total of 30 megawatt of electricity. [Text] [Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 6 Feb 85 p 8] 9597

GOODS DISTRIBUTION SUPERVISION -- For the second day, a two-day seminar of Ministry of Commerce officials, provincial trade directors general, heads of Industrial Affairs Societies, the State Central Guild Council, the governor-general of Gilan, deputy ministers of commerce for Public Necessities Distribution Network and Provincial Affairs and the chief of the State Central Cooperative Organization continued its work in Rasht. According to a report by IRNA, on the second day of the seminar the problems and issues of the State Central Guild Councils were discussed. Officials from the Ministry of Commerce explained to the participants various trade policies adopted in certain areas concerning trade issues. According to the report, the seminar will wind up its work by summing up the work of the four committees including, the supervision of guild affairs system, control and supervision of distribution, prevention of uncontrolled growth of guild unions, and guild problems and issues committee and then it will issue a declaration. [Text] [Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 6 Feb 85 p 8] 9597

TRADE WITH U.S. INCREASING--A traveler arriving at the Tehran airport immediately sees a big black poster on which is printed: "Here, America is unable to do anything at all." This slogan is again seen everywhere in Tehran. Unfortunately it is all too true. The US undertook no effective action after the arrest of the American diplomats or after the assassination of 200 US nationals in Lebanon while the instigator of these crimes did not even trouble to conceal his identity. In December 1983, when bombs exploded in Kuwait under the same circumstances as in Beirut, the Emirate hastened to send conciliation missions to Iran. It knew that no help whatsoever could be expected from the United States. How could it be otherwise? Last February Gerald Salmon disclosed that during 1982 and 1983 American companies had doubled the volume of their trade with Iran , and the volume increased further during the first months of 1984. Salmon correctly noted that in such circumstances the maintenance of the status quo should not be surprising: "We have sold Iran merchandise worth \$120 million and we have bought petroleum from her valued at \$365 million. We cannot decently maintain such close relations with Iran and at the same time ask our Western allies to respect an economic blockade which we are the first to violate." [Text] [Paris MOVEMENT 'IRAN LIBRE' in French 4 Mar 85] 9772

9772

hSO: 4619/42

PAKISTAN

SOLAR ENERGY CENTER PLANNED

Karachi DAWN in English 10 Apr 85 Business Supplement p I

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, April 9: Pakistan will be the first country in the ESCAP (Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific) Region, to have a training and demonstration centre in solar energy, official sources told 'Dawn.'

The centre will be called "Regional Solar Energy Development and Demonstration Centre (RSDC). An ESCAP mission has arrived in Islamabad to finalise the details of the proposed project.

The foreign exchange cost of 434.021 dollars will be borne by ESCAP and Japan whereas the rupee cost will be met by the Pakistan Government against the allocation of Rs. 1.6 billion for new and renewable sources of energy in the Sixth Plan, sources said.

The Directorate-General Energy Resources (DGER), an affiliate of the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources will execute and

operate the centre. The directorate will also have the responsibility for developing all renewable sources of energy through demonstration. The DGER had prepared a ten-year perspective plan (1980-90) for demonstration and development programmes for new and renewable sources of energy.

Site for the training centre is near Swat.

The proposed project activities will consist of permanent institutional facilities necessary for the training in new and renewable sources of energy in Pakistan. The training faculty in renewable energy resources will also be available to engineers in developing countries of ESCAP Region. The Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) is also in contact with Pakistan for enabling Member states to take advantage of the centre.

CSO: 4600/393

PAKISTAN

JI ELECTION LOSSES SAID DUE TO OVERCONFIDENCE

Karachi DAWN in English 10 Apr 85 p 10

[Text]

QUETTA, April 9: Mian Tufail Mohammad, chief of the outlawed Jamaat-i-Islami, here on Tuesday attributed the defeat of his party's two stalwarts, Mr Mahmood Azam Farooqi and Mr Munawwar Hasan from Karachi, in the February NA election to "overconfidence." They had not worked well in their constituencies, he said.

The Jamaat Amir was answering newsmen's queries before leaving for Islamabad on way to Lahore after a two-day stay here.

He said that if the elections had been held on party-basis and system of proportional representation, his party would have captured 40 National Assembly seats.

Mian Tufail, in reply to another

question, said that the Jamaat Majlis-i-Shoora, scheduled to commence from April 18, would decide the course of action for the party's legislators.

He said that the legislators elected on non-party basis should be "restricted to join any of existing political parties of their choice." This he added would help create an atmosphere of having organised political parties enjoying representative character within assemblies.

Mian Tufail urged opposition parties within and without MRD and military government to adopt a moderate attitude to solve country's problems on basis of conciliation.

CSO: 4600/392

PAKISTAN

LEADER CRITICIZES U.S. AMBASSADOR'S REMARKS

GF040644 Karachi DAWN in English 30 Apr 85 p 10

[Excerpt] Faisalabad, 29 Apr--"Pakistan is being economically choked to death through gradual entanglement of U.S. 'aid' and the facade of restoration of democratic institutions is expediently being employed to reduce the country to the level of a satellite state."

These remarks were uttered by Air Marshal (Retd) Asghar Khan, leader of the outlawed Tehrik-i-Istiqlal, while addressing a jampacked gathering of MRD workers here on Monday evening, on the first leg of his Punjab tour.

Mr Asghar Khan arrived in the afternoon from Jhang and went straight away to preside over the meeting.

Strongly criticising the American interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan, Mr Asghar Khan questioned the liberty being taken by Mr Deane Hinton, the American ambassador and asked "What right had he to meddle into the affairs of our country?"

Condemning Martial Law, he said eight years of Martial Law regime had placed the country on the verge of moral, political and economic bankruptcy. The imposition and extension of Martial Law, Mr Asghar Khan said were acting as a slow poison and had benumbed the people's sensibilities and irretrievably crippled their political consciousness and uprooted their moorings.

CSO: 4600/419

PAKISTAN

AMENDMENTS TERMED 'CONSTITUTIONAL ADHOCISM'

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 23 Mar 85 p 4

[Article by Khalid Akhtar]

[Text] There appears to be no end to the amendments in the Constitution. Nobody knows what final constitutional position will emerge. At the moment there is a great deal of confusion. Even for the most optimistic this is hardly a good beginning for the restoration of democratic order.

Two points have emerged from this rapidly changing scenario. In the first place amendments have been or are being made to suit a particular situation. This has confined their utility to a given time and as soon as new realities appear on the scene the provisions are found inadequate and wanting. The recent addition in the Order for the Revival of the 1973 Constitution making the President's consent a pre-requisite for any move to change the amendments in the 1973 Constitution falls under this category. Secondly, the moment-to-moment approach has conveyed the impression that the regime has not done enough homework for the switchover from Martial Law to civilian rule.

Way Out

Unfortunately, the regime is seeking a way out in ad hocism, little realising that this will result in frequent and at times major changes in its stand on basic issues. This explains one amendment superseding another. Simultaneously, this has led the regime to evaluate a given situation in two different perspectives, thus going for diverse solutions. In this respect the rejection of Hamida Khoro's papers and acceptance of others is an identical situation could be quoted as a classic example of the aberrations of ad hocism. While the rejection of Hamida Khoro's papers has left a bitter taste in some quarters it is doubted that the decision has solved any of the regime's problems. What is being forgotten is that constitutional ad hocism is making the transformation of a civilian rule proportionately difficult.

All this has made the job of the Assemblies a lot more testing. The members do not know what precise role they will have to play in the new setup. Much more is now known about the 'sovereign status' of the National Assembly. It was only recently that Hamida Khoro said that MRD made a mistake by not participating in the polls. One wonders whether she still stands by that statement after what has happened.

How will the Assemblies function and fare? Will they be able to command the respect of the masses? What place will they ultimately come to occupy in the new setup? These are some of the vital and crucial questions which still remain unanswered. It has remained the government's strategy to function in suspense. The deeper the suspense the more comfortable and secure the Government seems to feel. It has fought its decisive political battles with the opposition and taken major political decision in this state of affairs. But things have changed now. Political institutions can hardly flourish in a state of suspense. They call for more specific and unambiguous gestures and initiatives. That the success of the Assemblies will largely depend on how the Government reacts to the new situation is least debatable.

While the process of demarcation of authority and division of powers between the various institutions is still on, the National Assembly and the four Provincial Assemblies have already held their first sessions, Mr. Junejo (PML Pagara Group) has been appointed the new Prime Minister. How he controls the house, how assertive he could make it, and finally what kind of rapport he establishes with the President all will have a decisive bearing on future events. Pir Pagara, who won a Senate seat, has emerged as the leader of a major group in the House. For some time he may play the role of a king maker in the Assembly. Of his many prophesies the one that the next government will be formed by the PML has come partly true. But it is interesting to note that he himself does not think very highly of the newly elected Assembly. His pronouncement that the real election will be held by the PML in 1987 is an ample illustration of his lack of faith in the existing arrangement.

Potential Threat

Now there is another way of looking at the situation. The regime could look at the elected Assembly as a potential threat to its authority. It was perhaps this fear that has led to the shackling of the National Assembly by various amendments. Yet despite all these reservations on the part of the regime it is in its own interest that the Assemblies should function properly if the new system has to have a fair trial. Thus the situation is more complex than it otherwise appears on the surface.

That Pakistan is faced with an abnormal constitutional crisis should be openly acknowledged and clearly understood. This sorry state of affairs appears to have emerged from the thinking that the Constitution is not a sacred document and can be altered whenever necessary. This may be partly true under certain circumstances but it is not the whole truth in any case. This situation was remarkably summed up by Mr. Jefferson, the third U.S. President and a great political thinker, who said "We want a government of laws not of men". We have to accept this position if we want to have a constitutional rule.

Some important quarters have voiced the opinion that as the constitutional position settles down President Zia would assume the position of a constitutional figurehead. This opinion runs counter to the facts as they prevail at the moment. With most of the powers vested in the President this can only happen if he surrenders many of them and retains the essential few. But who knows what will happen tomorrow. The ascendancy and supremacy of law has to be gracefully acknowledged one day by all and the sooner it is done the better it would be for all.

PAKISTAN

WITHDRAWAL OF AMENDMENTS DEMANDED

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 23 Mar 85 p 6

[Article by Mohammad Ismail]

[Text] Attock, March 23: The District Bar Association, Attock, in its emergent meeting held here in the local Bar room under the chairmanship of the Bar President, Ahmed Waheed Akhtar, has demanded withdrawal of all the amendments made in the 1973 Constitution during the past seven years and its complete restoration.

The Bar unanimously approved a resolution in which demand was made for the revival of all defunct political parties forthwith. The Bar resolved that an individual cannot change the Constitution.

The Bar further demanded that martial law should be lifted and military courts wound up. They further demanded for the withdrawal of the Ordinance, which banned the political parties.

The Bar asked the members of the National and Provincial Assemblies to take steps for the lifting of martial law.

The Bar demanded early release of all political prisoners and withdrawal of cases registered against them.

Condolence A condolence meeting of the local branch of Halqa-e-Arbabe Zauq was held at the Rana Chambers in which the death of a local poet, Mirza Iqbal Beg Naeem, was condoled.

Primary Results The local F.G. Public High School showed splendid results in the annual primary examination of the Rawalpindi region.

The Principal of the F.G. Public High School, Attock Cantt, has informed The Muslim that 65 out of total 68 students have passed the exam, giving a percentage of 96.

Shahzadai Batool, daughter of Syed Abid Bukhari, Divisional Forest Officer (DFO), Attock Division stood first in the school securing 496 marks out of 600, while Salman Sarwar son of Sheikh Aftab Ahmed MPA and Chairman local MC

and Faiqa Farooq, daughter of a local physician, Dr. Farooq Azam got second and third positions securing 479 and 478 marks respectively.

The Principal hoped that the school students would get at least three scholarships of the region.

He has congratulated the position holders and all the passed boy and girl students, appreciated the efforts of class incharges, and hoped that both the lady teachers shall also do their best for keeping up the standard of education in the coming years.

POF Workers As many as 40,000 workers of the POF's Sanjawal, Wah, Gadwal, Havelian and Samiani (Karachi) were worried following lock-out in their factories and suspension and termination of more than 250 labour leaders and workers. A labour leader of the POF Sanjawal informed The Muslim here that they shall continue their struggle till the acceptance of their demands. For this purpose they were holding peaceful workers rallies at the welfare ground of the local POF.

The POF workers have appealed to the working class of the country to come forward and support them in their struggle against anti-worker steps.

Meanwhile, Ahmed Waheed Akhtar ex-MNA, Senator, President District Bar Association, Attock, Syed Zahid Bukhari, Vice-President of the Bar and Sheikh Mohammad Afzal, advocate, Member Punjab Bar Council have in a joint press statement deplored the lock-out, declared at POF, Wah and its four branches at different places in the country. They further said that the ban on the Workers Association may be lifted and the suspended workers may be reinstated.

The lawyers said that at present when the government controlled media is highlighting the claims of restoration of the Constitution, democracy and establishment of the Assemblies, there was no justification that instead of accepting the demands of the workers, their Association was banned. Meanwhile, the Lawrencepur Woolen and Textile Mills Mazdoor Union has resolved to solve the dispute through mutual negotiations.

CSO: 4600/373

PAKISTAN

JATOI STATES DEMANDS FOR NEW LEGISLATORS

Karachi DAWN in English 10 Apr 85 pp 1, 10

[Text]

KARACHI, April 9: Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, a prominent MRD leader, presented for newly-elected parliamentarians here on Tuesday a 14-point charter of demands which, he insisted, they should fulfil at the earliest opportunity if they were not to betray the confidence reposed in them by the electorate.

The 14 points he enumerated were related, inter alia, to the removal of martial law, restoration of the 1973 Constitution and the rejection of all presidential amendments to the document, restitution of legal and fundamental human rights, revival of political parties and political activities, removal of the ban on student and labour unions, withdrawal of amendments to the Bar Councils Act, revocation of the Press and Publications Ordinance, and payment of compensation to all those who suffered on account of the MRD's Aug. 14, 1983 movement.

Mr. Jatoi, who is also the convenor of the defunct PPP's new central executive, said categorically: "If this charter of demands remains in default, we will be free to demand that fresh elections be held and a new Constituent Assembly formed to frame a new Constitution on the basis of the Pakistan Resolution of 1940."

In a forceful, hour-long speech at the Karachi Press Club's *Meet-the-Press* forum, he said that through "one-man, unilateral and arbitrary" amendments to the Constitution not only had the 1973 Constitution been abrogated, but the nation had also been pushed back

to the position of the 1935 India Act.

"The new Constitution of 1985 totally rejects the parliamentary system of government; it is the worst type of presidential system," he said, adding: "It is a unitary constitution, superimposing One Unit. All this we have rejected before and we reject it again now," Mr. Jatoi declared.

The MRD leader called for the institution of a commission comprising retired judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts to adjudicate on the 1985 Constitution. "We will accept their judgment," he added.

Mr. Jatoi also endorsed the call made by Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani for a high-powered judicial inquiry into "acts of omission and commission" during the tenure of the present regime. "The commission's findings will be an eye-opener to the international community about the harsh sentences, excesses and humiliation perpetrated on the people of Pakistan," he said.

To the newly-elected MNAs and MPAs the MRD leader said: "We have no quarrel with you; we wish you well. Nevertheless, remember, posterity will not forgive you if you fail to come up to the aspirations of the people who elected you."

Mr. Jatoi said that hundreds of political leaders and workers were still languishing in jail, and asked what justification could there be to keep them in bondage now when what was being called "a new era of democratisation" had started.

He made it clear he condemned all acts of alleged terrorism and violence. At the same time, he said military court sentences should not have been carried out and, instead, those accused of terrorism should have been tried in civil courts with provision of the right to defence.

He demanded transfer of all cases from military to civil courts.

Besides, Mr. Jatoi opined, martial law should not remain a minute longer. The National Assembly should begin its budget session in May/June as a sovereign body in an "absolutely unshackled atmosphere" and "reject the President's amendments to the Constitution," he urged.

He defended the MRD's election boycott decision, saying that when the President announced his amendments to the Constitution, even though the electorate had already elected its representatives, "I immediately stood up in prayer to thank God that our (MRD's) stand had been vindicated."

Premiership offers

A correspondent's question about the reported secret meetings he had with the officials led Mr. Jatoi to confirm that on two occasions (in 1980 and before and after the December 1985 referendum and during the MRD's Abbottabad session) he had been offered prime ministership, which he said he had

flatly refused. Mr Jatoi said three serving generals had on these occasions met him and sought his cooperation (over the heads of the defunct PPP and the MRD). He firmly declined to extend any aid to the present regime.

Mr Jatoi called for direct talks with the Karmal regime, his contention being that both the Karmal and Pakistan regimes were "unrepresentative."

He also cautioned Pakistan against getting involved in superpower rivalry, and said that Pakistan's foreign policy should be non-aligned "in a true sense, and not in a hypocritical manner."

Mr Jatoi said the President could not claim to be an elected President on the basis of "an estimated six to seven per cent votes in the referendum." Even if, for argument's sake, the President had an affirmative vote, how could he arrogate to himself the right to amend the 1973 Constitution? Mr Jatoi asked. "The people's vote in the referendum was a rejection not of Islam, but of the present regime," he opined.

CSO: 4600/392

PAKISTAN

PPP LEADER SAYS MRD 'ON THE HORNS OF A DILEMMA'

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 23 Mar 85 p 12

[Article by Maleeha Lodhi]

[Text] London, March 22: "I have no quarrel with members of the new Assemblies inasmuch as they have been elected by the people, but the institution that has come into existence after the election does not have the capability to consolidate the foundations of the state". This was stated by Senior PPP leader and former Law Minister, Abdul Hafeez Pirzada while speaking to 'The Muslim' in London. Although accepting the electoral turnout figures, Mr. Pirzada said that the National and Provincial Assemblies are not democratic bodies since they are controlled by half a dozen elite families. According to him "a dozen elitist families had through the elections become junior partners in sharing power with the military".

Mr. Pirzada strongly disagreed with the argument that in hindsight the MRD's boycott decision had proved to be a political blunder. He gave two reasons for his firmly held views that the decision was "correct". First, that "by staying out the MRD reiterated the principle that political parties representing the people do not legitimise military takeovers", and second the "new constitution has vindicated the MRD's stand."

When asked where the election had left the MRD Mr. Pirzada described the present state of the MRD as being "on the horns of a dilemma" and said that "most of the constituent parties will become redundant". He also forecast that the "PPP will face a serious challenge to its survival because the party elite especially in Punjab and Sind had either directly or indirectly--through surrogates--participated in elections, thereby accepting General Zia's new political order".

In response to a question about what lessons the MRD politicians had drawn from the electoral exercise, Mr. Pirzada said, "there was a complete organisational breakdown in the machinery of the political parties". "The people, he explained, "were with the MRD parties but the parties were in a dilemma and they were unable to take a clear-cut decision in time to mobilise people". He described the dilemma as "the rank looking one way and the file another way" and underlined the inability of the parties to "prevent surrogates from being supported". Mr. Pirzada also said that "without being disparaging about

any party the MRD will be unable to survive in its present form". Asked to elaborate further, he said, "The objectives for which the MRD came into being have been frustrated and now a new struggle has to be launched". When asked whether this meant he will devote more of his energies to a different forum, like the Sind-Baluchistan Committee which was formed in London in 1983 and includes such notables as Attaullah Mengal and Mumtaz Bhutto, he said, "This committee is a cultural not a political organisation, although one of its declared goals in the achievement of right of self-determination of ethnic minorities". While acknowledging that he will be "devoting much time to this organisation", he said he saw his own role as "searching for a new consensus, since today the old consensus has been destroyed and polarisation has become razor sharp". Mr. Pirzada stressed the "need for rethinking and realignment", saying that "this time alliances must be natural and people who agree ideologically must sit together to chalk out future strategy". Expanding on this, he said "now politico-ethnic groups have to realign to Press for the equality of ethnic groups within the umbrella of Pakistan".

Mr. Pirzada dismissed the idea that the groups of PP defectors in the Assemblies could act as a bridge with the APP. According to him, "to expect renegades to provide a bridge is expecting too much, moreover it is tantamount to our compromising our principles". He ruled out the possibility of backchannels developing between the Assembly members and MRD parties and emphasised that "the Assembly members are incapable of playing a bridging role".

When asked to comment on the swift congratulatory response of the Reagan administration to the election, Mr Pirzada replied "This is another Salvador for the Americans".

CSO: 4600/373

PAKISTAN

PAGARA ABSENT FROM INAUGURAL SESSION OF PARLIAMENT

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 24 Mar 85 p 1

[Text] Islamabad, March 23: Pir of Pagara, leader of a faction of the defunct Pakistan Muslim League, surprised political observers by not showing up at the inaugural session of Parliament today. It was strange in view of the fact that not only the President took oath of his office before this session, but also Muhammad Khan Junejo, who Pir Sahib claimed to be his nominee, was administered oath for the Prime Ministership. Pir Pagara intrigued further by not turning up at the dinner hosted by the President in honour of the newly elected members of the parliament. Informed sources claimed that Pir of Pagara was missing because he offended the regime by his boastful approach.

Claiming majority in the House he was not only asking government for his faction of the Muslim League in the Centre but Chief Ministerships in the important provinces of Punjab and Sind also. Interestingly he was demanding these two important positions for his close relatives. He lobbied for Mukhdoomzada Hasan Mahmood, his brother-in-law to be nominated as the Chief Minister of Punjab and desired Sind Chief Ministership for one of his sons.

He is reported to have alienated the government further by fielding Fida Khan, as a contender for the Chairmanship of the Senate against Ghulam Ishaq Khan.

CSO: 4600/373

PAKISTAN

COMMENTARY VIEWS JI STANCE ON MAJOR ISSUES

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 13 Apr 85 p 4

[Commentary by Khalid Akhtar: "Jamaat Stirs Another Controversy"]

[Text]

It is not for the first time that Mian Tufail Mohammad, the Ameer of the Jamaat-i-Islami, has stirred a controversy. He has often taken position on issues which has run counter to the nation's aspirations and thus no wonder in each case it has been the Jamaat itself that has been the worst sufferer. Unfortunately, the Jamaat has learnt nothing from this traumatic experience. On the contrary at a time when the nation is struggling to return to constitutionalism, Mian Tufail has come out with a statement that has again placed the Jamaat at variance with democracy - an embarrassing position for any political party to be in.

Mian Tufail may have certain things in mind while offering or suggesting life presidentship to Gen Ziaul Haq. But whatever may have been Mian Sahib's considerations the fact remains that in doing so he has been guilty of pleading for a highly undemocratic course. (In democracy there is no such thing as life presidentship or life premiership. Instead all these cliches are a legacy of a totalitarian system). A good president or a premier has never needed special legislation to remain in power. (Both Roosevelt and Nehru were elected four times). But there is always a time to bow out and say goodbye. And if this is not done there can be trouble. Soekarno was made President for life, but we all know the fate he met. Above all conferring life presidentship is like

depriving the nation of its right to franchise.

In the early 60s Pir Ali Mohd Rashdi suggested to the late Ayub Khan to establish monarchy in Pakistan. Today Mr. Rashdi will not feel proud of having advocated a system that has been rejected long ago. It is difficult to say with any degree of certainty to what extent the Field Marshal was influenced by his close 'courtiers' in chalking out a political course for himself and the country. It is only wished that the 'courtiers' had counselled the military man wisely. Mian Tufail, being the head of a political organisation, ought to be more cautious in airing his views. Mr. Rashdi had no such compulsions.

IRANIAN REVOLUTION

Invariably somehow the Jamaat has always found itself cut off from the mainstream of the nation's life. At the height of East Pakistan crisis Mian Tufail declared Bengali Muslims as 'Kafirs'. This statement helped none; instead it made matters worse for all. Again when the popular feelings were running high against Yahya Khan the Jamaat Chief termed his constitution as an Islamic one. The Jamaat was later to pay dearly for supporting the minority view against the will of the majority

Equally incomprehensible has been the Jamaat's position on the Gulf War. It has held Iran responsible for the hostilities in the Gulf and blamed Tehran for the continued bloodbath involving the two Muslim States. The Jamaat Chief has not stopped here. In his recent statement he said that the Iranian Revolution was be-

coming increasingly sectarian in character. Mian Tufail is perhaps forgetting the fact that a restricted revolution would have perished long ago.

The bloody war between the two Muslim States is certainly regrettable, but, it is not the only case of its kind. Pakistan is not friendly to the Karmel Regime or vice versa, though both the regimes are manned by Muslims. Then again who is killing whom in Afghanistan? In most cases they are the pro- and anti Karmel Afghans (not only sharing faith but in some instances closely related to each other), who are devouring each other. The Jamaat itself was in the forefront in a most 'violent agitation' against the late Bhutto who was as good or as bad a Muslim as many others in the PNA fold. It will be evident that in each case the 'bond of faith' has proved a fickle one when confronted with the diverse political interests of the parties concerned. It will be asking too much from Pakistan to accept 'Brother Karmel' on the seat of authority in Kabul wearing a Soviet uniform. Iran's apprehensions are equally strong. It cannot afford to give Iraq another chance to destroy it. Moreover the psychology of a revolution is not being fully understood. The Iranian Revolution could not have responded tamely to Iraqi aggression. How the French and the American Revolutions had reacted in similar situation we all know too well. The Iranian Revolution is only following a well-defined course.

Moreover the one sided statements such as the one by Mian Tufail Mohammad will make the Pakistan Government's task of maintaining its neutrality in the Gulf War a bit more difficult.

Already the regime is under tremendous pressure to abandon its principled stand on the issue. The Jamaat Chief's statement could be exploited by interested quarters, both internal and external, and create problems for Pakistan.

JAMAAT'S PLUSES

'Finally if it is not already late it is time for the Jamaat to review its strategy dispassionately and find out why it has frequently found itself at variance with the nation's aspirations and take remedial measures even if it means re-fixing of priorities and re-structuring its organisational set-up. It is significant that since July 5, 1977 things have gone the Jamaat's way. It has been the sole beneficiary of the Martial Law regime. During all this period it has been allowed to function as a party. But when it has gone to people's verdict the Jamaat has found itself isolated. In the recent partyless polls it did not have many gains to boast of. Some of its heavyweights were rather unceremoniously routed. There was a high-level moot at Mansura to find out the causes of the debacle, but it turned out to be a half-hearted exercise.

The Jamaat has many pluses as well. It has an ideology to inspire its cadres. The discipline in its ranks has remained the envy of other political parties in the country. It can play a great role in the nation's affairs if it harmonises its dogmas and policies with the aspirations of the majority of the people. It must realise that a truth which does not meet popular acceptance is not a truth but illusion.

CSO: 4600/393

PAKISTAN

DENIAL OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS DISCUSSED

Karachi DAWN in English 28 Mar 85 p 2

[Text]

LAHORE, March 27: Speakers at a seminar here on Wednesday deplored the suspension of fundamental rights in Pakistan and demanded their restoration forthwith.

In their opinion the imperialist forces were responsible for suspension of basic rights in the Third World and they, as a matter of policy, were supporting the military regimes in such countries to keep the armament factories in operation.

Malik Saeed Hassan, former Judge, Lahore High Court and the incumbent President of the Bar presided the seminar, arranged by the National Council of Civil Liberties, Punjab.

Mr Abid Hassan Minto, a former Lahore Bar President enlisted liberty from the imperialist shackles, economic freedom and riddance from the foreign loans, as the essential factors for restoration of fundamental rights which, he said, were in force for five years following the inception of Pakistan. "We would remain unfamiliar with the civilised life as long as these prerequisites were not met," he asserted.

Mr Minto disclosed that the United Nations High Commission had issued a show-cause notice to the Government of Pakistan to explain

why the people of a particular sect were being discriminated against on the basis of religion. The Government authorities were preparing a defence statement, he added.

According to Mr Minto, the show-cause notice had been issued following a hot debate in the United Nations and serious criticism by the Nigerian representative for discriminatory behaviour of the Pakistani authorities against the said sect.

Former Finance Minister Dr Mubashar Hassan referred to the convention against torture, cruelty and other degrading methods to which Pakistan was also a signatory. He said the Pakistan Government was bound to take measures to eradicate torture from the country as committed in that convention.

Dr Hassan proposed a resolution should be adopted to impress upon the Government to restore fundamental rights and eliminate all the instances of torture from the country.

An international machinery has been set up to monitor the implementation of the United Nations conventions, the former Finance Minister pointed out.

Mr Aitzaz Ahsan, a leader of defunct Tehrik-i-Istaqlal attacked what he called the imperialist forces and held them responsible

for trampling the fundamental rights in the Third World.

He said the objectives of the State machinery today were the same as before the establishment of this country i.e. maintenance of law and order and collection of revenue. In his opinion the dawn of freedom would never be visible, unless the circumstances of August 13, 1947 were changed.

Mr I.A. Rehman, a renowned journalist, gave a number of examples of discrimination against the women in the country although, he said, according to the United Nations Charter of Human Rights, all human beings were equal in dignity and rights.

Mr Rehman said the female flock was in particular deprived of its rights. He said the women were not given remunerations equal to that of men, they were not free to marry according to their will, their evidence was not equally admissible and they were "sold" to foreigners like "slaves."

He suggested that the fundamental rights should be propagated as much as possible for the general information of the commoners so that they could try for their realisation.

Malik Saeed Hassan, Malik Sultan Mehmud and Mr Hamid Khan also addressed the seminar.

CSO: 4600/375

PAKISTAN

TI LEADER CRITICIZES PRIME MINISTER'S MAIDEN SPEECH

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 2 Apr 85 p 8

[Text]

LAHORE, April 1: MRD leaders have described Prime Minister Junejo's first address to the nation as a manifestation of the constitutional limitations on his powers, rendering him unable to offer any concrete solution to the problems he himself had enumerated in his speech.

Mian Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, a leader of the defunct Tehrik-e-Istiqlal, in his statement said that Prime Minister Junejo's speech had confirmed the fears of the Tehrik and the MRD that under the present constitutional scheme, the President and not the Prime Minister is the repository of real power.

He said another reason why Mr. Junejo was in no position to offer concrete solutions to the multifarious problems he himself mentioned in his speech was the absence of political parties as the Prime Minister is devoid of any organised support in Parliament. He is merely a Presidential nominee and does not in the absence of a party system, enjoy the support of the parliamentary wing of any political party. If Mr. Junejo is to wield any real authority and if the Parliament does not wish to become a rubber-stamp body, both the Prime Minister and the parlia-

ment must concentrate their energies on the immediate lifting of martial law, the restoration of fundamental rights and the powers of superior courts as well as the revival of a genuine federal and parliamentary government as envisaged under the unamended 1973 Constitution. This is only possible if the recent amendments in the Constitution announced by the President are withdrawn forthwith.

Khurshid Kasuri further said that the absence of a reference to any definite timetable regarding the removal of martial law is very meaningful. It is impossible to envisage the working of a democratic and responsible government without an independent Press. The absence of any reference to Press freedom in Mr. Junejo's speech is also highly regrettable and cannot be regarded as a mere oversight. By highlighting the present critical state of the economy, as reflected by the absence of even the very basic facilities like drinking water in villages and the crisis proportions that power shortage has assumed in the country, Mr. Junejo's speech amounts to a condemnation of the economic policies of the present government which has been in power for the last eight years.

CSO: 4600/392

PAKISTAN

EXILED BALUCH LEADER INTERVIEWED

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 13 Apr 85 pp 1, 6

[Interview with Ataullah Khan Mengal by Maleeha Lodhi in London; date not given]

[Text]

LONDON, April 12. Ataullah Khan Mengal, who has lived here in exile since 1978, headed Baluchistan's first elected provincial ministry in 1972-73. He spent eight years in jail, first under Ayub Khan and then under Bhutto. He recently emerged from political hibernation to announce the formation of the Sindhi-Baluch-Pashtun Front (SBPF) in London. PPP leaders associated with this Front portrayed Mengal's participation in the Front as signalling his return to mainstream politics, claiming credit for bringing Mengal around to thinking once again in all-Pakistan terms. In an exclusive interview with "THE MUSLIM" in London, (the first he has given to any Pakistani newspaper in years) the Baluch Leader discussed the reasons for the formation of the Front, its aims and objectives and whether his own position had indeed changed at all. He also discussed recent developments in Pakistan, and the country's future and addressed himself to foreign policy issues, especially the American role in Pakistan. Excerpts from the interview:

Q. What stimulated the creation of the Sindhi-Baluch-Pashtun Front (SBPF)? What made you come out of political hibernation to associate yourself with this organisation, especially since you had declared a couple of years back that you

would have nothing to do with Pakistan?

A. It was the need for the achievement of the rights of nationalities. As you know, I was of the view that there is no room for achieving these rights within the framework of Pakistan, which is why I called for an "independent" Baluchistan. But some of my colleagues in Sind and Frontier think that there is a sane element in Punjab which can, at some stage, be in a position to have a say in national matters and accommodate our demands. I have for the time being accepted this proposition which has come from their side. I told them that as far as achieving rights within Pakistan is concerned I had more or less given up hope. But if you want to give it a try I have no objection. However I know the moment they fail they will be left with no alternative but to speak the same language I have been speaking. The basic reason (for the establishment of the front) is to create unity among the three provinces and go for a joint struggle. The outcome depends mostly on those wielding power. However, Punjab cannot stand absolved for the blame (for the present situation).

Q. Your position then has changed from one who believed nothing is possible within the framework of Pakistan to one who wants to at least give it another try?

A. I still believe that the 'sane' elements in Punjab will never get the opportunity to assume power and accept the demands of smaller provinces. But I will be the happiest man on earth if the minority in Punjab who believe in the rights of nationalities prevail on the majority or those in power to grant provinces their rights before any worst case scenario develops.

Q. Can you identify what you

call the 'sane' elements in Punjab?

A. Those claiming to believe in the rights of smaller provinces particularly those claiming to be socialists. They are very few, even less than a microscopic minority. And I don't know whether their belief in the rights of nationalities will last only so long as Pakistan does not transform itself into a socialist economy.

Q. Don't you think that there is a contradiction in that the PPP leaders who have joined the Front belong to a party whose stance on provincial autonomy is fundamentally different from the Front's objectives?

A. As far as I know they have joined in their personal capacities and I think they feel their allegiance to their party is much less than that to their area, which is precisely the reason why they have joined the Front without taking their party or leaders into confidence. This also indicates that they have been unable to change the attitude of the majority of the party which of course comes from Punjab. It is this sense of disappointment which has forced them to openly join this Front. I do agree that there is a contradiction here which will sharpen in the near future.

Q. If you are working on the assumption that there is a 'sane' element in the Punjab, why did you not seek to include such people in the Front? Why start by isolating yourselves from the word 'go'?

A. One reason why the Front so obviously includes only representatives of the three minority ethnic groups is because we would like the 'sane' Punjabi elements to go and speak to Punjabis and convince them that it is high time that the demands of smaller provinces are met. If they do not succeed in convincing those at the helm of affairs,

the fault either lies in their approach or rests with those in power. If we include these saner Punjab elements then there would hardly be any difference between this Front and other political parties in Pakistan also demanding provincial rights. If at all there is any room for accommodation please go and approach those in power.

Q. Suppose for a moment that I happen to agree with the Front's objectives. But under its rules of membership, I as a Punjabi am ineligible to join?

A. Yes, because what I say to you is have your own platform, go to your own people and tell them to accept our demands. The moment you stand here with me they will dub you as my partner and pay as much attention to you as they are paying to me. I want you to create your own lobby and persuade your own people. When we had the NAP and NDP, all those who were with us from Punjab were never in a position to increase their support because they were always dubbed as our partners. We want to minimise difficulties by leaving a lobby open to go and canvass for us in Punjab and tell them that they must listen to us and accept our demands.

Q. Do you plan approaching the MRD to ask them to endorse your stand?

A. The MRD as a whole or constituent parties/individuals will respond either way to our move. Most probably in a negative one. According to our assessment everyone of them will try to convince the Punjab lobby that they are the most patriotic elements in Pakistan. So we've provided them an opportunity to prove their patriotism by condemning us. Throughout our history people have always tried to claim a monopoly over patriotism at the cost of the smaller provinces. Here we are giving them another chance to claim patriotism - and we don't care two hoots!

Q. Can you tell me what precisely the Front's aims are and what practical shape these will take?

A. The demand is for a confederation which can only be established after recognising the 'sovereignty of the states'. You can confederate only after you have the authority to confederate. Previously we used to demand rights within a federation. It's clear that the more time passes the greater the damage to those who play the game of Patriotism.

Q. At one point you talked about an arrangement similar to the UAE (United Arab Emirates) set-up.

A. Yes, that's what it is.

Q. Does the Front envisage seeking foreign help?

A. Not at this stage, because barring me, all my colleagues want to play the game within the framework of Pakistan. I admit that in the past I called for separation. But the question of foreign support does not arise as long as the game is played within the framework of Pakistan. But judging from the response I believe it won't take long for my colleagues to be convinced that what we are asking today has been made impossible for them to achieve without at least preaching the confederation idea outside Pakistan, because they will not even be allowed to preach within the boundaries of Pakistan.

Q. By what you've said so far it sounds to me more a tactical manoeuvre on your part to bring Sindhi and Pashtun leaders around to your position, which in its fundamentals, remains unchanged?

A. You can call it that. But as I said if I am proved wrong I'll be the happiest man on earth because it will shorten my struggle. My demand for separation arose from the realisation that there was no room for adjustment within the framework of Pakistan. But if some body can find me a way within the Pakistan framework which not only gives me back my rights but also ensures that these are not threatened in future, I'll be happy to make adjustments even there. So who's trying to manoeuvre whom? I'm trying to manoeuvre them or they are trying to manoeuvre me? That depends on the results.

Q. Is there any hope of your arriving at a mutually agreeable settlement with Islamabad?

A. In Pakistan even the "Western-style of democracy" is a forgotten term. You cannot have democracy in Pakistan until and unless you fundamentally transform the status quo as happened in Iran. You can have the Junojo-type of democracy or "shoocracy." If you regard that democracy, it's up to you. But you'll never have democracy in the sense of "government by, of and for the people" unless the status quo changes. Iran did stand that jolt because it had a history of 2,500 years, and because it had a sound economy. If that scenario is repeated in Pakistan, it will definitely result in the break-up of the country.

Q. How do you see the recent elections?

A. I don't think these elections can be regarded as elections in the real sense. But the question is how does the regime see these elections? Immediately after the election it comes out with constitutional amendments. The regime was not willing to put these through the democratic process - it could have

got this done. Similarly, it could easily have got the PM elected through the assembly. Likewise, it is the governors who nominate the Chief Ministers. Of course, the question arises, why people went out to vote. Well, people do have their likes and dislikes for candidates in their areas.

Q. But, in their own way, people were reaffirming their commitment to the electoral process?

A. One can't expect people not to be interested in the democratic process.

As far as the elections go, if we give credibility to the members we will be minimising the degree of democracy people want. They can't be expected to be satisfied with the kind of democracy they have been given. And undoubtedly they want democracy.

Q. But do you see anything at all emerging from this process, however tentative or limited it may be?

A. It will accelerate the process of change. One way or another the regime will have to liberalise restrictions. A lot depends on when Martial law is lifted.

Q. Some people see the emergence of a new Baluch middle class and argue that this class has been coopted by the regime? Is there any validity in such an argument?

A. If it were true, that would be news to me.

Q. What about the Government's claims about its development efforts in Baluchistan?

A. There have been a couple of airports and roads built. As far as the new cadre is concerned, I'd be the happiest man if the Government came out with statistics explaining how many locals compared to non-locals have been employed in Baluchistan's administration and services.

Q. Do you link development activity in Baluchistan, to the American role in Pakistan? and do you think Baluchistan fits into America's Gulf Strategy?

A. The traditional concept of bases has now changed. Previously superpowers had open bases like the one at Badaber. Now the concept of bases is that whenever and wherever required, a particular country will provide facilities for the rapid deployment force to land there. Today American forces in the Indian Ocean can reach our area within hours.

Regarding the American role in Pakistan I remember when I was coming here (in 1978), a state Department official was sent to Pakistan by the Carter Administration to assess the situation. He came and met me and I asked him for his assessment. He said 'unfortunately the assessment we've arrived at is not that good; we see no hope for

Pakistan, politically and economically". They had given up on Pakistan. Then, the Afghanistan development took place on the one hand, and on the other hand President Reagan assumed office. In view of the Afghan situation it is in America's interests to keep on aiding Pakistan. Let's not forget that basically Pakistan does not have a sound economy. What money is pumped into Pakistan, evaporates the moment it reaches there - like the petro-dollar-creating no basic industry. There is no political system for which the Americans can be expected to have a liking. It is the need of the Americans. You can call it a 'mutaa' (temporary marriage). There is a 'Mutaa' between Pakistan and America which will end the moment the Afghan problem is over. And you can't expect the Afghan scenario to continue for long because the U.S. and the Soviet Union will come to an understanding on this at some stage, either during or after Reagan's tenure. When this happens Pakistan will lose its utility for the Americans. Then attention will focus on Baluchistan - the gateway to the Gulf.

To ensure that this gateway is not used against their interests they will have to adopt a strategy for future guarantees in an area where their interests could be jeopardised. Then the Americans might start thinking in different terms although it's very difficult for me to categorise these. But things will definitely not remain as they are today, much depending on what happens in Afghanistan and Iran. The decision about Pakistan will be taken in the light of what happens in Iran after Imam Khomeini.

Q. How do you see what is described as a 'hardening' of the Soviet stance towards Pakistan? Do you think Soviet patience over the Afghanistan issue is beginning to run out? And do you think that as a result the Soviets might play what Americans call the 'Baluch card'?

A. The Soviets are hardly happy over the role Pakistan is playing (in the Afghan crisis). When and where the Soviet Union is going to exhaust its patience is a difficult question to answer. Even the Americans don't have a gauge to measure this. But two things can bring matters to a crunch. First,

visible physical presence of American military personnel in Baluchistan could be the breaking point. Second, expansion in supply of sophisticated weapons to the Afghan Mujahideen. These can provoke Soviet retaliation. Let's not forget that the 'Baluch card' can only be used when the Soviet Union decides to do so. And if at all it decides to do so, it will use both cards - Baluch and Pashtun, and they will then use these not as pressure tactics but really mean business. But I doubt if this will happen. According to my assessment, the Soviet Union is sure that Pakistan as a whole will one day fall in its lap - because of its economic conditions, corruption in society and the various political contradictions in the country. Even today the Jamaat-e-Islami thinks ten times before it comes out openly with a statement in favour of the U.S. What more could the Soviet Union want? Why should they indulge in the business of balkanising Pakistan? The danger is that once balkanisation begins, it is outside the control of any power to stop it. Nobody knows where it will end.

Q. What do you think is a viable way out of the Afghan problem?

A. Once this aid to feed refugees stops flowing, then it's not a joke to feed three million people who are armed. If you stop feeding them where will they turn their guns? The Afghan problem can of course be solved if Pakistan starts talking with the Afghans, recognises their government and solves the problem politically. But I don't see a way out of the refugee dilemma.

Q. Is there any possibility of your returning to Pakistan?

A. No, because I am not that optimistic about the response (to our demands). I'll be praying here for those who, after joining this Front, go back to Pakistan.

PAKISTAN

BELGIUM SAID WILLING TO GIVE SOFT TERM LOANS

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 13 Apr 85 pp 1, 8

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, April 12. The Belgium Deputy Prime Minister Jean Gol expressed his country's willingness to balance trade relations with Pakistan.

According to the current trade exchanges, Pakistan imports from Belgium are worth 62 million dollars against 22 million dollars exports.

Addressing a Press conference at the Islamabad airport here today before his departure, the Belgium Deputy Prime Minister said that Belgium would give soft loans to finance Pakistani projects repayable in 30 years with the grace period of 10 years on an interest free basis. The loans will be repaid in shape of Pakistani commodities, he added.

He also announced increasing 100 million Belgium francs to Finance Pakistani projects during 1985-86 in addition to 560 million francs still to be utilised by Pakistan.

Jean Gol said that Belgium

was ready to allocate further soft loans for various other projects. Belgium will also play its positive role in the meeting of aid to Pakistan consortium being held on May 6 and 7.

Belgium is the member of the consortium, he added, Mr. Jean said it was the first ever ministerial level visit of Pakistan since independence of the country and that too at the time when the country was taking historic step toward democracy.

The Deputy Prime Minister also reaffirmed his country's stand on Afghanistan and said that Belgium was one of the few countries who had broken all links and relations with the present Kabul regime.

He said that Belgium fully supported Pakistan's stand on Afghanistan issue like 118 other countries of the world. The five principles laid down by the

European Community provide for the just settlement of the issue. These principles are total withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, return of the refugees to their homeland, Afghan people's right to choose their future, respect for integrity and sovereignty and its return to the status of neutrality and non-alignment.

Regarding three million Afghan refugees in Pakistan the Deputy Prime Minister said that it has caused great economic burden. Belgium has given 2000 tonnes of cereals for the refugees and this may be increased, he added.

He said the visit would enhance, promote and develop Pak-Belgium relations.

Jean Gol said Belgium will help Pakistan to set up gas turbines to overcome the power shortage in Pakistan.

He said that his country had the know-how in the field of energy which can be transferred to Pakistan. He said that parts of the soft loans can be allocated for the energy projects in Pakistan.

Dr. Mahbubul Haq, the Federal Finance Minister, at the occasion said that the visit would open new era of cooperation between the two countries. The energy problem was discussed with the delegation and they had assured all possible help. The assistance given for the projects will be returned in Pak goods to Belgium, he added.

CSO: 4600/393

PAKISTAN

PPP LEADER SAYS ASSEMBLIES ARE POWERLESS

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 2 Apr 85 p 8

[Article by Tariq Butt]

[Text]

RAWALPINDI, April 1 PPP leader Gen. (Retd) Tikka Khan said here today that the newly constituted assemblies were 'powerless' and 'represented a negligible number of electorate from their constituencies'.

Elaborating, Tikka Khan said that though the overall turnout in the February elections was fairly large, each elected member had bagged only a small percentage of the total votes in his area.

Speaking at a reception, first after his release a couple of days ago, Tikka Khan pooh-poohed the Prime Minister's statement that democratic institutions had been restored in the country. He pointed out that veteran politicians were either in jail or not allowed to move freely from one province to another.

Recounting the pre-election parleys between the Government and the MRD, the PPP leader disclosed that the latter succeeded in escaping the 'trap laid by the Government'. Elaborating, he said that in fact the Government wanted that the MRD should accept the validity of the December Referendum, authorise President Ziaul Haq to amend the 1973 Constitution arbitrarily, and contest election on non-party basis. All these demands were not acceptable to the MRD and this was the sole reason for the boycott of the February elections. There was also no commitment by the President

about lifting Martial Law.

Tikka Khan claimed that boycott of the elections by the MRD was "a total success and a right decision". He announced that the successful Assembly members would not be allowed to return to the MRD fold.

The PPP leader said that the voter turnout in the February polls was in fact "a manifestation of the people's dislike of the Martial Law regime". It was due to this that several incumbent Ministers lost.

Tikka Khan challenged the frequent claim of the President that he enjoyed the mandate of the masses to amend the Constitution by virtue of the December Referendum. He said the former Chief Justice of Pakistan, who wrote the famous judgement in the Nusrat Bhutto case, had on a number of occasions declared that President Ziaul Haq was not authorised to amend the Constitution.

Tikka Khan endorsed a recent statement made by Air Marshal (Retd) Noor Khan that there are currently three parties in the country—MRD, National Assembly and Martial Law. He said some person like Noor Khan had been elected to the assemblies on their personal merit.

Others who spoke on the occasion were Aftab Mughal, Kabir Ali Wasti, Mian Munzoor Shaheen, Sajid Kaleem, Sh. Liaqat, Suhail Mehdi and Begum Nusrat Rashid. The reception was organised by local MRD Convener, Masoodul Hassan, in the Kohati Bazar.

CSO: 4600/392

PAKISTAN

OFFSHORE OIL EXPLORATION PLANNED

Karachi DAWN in English 28 Mar 85 p 8

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, March 27: Exploration of the first offshore oil and gas well, some 160 kilometres south of Karachi, will begin in October this year, it was reliably learnt here on Wednesday.

The 30.3 million dollars Canadian assistance for which the agreement was signed this afternoon will enable the Oil and Gas Development Corporation (OGDC) and the Canadian Oil Companies to drill at least two exploratory offshore wells.

The Pakistan-Canada cooperative project includes drilling of 3500-meter exploratory offshore well, some technical assistance and possible seismic programme for delineating new structures.

A number of promising drillable structures have been delineated as a result of previous seismic surveys in offshore areas.

Chairman of Petro-Canada International Assistance Corporation (PCIAC) Peter Towe and Chairman Oil and Gas Development Corporation Zaka Malik signed the agreement on behalf of their respective organisations, while Mr F.I. Malik, Joint Secretary, Economic Affairs Division signed the agreement on

behalf of the Government of Pakistan.

The PCIAC chairman who arrived here on Monday held extensive negotiations with the Pakistani officials before concluding the agreement.

Mr Peter Towe later told a news conference that the project in Pakistan will be the largest to be undertaken. It represents half of PCIAC's current year budget.

He said the finalisation of the project took long period, changes in the Canadian Government last year which necessitated the review of aid programmes and institutional arrangements delayed the process considerably.

"We are hopeful private sector will be interested in working with OGDC and will be helpful in enhancing OGDC's bargaining position in terms of negotiations with potential private sector exploration companies," he remarked.

The agreement also provides additional training facilities to OGDC experts in Canada as well as in Pakistan. The Canadian loan is interest-free and its maturity period will be 50 years with 10 years grace period.

CSO: 4600/375

PAKISTAN

LAWYERS ORGANIZE PROTEST AGAINST AMENDMENTS

Karachi DAWN in English 28 Mar 85 p 2

[Text]

LAHORE, March 27; A black flag was hoisted by the Lahore High Court Bar Association at the bar building on Wednesday and all the lawyers wore black arm-bands in protest against the recent amendments to the 1973 constitution.

A meeting was held in the Kiyani Hall under the chairmanship of president of the High Court Bar Association, Lahore.

The meeting was addressed by Mr. Mohammad Akram Sheikh, Vice-Chairman, Punjab Bar Council; Mr. Aitzaz Ahsan and Ch. Mohammad Ashraf, members of the Pakistan Bar Council, and Mr. Hakam Qureshi and Mr. Hamid Khan, members of the Punjab Bar Council, and Mr. Saeed Akhtar, Secretary of the High Court Bar Association, Lahore, among others.

Malik Saeed Hassan in his speech said the lawyers were unanimous in their views that the present regime had no right to promulgate laws, curtailing the autonomy and jurisdiction of the established democratic institutions.

Mr. Aitzaz Ahsan in his address condemned all constitutional amendments, as well as amendments to the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act.

He demanded immediate lifting of the Martial Law, restoration of the 1973 Constitution, political parties, abrogation of Press and Publications Ordinance, reinstatement of 10 journalists whose services were terminated in 1983 from NPT newspapers.

He also demanded the release of all political workers, leaders and

others who were sentenced by military courts, and reiterated that lawyers would continue their struggle till the realisation of their goal of restoration of democracy.

Mr. Mohammad Akram Sheikh pledged to continue the lawyers struggle.

In the country the Bar Associations today hoisted black flags over their buildings according to a Press release of the Bar Council, in protest against all amendments made to the Constitution after July 5, 1977. At their respective meetings, for the Bar Associations also called for withdrawal of the amendments brought about recently in the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act 1973.

According to reports, the lawyers' protest meeting were held at Multan, Sahiwal, Sialkot, Gujranwala, Gujrat, Faisalabad, Rawalpindi, Islamabad, Bahawalpur, Liaquatpur, Rahimyar Khan, Rajanpur, D.G. Khan, D.I. Khan, Sukkur, Hyderabad, Karachi, Abbottabad, Mardan, Quetta and all other places where the Bar Associations have their offices.

The Punjab Bar Council is hosting an all-Pakistan Bar Councils convention on March 29 in the Kiyani Hall wherein all members of the Bar Councils in the country are expected to participate.

Mr. Qadir Bakhsh Bhutto, Vice-Chairman of Sind Bar Council, would reach Lahore tomorrow to attend this convention. Many of the members of Pakistan Bar Council have arrived here for attending the convention.

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